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Abstract
This thesis examines the strategy employed by the Catalan nationalist movement 
in the late 1980s and 1990s to secure a greater role for sub-national authorities in 
the process of European integration. It includes an analysis of the relationship of 
the Generalitat, the government of the Spanish autonomous community of 
Catalonia, and particularly, Convergencia i Unio, the centre-right Catalan party in 
power since 1980, with the various actors and institutions central to the process of 
European integration. Thus, the Catalan nationalist movement has pursued a dual 
strategy to consolidate its participation in the process of European integration 
based on the one hand on a co-operative regionalist strategy and on the other, a 
bilateral nationalist strategy. A close examination of this dual strategy would 
suggest that there is a clear disenchantment among Catalan nationalists with the 
concept of "Europe of the Regions" and with the EU-wide efforts in the 1990s to 
secure a greater role for sub-national authorities.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Chapter Summary
Introduction
This thesis examines the strategy employed by the Catalan nationalist movement 
to secure a greater role for itself and other sub-national authorities in the process 
of European integration. It includes an analysis of the relationship of the 
Generalitat, the government of the Spanish autonomous community of Catalonia, 
and particularly, Convergencia i Unio, the centre-right Catalan party in power 
since 1980, with the various actors and institutions central to the process of 
European integration. The purpose of this thesis is to generate a deeper 
understanding of the changing role of sub-national authorities within the process 
of European integration by presenting the case study of Catalonia. The 
motivations behind these efforts vary and this thesis will argue that the Catalan 
nationalist movement has developed its own unique strategy to fulfil a series of 
objectives: a) to enhance its own influence in the EU decision-making process 
both at the domestic and European levels; b) to secure a greater role for sub- 
national authorities in EU institutions; c) to encourage a non-territorial form of 
international recognition of Catalonia as a state-less nation; and d) to push 
forward a transformation of the structure and functions of the state.
The primary process under scrutiny in this thesis will be the regionalisation of 
Europe and the emergence of a European polity characterised by a hybrid of 
relationships across various tiers of governance. The thesis would elucidate one 
salient but not universal feature of this process - the role played by nationalist 
movements. Within the historical, cultural, and political background of its hard- 
won autonomous status at the domestic level, Catalonia seeks to exert an 
independent influence on policy making in the EU and by extension this 
contributes to the continued process of regionalisation within the EU.
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The thesis is expected to be valuable to any reader interested in the regionalisation 
of European politics and the particular case of Catalonia, as well as the evolution 
of the nationalist movement in Catalonia. The Catalan case is significant in the 
sense that the reader will be able to gain a greater understanding of one aspect of 
the complex process of European integration. The thesis will question pre­
conceived notions about the role of sub-national authorities in the process of 
European integration. By presenting an analysis of the Catalan case, the thesis 
will shed light on the relevance of the Catalan case to the regional question in 
Europe and specifically, that of devolution. Devolution has become a more public 
issue in the late 1990s with, for example, possible constitutional reform in Britain 
and the creation of a Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly. Furthermore, as 
the process of European integration deepens and increasingly affects citizens’ day 
to day lives, the Catalan case could prove to be a model followed by other 
European regions or sub-national authorities. Its high degree of self-government 
and its unique strategy in dealing with EU matters have set a precedent for 
nationalist movements attempting to cope with the Europeanisation of politics and 
policy-making.
Questions and hypotheses to be addressed
The traditional concept of the nation-state within the European Union is being 
challenged at present by two forces, one emerging from the ashes of the Second 
World War to ensure continued peace as well as economic reconstruction and 
political unity in Europe, that of ‘Europeanism’. The other force appears in the 
form of historical movements that in some areas of Europe refuse to die, 
nationalism and regionalism. The concept of the nation-state has changed since 
the Second World War. Its traditional description no longer fulfils modem day 
functions and requirements, such as a greater reliance on regional defence 
alliances such as NATO, this area traditionally being a prerogative of the nation­
state. Greater economic interdependency has also radically shifted importance 
away from the territorial dimension of the state. More emphasis has been placed 
on the role of the regions within the EU, in part because of the administrative and 
political decentralised arrangements in federal and quasi-federal member states
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such as Belgium, Germany, Austria and Spain. In light of increased co-operation 
between the EU and the sub-national authorities, will this association result in the 
undoing of the structure and function of the nation-state as it has been 
traditionally viewed? How will regions with high degrees of autonomy and self- 
government within their own states be able to influence the EU decision-making 
process faced by resistance to the devolution or transfer of policy-making powers 
to any institution which does not directly represent the state? How will moderate 
nationalist ideology reconcile its own nation-forming objectives with a shift 
towards adopting federalist institutional arrangements and practices in a 
supranational political system? Are these two objectives compatible or will they 
inevitably conflict? And in legal and constitutional terms, why is it that the 
implementation of EU legislation on member-states has a relatively clear set of 
procedures and the same process is so lacking for sub-national authorities?
These questions have a special significance for Spain as the process of European 
integration coincides with the creation and evolution over the last two decades of 
the State of Autonomies, a radically different model from the one that has 
prevailed in Spain since the eighteenth century. Spain, more so than any other 
member-state of the EU, has been experiencing a change both in its internal 
political structure and in its exterior political outlook, ending nearly four decades 
of political and cultural marginalisation from the rest of Europe. Although the 
strength and nature of regionalism vary within the member-states of the EU, an 
analysis of the Catalan case within Spain and the EU framework will provide a 
strong example of the changing role of the regions and other sub-national 
authorities within the emerging European political system. This role will likely 
increase in the future, as sub-national units have grown faster than the state at the 
central level (Sharpe, 1988).
By examining the parallel relationships between the Catalan and Spanish 
governments on the one hand and the Catalan government and the EU on the other 
hand, I propose to use this level of analysis to explain the ongoing development of 
a process of institutional and political legitimisation for the European Union and 
Catalonia. This process is fundamentally transforming traditional interpretations 
of the nation-state. By engaging in competitive relationships based on the pursuit
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of political and economic benefits within the state, both Catalonia and the EU 
hope to be able to continue with the analogous processes of state building (in the 
case of the EU) and nation formation (in the case of Catalonia). The thesis will 
attempt to describe both relationships and the strategy employed by the 
nationalist-led Generalitat to strengthen the Catalan position in constitutional, 
political and institutional terms. By using both the comparative approach on the 
institutional level and the cultural pluralist approach to explain the nationalist 
motivations, I hope to be able to explain the increasing role of the regions within 
the EU by using the Catalan case.
Chapter Summary
Although this thesis attempts to stay away from a purely theoretical argument 
within which the case study has been laid out, the nature of the subject requires a 
more detailed analysis of the definitions used throughout. In Chapter 2, concepts 
such as nation, state, identity, and nationalism will be examined in the context of 
the Catalan case. A more precise definition of the terminology employed 
throughout the thesis as well as an overview of the theoretical frameworks used 
will be the focus of Chapter 2. Faced with an intense process of European 
integration, traditional concepts of state and nation have begun to change 
functionally. Throughout its brief history, the EU has divided up its spheres of 
influence into functions, rather than into territories. Following the creation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community after the Second World War, the process of 
European integration was characterized by the promotion of the differentialization 
of functions, the first instance of this being the area of coal and steel. Within this 
paradigm, sovereignty is divisible not by territory, but by function. Inevitably, the 
role of the state enters into another dimension, wherein it no longer exercises 
exclusive control in the classic Weberian sense over such traditionally sovereign 
areas as territory, society, government, and foreign affairs or retains a monopoly 
on violence or coercion1. The proliferation of federalism and regionalism 
throughout Europe and increased global economic interdependence since the 
Second World War suggest that the state is losing its control over events and
1 See Weber, M. (1946) and Tilly, C. (1978).
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policy areas of which traditionally it was able to control. The dual processes of 
European integration and regionalism have contributed to the tendency within 
both the EU and Spain to allocate or distribute competencies, rather than 
sovereignty. The state is therefore no longer a single agent, but rather divided up 
into units which determine its behaviour vis a vis other actors. The state is forced 
to deal with a reality in which other actors (regions and supranational 
arrangements) penetrate its territory and reduce its autonomy. In this process, 
“sovereignty is devolved but not divided. The subdivisions of the state are 
reconstructed rather than the state itself’2. Regardless of the analytic approach 
taken to the terminology, on the surface, the notion of state has changed owing to 
both functional and cultural requirements. These requirements are closely related 
to the evolution of nationalist movements in the twentieth century. In the Catalan 
case, this relationship is even more relevant since it is based, in most cases, on the 
assumption of the separation of nation and state without the objective of state- 
creation for each nation.
Although Chapter 2 will analyse the concepts and assumptions used throughout 
the thesis in more depth, the process of transformation of the state within both the 
European and member state’s context is important as this will prove to be the 
primary assumption used in the arguments. In the level of analysis I propose to 
use comparing the two relationships described above, I will analyse the existing 
institutional and political balance between the various variables, i.e. the 
Generalitat (at the sub-national level), the Spanish government (at the state level) 
and the EU (at the supranational level). Thus, the importance of the discussion 
lies in the description of this particular balance rather than the identification of the 
specific powers or functions of the nation state.
The cultural pluralist argument used will attempt to define the Spanish state as a 
plurinational state in which cultural groups or societies have been territorially 
assimilated over time. These groups wish to remain culturally distinct societies 
while simultaneously participating in the state’s cultural and political processes in 
order to reinforce principles of the recognition of historical rights and privileges,
2
Hebbert, M. (1987) “Regionalism: a reform concept and its application to Spain,” Government
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reaffirmation of cultural differences and the reinforcement of distinct core values 
which make up the nationalist movement. Within the state, minority groups 
attempt to secure their participation in the prevalent political process to obtain 
greater political and economic influence, thus securing their survival and 
objectives. Core values such as symbols (national anthems, flags, music, 
literature, the celebration of public holidays), language and a clear definition of 
national identity contribute to the consolidation of the nationalist movement. 
Despite the implicit recognition and the validity of such concepts as citizenship, 
demos, and ethnicity, the thesis will attempt to focus on other concepts such as to 
retain certain simplicity to the argument.
Chapters 3 and 5 will detail the history of the Catalan nationalist movement and 
its views on Catalonia’s role within Europe. Chapters 3 will place the present day 
Catalan nationalist movement in its historical context tracing its political origins 
back to the nineteenth century at which time many of the movement's present 
political strategies began to take root. The historical framework of the Catalan 
nationalist movement has been outlined extensively to provide a more accurate 
description and explanation for its present nature and overall objectives. Similarly, 
Chapter 5 intends to describe the concept of Europe as employed in Catalan 
nationalist discourse thereby refuting the frequently held assumption of a 
generalised consensus among Catalan political parties on the role of Catalonia in 
Europe. Inevitably, the focus will be CiU as it has dominated the Catalan 
nationalist movement since the late 1970s. Its ideology is based upon a pro- 
European outlook, a re-definition of Catalan identity, and promotion of Catalan 
interests in EU matters. Its position as one of the leading nationalist parties both 
within Spain and the European Union requires a closer scrutiny as a party which 
has managed to channel traditional regionalist and nationalist demands both at the 
Spanish and European levels. In recent years, numerous regionalist and 
nationalist parties throughout Europe have transcended the domestic level in their 
attempts to secure increasing political power both at the domestic and EU levels. 
This has led to the emergence of a distinct pro-European tendency, particularly the 
principal nationalist and regionalist parties in Spain, Belgium, Germany, and more
and Policy. 5 (3), p.242.
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recently the United Kingdom. The motivations for this pro-Europeanism vary 
from a growing realisation that regional development is inevitably linked to EU 
development or that the discovery of a new political arena within which 
nationalist objectives can be pursued. Thus, these parties have re-evaluated their 
party goals and have as result become more Europeanised. Nevertheless, as 
Chapter 5 will evaluate, Catalan political parties, both nationalist and non­
nationalist, have increasingly become more divided over Catalonia’s true role in 
the process of European integration. Rather than questioning the merits of 
European integration itself, they have raised doubts over the extent to which 
Catalonia and other sub-national authorities can secure an important role in the 
EU decision-making process faced with member-state resistance.
However, the process of European integration encourages the idea of 
fragmentation of power and greater attempts have been made to decentralise state 
power. Regionalism and Europeanism both challenge the present concept of the 
nation-state. These processes do not necessarily challenge the actual definition of 
the concept of the state, but the framework of laws, functions and powers that 
constitute it. Thus, nationalist parties such as CiU in Catalonia and the PNV in 
the Basque country “regard the consolidation of the European Union as the most 
desirable scenario where the powers of central governments and the very idea of 
the nation-state would be in retreat”4. As a result, these parties have continued 
developing their pro-European disposition in their attempts to secure a greater role 
for sub-national authorities within the EU policy process. These objectives are 
based on the notion that “nations” like Catalonia can contribute both to the 
plurinational character of Spain and to the European Union5. These objectives 
have been set out despite the apparent contradiction between refusing to adopt a 
completely pro-federalist position within Spain itself for fear of a perceived loss 
of identity and the construction of a ‘Europe of the Regions’6. The development
In this context, the term “Europeanism”, refers to all that which is pro-integration and 
convergence.
4 Moreno, L. “Multiple Ethnoterritorial Concurrence in Spain,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics. 
Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 25.
5 Based on a speech given by Jordi Pujol, President of Catalonia, titled “States, Regions and 
Transnational Organizations,” at the London School of Economics, 6 November, 1997.
6 Walker, D. “Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya: Its Successes and Its Problems,”
Regional Politics & Policy (now, Regional & Federal Studies). Vol. 1, No. 3, Spring 1991, p. 300.
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of the pro-European element of nationalist ideology will be traced in Chapter 3 
and the argument will be developed further in Chapter 5.
Chapter 3 will trace the background of the Catalan nationalist movement and is 
based on the assumption that the crystallization of the nationalist movement since 
the 1970s is a direct result of: 1) the moderate nature of its nationalist ideology 
which has allowed it to attract broad based support cutting across traditional class 
and ethnic cleavages; and 2) a reaction against the ‘overcentralised’ structure of 
the Franco regime, an approach based upon a “cause-effect model, which 
explains....insurgencies as a direct response to state repression”7. The moderate 
nature of the nationalist movement is based on a pragmatic approach that rejects 
secessionist aspirations, embracing a centrist political orientation and an 
inclusivist notion of Catalan identity. The evolution of the movement is based 
upon a variety of socio-cultural triggers implying a “consciousness of difference 
from the majority culture that goes beyond mere localized variation and involves a 
difference in language, religion or ethnicity, or all three”8. This ideology 
encompasses a traditional view held by Catalan nationalists of their responsibility 
to modernise the Spanish state, both in economic and political terms. This sense 
of duty or responsibility in Catalan nationalist ideology establishes an inextricable 
link between the notion of ‘being modem’ and ‘being Catalan’9. Thus, full 
participation in the Spanish political process is motivated, among other factors, by 
a desire to contribute to Spain's continued integration within Europe, Spain’s 
consolidation as an open democratic regime and to persist with a policy of co­
operation with other regions in Spain. Despite frequent publicly manifested 
defences of the so-called core values of Catalan nationalism and identity such as 
language, culture, and history, the Catalan nationalist movement has managed to 
integrate itself into both the Spanish and EU political processes. It has done so 
without being alienated from either process or advocating violence. Its rhetoric 
denounces the Spanish state for wanting to dilute the claims of Spain's 'historic 
nationalities' (Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country) and homogenise Spain's
7
Conversi, D. “Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as Boundary 
Maintenance and Creation,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics. Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 76.
g
Sharpe, L.J. (1993) “The European Meso: An Appraisal,” in The Rise of Meso Government in 
Europe, Ed. by L.J. Sharpe, London: SAGE Publications, p.7.
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decentralised political system. In practice however, CiU has embraced a strategy 
of full participation in the Spanish political process, a far cry from the ‘all or 
nothing’ strategy engaged in by other less moderate nationalist movements.
Catalan nationalists see themselves as a nation without a state, pertaining to the 
Spanish state but without any secessionist ambitions. This moderate nationalism 
arises from a rejection of the traditional view that nationalist movements seek the 
creation of new nation states (Tamir, 1993). It also confirms a more pragmatic 
approach based on demands for the creation of political institutions in which a 
high degree of autonomy and self-government is exercised. In other words, the 
underlying principle of much of the Catalan nationalist movement is the 
acknowledgement that not all nations seek to establish a state and the realisation 
that this objective is not always attainable. Thus, this new class of nationalism is 
based on the defence of identity, language and culture, core values that distinguish 
the nation and the movement from others. However, it also seeks the separation 
of the nation from the state through both full participation in the domestic political 
process and recognition in the institutions of the European Union. This is 
achieved through the consolidation of new forms of institutional and political 
arrangements within a dynamic of competitive relationships among all groups 
involved.
CiU will be the primary focus of analysis in examining how the nationalist 
movement has succeeded in acquiring broad-based support across Catalonia and 
political leverage at the state level. Nevertheless, Chapter 5 will analyse how 
Catalan political parties (both nationalist and non-nationalist) employ varying 
approaches to both Catalan nationalism and its role in the process of European 
integration. One example of these differing approaches is the interpretation of the 
concept of autonomy. Whereas CiU has defined autonomy as “the vehicle to 
preserve and build Catalan culture and society against Castilian dominance,” the 
regional wings of such statewide parties as PSOE and PP have demanded that 
Catalan nationalism “must remain open to the multicultural diversity of the 
region,” in an attempt to secure the support of those sections of Catalan society,
9 Pi, R. (ed.) (1996) Jordi Pujol: Cataluna-Espana, Madrid: Editorial Espasa Calpe, p. 112.
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i.e. immigrants from other areas of Spain and segments of the working class, 
which have traditionally felt threatened by the nationalist movement10. Thus, 
Chapter 5’s focus will be on the varying approaches towards the role of Catalonia 
in the process of European integration.
In Chapters 4, 6 and 7, the relationships between the Generalitat and Spanish 
government on the one hand and the Generalitat and the EU on the other hand are 
analysed. The underlying theme however, will be a detailed examination of the 
EU strategy embraced by Convergencia i Unio (CiU) through its presidency of the 
Generalitat over nearly two decades. A variety of approaches will be employed 
to analyse the development of this strategy including both institutional and legal- 
constitutional perspectives. Thus, Chapters 4, 6 and 7, present a picture of 
institutional arrangements and relationships of power among the three levels of 
government as they coexist under the present legal and constitutional frameworks. 
They also include the institutional/decision-making arrangements designed to 
accommodate these relationships.
Chapter 4 is intended to generate a greater understanding of the evolution and 
state of the Spanish constitutional framework. It examines the complexities of the 
relationship between the Catalan and Spanish governments within a constitutional 
framework which has granted the Spanish autonomous communities varying 
levels of autonomy. Spain’s transformation from a unitary state to its present 
State of Autonomies has often been written about as an example in which centre- 
periphery relations and issues of ethnic conflict and identity have been addressed. 
These conflicts are gradually being resolved within a framework which allows for 
a high degree of regional autonomy in legislative, administrative, and economic 
affairs. Gradually, the State of Autonomies has become a structure in which 
historical sub-cultures and political sub-units have been accommodated. Chapter 
4 will also contribute to one of the underlying premises set out in this thesis: the 
fundamental transformation of the state. Accordingly, the chapter will illustrate 
how the establishment of the State of Autonomies in Spain and the ensuing
10 Johnston, H. (1991). Tales ofNationalism: Catalonia. 1939-1979. New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, p. 201.
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devolution process has led to widespread confusion by the Spanish political class 
of the notion of state.
The evolution of constitutional arrangements in Spain and the development of 
Catalan autonomy following the death of Franco in 1975 will be traced in this 
chapter. This chapter will attempt to paint a picture of Catalonia's11 position 
within the Spanish political process, both at an institutional and political level, as 
it relates to the Catalan nationalist movement's European strategy. This position 
has often been described as exercising disproportionate influence: the “Basque 
provinces with only about 6% of the population and legislative representation, and 
Catalonia with about 15% of the population and 14% of the representation, 
exercise far greater weight politically in terms of strength, decentralization and 
regionalisation, not only because of their historic ethnic subnationalism, but with 
the political weight that corresponds to their relative weight”12. Special emphasis 
will be placed on the conflictive relationship between the Generalitat and Spanish 
government that has characterised the process of devolution and the consolidation 
of Catalan autonomy. Catalan nationalists argue that the Spanish central 
government is engaged in a process of homogenising devolution within the 
Spanish state. In general however, the devolution of powers and functions to the 
regional governments by the central government has continued to evolve on an 
asymmetrical level. Critics have warned of greater tensions in centre-periphery 
relations13, the threat of instability to Spain’s constitutional framework14, and the 
crisis of Spanish ‘stateness’ which has only been contained through efforts by the 
Spanish government to delay the process of devolution throughout the period of 
democratic transition and consolidation15.
11 Along with the Basque Country, also led by a nationalist party, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco.
12 Agranoff, R. “Inter-governmental Politics and Policy: Building Federal Arrangements in 
Spain,” Regional Politics & Policy (now Regional & Federal Studies), Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer 
1993, p. 13.
13 Agranoff, R (1993).
14 Peces-Barba, Gregorio. Based on a speech given at the London School of Economics, October 
23, 1997.
15 Linz, J. & Stepan, A. (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Baltimore: 
The John Hopkins University Press, p. 106.
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Chapters 4 and 6 focus on the specific legal-institutional arrangements of both the 
Spanish state and the EU to accommodate the participation of sub-national 
authorities. Chapter 4 avoids pointing to the direction that Spain’s process of 
regional devolution has taken since the mid 1970s but will conclude with an 
outline of some of the issues that remain contentious in the consolidation of 
Spain’s political, institutional and territorial framework within the devolution 
process. These issues concern demands that remain unresolved by Catalonia (as 
well as the Basque Country) for: a) greater levels of fiscal autonomy; b) a clearer 
distribution of administrative arrangements; c) the transformation of the Senate as 
a forum in which regional and nationalist issues are discussed; d) continued 
commitment on behalf of the central government to the recognition of Spain as a 
plurinational state; e) widespread recognition of Catalonia’s hecho diferencial16. 
The dynamics of the problems facing both levels of government in their 
relationship at the domestic level are crucial in the understanding of the 
comparative elements generated by an analysis of both relationships (Spanish 
government/Generalitat and 'EM I Generalitat). Whatever the conclusions in this 
aspect, the main objective of Chapter 4 is to establish that the unique legal, 
political and constitutional arrangements of the Spanish state have allowed for the 
replication of a traditional political system but at the sub-national level. In other 
words, the 1978 Constitution provided for a political system at the central or state 
level composed of legislative, judicial and executive powers and institutions. This 
structure is replicated at the sub-national level with the autonomous communities 
retaining a political system with a similar institutional arrangement. In addition, 
the assymetrical and decentralised constitutional arrangements have reinforced 
rather than weakened the unity of the Spanish state.
Chapters 6 and 7 will focus on the evolution of the Generalitat's efforts to assert 
its role, as well as the role of other Spanish and European sub-national authorities, 
in the EU decision-making process. The efforts described will include: 1) Catalan 
participation in the Committee of the Regions; 2) the establishment of a Catalan 
regional office in Brussels; 3) transregional initiatives wherein Catalonia has 
participated to foster greater co-operation among the regions of Europe; and 4) the
16 Hecho diferencial is the recognition that the ‘historic nationalities’ of Catalonia, the Basque
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push towards a ‘direct route’ to secure active sub-national participation in EU 
institutions. The purpose of the establishment of the Committee of the Regions in 
November 1993 by the Treaty on European Union was seen by many as 
contributing to the strengthening of the role of the regions in the EU policy­
making process. Its creation provided a solid defence of the subsidiarity principle, 
based on the notion that policy-making and other decisions faced by EU 
legislators should be taken at the lowest level of authority in order to ensure that 
these policies and decisions are carried out effectively. Despite the widening of 
powers through the draft Treaty of Amsterdam and the impressive amount of 
opinions generated by the Committee of the Regions (CoR) since its creation, it 
has been difficult to assess its long-term impact on the EU policy-making process. 
Nevertheless, this chapter includes a brief description of the successes and failures 
of the Committee of the Regions avoiding predictions on the future of the CoR or 
on the proposed ‘Third Level’ of government. This description will merely serve 
as background information to generate a clearer picture of the bilateral 
relationship between the Generalitat and the EU by presenting the Committee of 
the Regions as one of the crucial institutional forums wherein this relationship is 
based.
In order to place the Catalan strategy into context, a comparative element will be 
introduced with the German Lander and their efforts to participate in EU matters. 
Chapter 6 contains a brief section with a comparative analysis between Spain and 
Germany of the modem constitutional and political arrangements for sub-national 
authorities to both participate at the European level and involve themselves within 
their own states in European matters. The aim will be to cast light on the potential 
and limitations of specific constitutional arrangements for the Spanish 
autonomous communities by drawing comparisons with the empirical case of the 
German Lander. Although the comparative analysis will demonstrate some of the 
differences between the two cases, it is because of these differences that extensive 
research is needed into the varying provisions for sub-national authorities within 
both the EU and its member-states in form and in function.
Country and Galicia are to be differentiated by right and not privilege.
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Although the Catalan nationalist movement’s pro-European outlook will have 
been analysed in Chapter 5, the actual success of its policy and institutional 
objectives is examined in Chapters 6 and 7. The ideological contradictions of the 
concept of the ‘Europe of the Regions’ adopted by CiU as a key theme of its 
overall EU strategy are analysed in Chapter 7. References to a 'Europe of the 
Regions' are confusing both in political discourse and academic literature. As a 
political concept in nationalist discourse, it is ambiguous and abstract. The 
interpretation employed here is a Europe of the Regions as the struggle by sub­
national entities to radically transform the political organisation of the state. Still, 
this remains very normative and vague. It is of a 'Europe with the Regions' 
(Borras, Christiansen and Rodriguez-Pose, 1994) rather than 'of the regions' that 
we are hearing. Many are sceptical of a true Europe of the Regions (Amin and 
Tomaney, 1995). Is it a federal concept, as the Lander would see it? Germany 
has been cited as a model for the Europe of the Regions. But Germany is a 
federal state. When nationalists refer to this concept, do they mean the 
federalisation of Europe? Does it mean the by-passing of the nation-state with the 
emergence of a European super-state? The assumption here is that the nation­
state is not being abandoned; it is merely being reformed. Again, the question of 
whether this pro-European outlook is merely a convenient way towards securing 
more influence in all policy areas except controversial areas such as defence and 
foreign policy, bypassing Madrid and placing Brussels in a scapegoat position17, 
is addressed in this chapter.
Thus, both Chapters 6 and 7 will address the apparent contradiction within the 
Catalan nationalist movement between the apparent loss of sovereignty for sub­
national authorities and the process of European integration. In other words, why 
do Catalan nationalists seem to keen on the process of European integration when 
it means that they may have to transfer competencies to Brussels? If member- 
states have had to transfer their competencies, sub-national authorities will also 
have to surrender their limited sovereignty. At this stage, it is difficult to assess 
who will gain and who will lose with this process. Will continued European 
integration be beneficial or detrimental to Catalonia and other sub-national
17 Walker, D. “Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya: Its Successes and Its Problems,”
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authorities? One can argue, however, that it would be difficult for regions to lose 
much more, as they were never given much decision-making power or 
sovereignty in the first place. However, this argument does not hold true for 
Catalonia which exercises a high degree of self-government. At present, the most 
efficient way for regional governments to influence the EU’s decision-making 
process is directly through the member-states, something regional governments 
increasingly have shown to want to move away from. In this chapter, the 
influence of sub-national interests in the EU’s decision-making process, both 
through regional governmental initiatives and private initiatives is addressed, by 
presenting the case study of Catalonia.
The emphasis in these two chapters will be the strategy employed by the Catalan 
nationalists in EU matters. Both the Spanish and EU legal and policy-making 
structures are examined in great detail particularly with regard to the proposed 
changes inherent in the Catalan strategy. This strategy has evolved from a 
concerted effort in the late 1980s and early 1990s to bypass central decision­
making mechanisms by appealing directly to the EU and other regions to a more 
pragmatic regionalist approach in the late 1990s. Related to this change in strategy 
is the change in government occurring with the March 1996 Spanish general 
elections and the subsequent govemability pact established between CiU and the 
ruling Partido Popular (PP).
The Generalitat's increased involvement in the Spanish political process from 
March 1996 onwards was due to CiU’s coalition with the ruling PP. The fragile 
govemability pact established within a few weeks of the election reaffirmed the 
conflictive nature of the relationship between the Catalan nationalists and the 
central government. This conflict escalated between 1996 and 1999 despite 
greater ideological agreement in economic and social matters between CiU and 
PP than with the previous PSOE led central government. These events include 
protests by the central government over the 1997 Catalan linguistic law. This 
Generalitat-sponsored legislation included several contentious components: a) it
Regional Politics & Policy (now, Regional & Federal Studies). Vol. 1, No. 3, Spring 1991, p. 300.
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favours the use of Catalan over Spanish in business and legal documentation18; b) 
guarantees a minimum use of Catalan in radio and cable television broadcasts as 
well as in cinematic productions; c) introduces regulation for the use of Catalan in 
those firms and industries which provide public services, and d) introduce labels 
in Catalan on all food products19. With the controversy generated by this 
legislation, the issue of language takes on a variety of important elements central 
to the arguments in this thesis. First, the issue of language is a key element 
Catalan nationalist ideology. Second, linguistic legislation is an example of a 
policy area brought to both the EU and Spanish political arenas by the Catalan 
nationalists, symbolising the importance placed on the issue20. Finally, the 
controversy over the linguistic law demonstrated the fragility of the govemability 
pact between CiU and the PP. This reinforces the argument that the Catalan 
nationalists’ political strategy (including their EU strategy) is highly dependent on 
electoral outcomes rather than a move within Spanish political circles to accept 
the growing role of sub-national actors in the political process.
Chapters 6 and 7 also examine the changes occurring with the participation of 
sub-national authorities in EU institutions. Specifically, the Committee of the 
Regions and the agreements reached between the Generalitat and the Spanish 
government on the former’s role in EU matters are analysed. This agreement is 
based a series of bilateral and collective agreements which would allow for the 
Spanish autonomous communities to participate in committees or working groups 
of the European Commission21. Thus, representation of the various regional 
governments would be guaranteed in 55 of the 450 committees or working groups 
within the Commission following an agreement among the various regional
18 The 1978 Spanish Constitution officially recognizes Catalan as one the languages of the Spanish 
state and the 1980 Catalan Autonomy Statute establishes Catalan and Spanish as co-official 
languages of Catalonia.
19 Pujals, J. M. “^Por que otra ley del Catalan?” El Pais, October 24, 1997.
20 The 1997 linguistic legislative project sponsored by CiU was inspired by Bill 101/1977 in
Quebec, of which the Catalan nationalist movement has drawn great inspiration and influence over
the years. For more on the legislation, see Varela, J. “La ley del Catalan,” El Pais, 25 September,
1997.
21 Both the Basque and Catalan governments demanded the central government’s support for these 
initiatives in the April 1996 govemability pacts signed with the PP. Section 5 of No. 11,8 of the 
agreements stipulates that “the presence of autonomous government representatives will be 
specified in the Spanish delegations within the committees and working groups in the Commission
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governments involved. Along with the regional governments’ representative 
would be the central government representative. This agreement followed the 
Catalan government’s 1993 proposal in which representatives from the regional 
governments would be able to substitute those from the central government in the 
various EU institutions. This proposal was disallowed by the then Secretary of 
State for Territorial Administration, Jorge Fernandez, by reason of Spain’s lack of 
a federal structure, unlike the German case, which would not allow the regions to 
substitute the central government. The Generalitat, in co-operation with other 
Spanish regional governments, most notably the Basque government, has 
attempted to persuade the central government to accept proposals which would 
allow regional governments to be represented in the Council of Ministers. These 
proposals follow the creation in the early 1990s of a Conference for Matters 
Related with the European Communities22. Within this Conference, the central 
government consults with its regional counterparts on the positions it will adopt 
regarding certain issues which directly affect the various autonomies. Other 
developments included the recognition by the Constitutional Tribunal in 1992 of 
the representative offices of the regional governments at the European level and 
the establishment in July 1996 by the PP government of the position of regional 
aggregate in the office of Spain’s Permanent Representative in the EU. These 
issues, and more recent developments, are discussed in Chapter 7.
Conclusion
Over the last few years, the transformation of the nation state has become more 
evident with the proliferation of both new and traditional pressures. These 
include governments’ inability to control crises provoked by fluctuations in an 
increasingly interdependent world economy and the mass proliferation of a global 
communications system which allows for enormous transfers of information and 
capital in shorter and shorter periods of time. The traditional notion of the nation 
state based upon the possession of the monopoly of the use of force or on the 
sovereignty of political institutions within a bounded territory and a citizenry
in areas of specific or singular interest for the corresponding autonomous communities.” See El
Pais, 3 August, 1997.
22 In Spanish, Conferencia para Asuntos Relacionados con las Comunidades Europeas.
24
defined by these institutions has become an increasingly obsolete concept. The 
state has become forced to coexist on a more or less equitable level with other 
institutions, nations, cultures and social forces. The consequences of this 
phenomenon have yet to be felt completely. Nevertheless, the state will be forced 
to resist moves by regions, sub-territorial units, supranational organisations, and 
other institutions to continue the processes of devolution, decentralisation and 
transfers of power, functions and sovereignty.
Even as citizens, we have begun to realise that many of the competencies and 
functions previously carried out by the state in such areas of daily life; education, 
culture, transport, environmental concerns, etc. have been taken over by local, 
regional and supranational institutions. This phenomenon of modem society is no 
longer apparent merely in those functional spheres or areas of competency but 
also in our own identities, which are no longer expressed within a territorial 
boundary encompassed by the modem state, but within several boundaries. Some 
of these boundaries have been drawn by nations without a state such as Catalonia, 
the Basque Country, Northern Ireland or Scotland, or with a vaguer definition 
such as that drawn by an entity such as Europe.
Thus, the structure of the nation-state is changing in two ways: 1) supranationally 
in addressing the challenges of globalisation and; 2) 'intranationally’ towards a 
new internal distribution of power within the nation-state. This process is driven 
by the demands of regional and local identities anxious at the homogenizing threat 
posed by globalisation. This does not suggest that the state as such will disappear 
in light of the transfer of functions and powers on the one hand and the 
strengthening of regional or national identities on the other. This transformation 
is hindered by the state’s tradition of historical stagnation and permanence, as 
well as the presence of powerful interests at the state level. To a certain degree, 
the state still controls many of the mechanisms for social cohesion by ensuring 
that the principles of democracy remain with the citizenry, hence the impossibility 
of foreseeing the complete destruction of the state in Europe. As a dominant 
political actor however, its influence is changing. But that does not mean that the 
nation-state as we know it today is disappearing. It is not playing a secondary role 
to the other two levels, supranationalism and regionalism, and it is not being
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replaced by the regions. Even in the economic sphere, the regions are not 
replacing the states as dominant economic actors. Indeed, even an economic 
'Europe of the Regions' is not taking place (Borras, Christiansen and Rodriguez- 
Pose, 1994).
Nevertheless, the state is being faced with regionalisation and Europeanisation of 
its functions manifested by: devolution occurring within many European states; 
the emergence of a state made up of nation states; the presence of nations without 
a state, autonomous governments, provincial and municipal authorities and other 
European institutions; and the increasing intervention of these institutions and 
authorities in the day to day economic, political, social and cultural processes. 
Thus, the state is not disappearing but merely undergoing a transformation with 
the emergence of a new genre of state, based upon principles of flexibility. This 
flexibility is reflected in allowing other forces and institutions to take over the 
state’s traditionally prerogative functions and powers in return for a guarantee for 
the permanence of social order and cohesion.
The case of Catalonia with its intertwining actors, groups and institutions and the 
competitive nature of these relationships within both the Spanish and European 
political and institutional framework is a strong example of the way both 
nationalist movements and regional governments are extending their influence 
within two different spheres of decision-making. States still play a significant 
role in regulating relations between the regions and the EU as the case of 
Catalonia demonstrates. What is clear is that the constitutional and institutional 
framework of the various forms of autonomy and decentralisation both in Spain 
and at the European level need to be examined in light of the decisive impact 
European integration has had on the political process. This in turn has largely 
defined the boundaries of the changing legal and constitutional frameworks. As 
part of this, regions have increasingly attempted to strengthen their participation 
in the EU policy-making process (Hooghe, 1995) to maximise their role in the 
transformation of the nation-state. The functions exercised by all three levels of 
government (the supranational, national and sub-national) must be re-evaluated 
within their legal and institutional contexts along with the motivating factors, in
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this case the ideological and pragmatic importance placed by nationalist 
movements on the process of European integration.
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Framework and Methodology
Introduction
This chapter will provide a brief overview of the primary theoretical approaches 
to the issues and assumptions addressed in this thesis. In addition, the chapter will 
attempt to clarify some of the terminological confusions that arise from tackling 
the complex issues of nationalism, regionalism, and European integration. The 
terms ‘nationalism’ and ‘regionalism’ have become increasingly blurred in recent 
years particularly within the context of European integration (Lynch, 1996). 
Adding to this confusion is the popular notion of the apparent decline or 
disintegration of the nation-state as a result of the construction of a politically 
unified Europe. By examining the historical complexities of nationalism and the 
transformation of the state, we can begin to understand some of their present day 
challenges. Regionalism and nationalism are in fact not very different from one 
another. Perhaps the only difference is the degree to which nationalism’s 
affective content is expressed.
The importance and definitions of both nationalism and the nation-state have 
changed over time in spite of the fact that our present-day interpretations reveal 
that both of these concepts are in reality recent phenomena. Reasons vary but 
many authors agree that our interpretation of the nation-state is a product of the 
modem era (Keating, 1997) or a product of the process of modernisation 
(Deutsch, 1966). As a product of the modem era, the nation-state is seen to be 
labouring to survive or merely resisting change in light of growing cultural 
pluralism and the rise of nationalism. These views however, give rise to a series 
of questions regarding the interplay among the forces at work. Will the rise of 
nationalist movements since the 1960s and 1970s or the ever-growing process of 
European integration lead to the demise of the nation-state? Or is a fundamental 
reordering of the political system underway with a ‘reshuffling’ of powers, 
structures and competencies? Does the case of the European Union with its
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process of integration deserve special attention owing to the nature of the 
competing forces at work? Or are the forces of economic globalisation and 
modernisation responsible for these changes, generating a spill-over effect into 
other areas of the world?
The section on approaches to European integration is based on the assumption that 
the structure and composition of the nation-state as it exists today is evolving due 
to a dual set of forces: (1) one emanating from above, at the supranational level, 
involving exposure to the globalisation of the economy, communications 
revolution, increased interdependence, socialization flowing from membership 
within transnational systems and agreements such as the European Union and; (2) 
the other force emanating from below, at the sub-national level, involving changes 
occurring from increasing tendencies towards regionalisation and in some cases 
resulting from successful nationalist movements. These forces have resulted in 
two complementary evolutionary processes that have corroded the traditional 
definitions and functions of the nation-state. They have also led to new actors and 
institutions playing influential roles within a changing political structure. 
Essentially the three levels, the state, supranational and sub-national levels, 
engage in a constant process of interplay and increasing interdependence.
Thus, the main purpose of this thesis is to weave together several explanatory 
threads. The focus will be on the European dimension of the Catalan nationalist 
movement both in ideological and policy terms taking into account European 
integration and the relatively recent consolidation of the State of Autonomies in 
Spain. On a broader level, an analysis of these issues will generate a greater 
understanding of the challenges posed to the state. The purpose here is not to 
come up with a new theoretical design encompassing nationalism, regionalism 
and European integration. This chapter will simply examine existing theoretical 
models and isolate those that apply to the study in question, clarifying conceptual 
problems arising along the way.
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Defining Nationalism
The problem of defining nationalism and its impact on the nation-state has 
confounded authors time after time. In essence, the definition of nationalism, like 
our interpretation of the nation-state, is a function of the era and society we live 
in. Nationalism means different things to different people, not least among 
academics in the field. Objectives and feelings among people are difficult to 
measure and categorise. Most theories of nationalism seek to explain the specific 
relationships between politics, economics and culture as factors explaining the 
rise of a particular nationalist movement. Unlike social or economic development 
where one can analyse indicators such as poverty, unemployment and inflation 
statistics, it is difficult to pinpoint specific indicators in the study of nationalism. 
Indicators such as ethnic affiliation, language, legitimacy, territoriality, civil 
society, economic discrepancies and religion have been used to categorise varying 
types of nationalist movements. What is important however, is the process of 
state formation within which nationalism evolves.
The process of state-formation in Western Europe varied from state to state. 
Several structural factors were essential to this process but again, owing to 
historical or cultural reasons, they played different roles in each state. This thesis 
does not set out to provide a general theory of the origins, structure and dynamics 
of the modem state but does intend to highlight the structure of the Spanish state 
in the face of two impending processes threatening to modify it. Nationalist 
considerations have played an enormous role in both the historical and modem 
legitimisation of the Spanish state and continue to exert an important influence.
Territoriality
As well as processes of state formation, territoriality is another factor to take into 
consideration when studying nationalism. In a sense, territoriality is the common 
denominator of both the nation (or nationalist movement) and the state with both 
entities expressing territorial claims. Although a nation need not have specific 
territorial claims (e.g. the Jewish nation outside of its Israeli homeland), in many 
cases territoriality remains as an element claimed by both the nation and the state.
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Both Anderson (1992) and Smith (1986) have discussed this common 
denominator not only in distinguishing between the nation and the state but also in 
determining that the territorial dimension separates the ethnic group from a nation 
or a state. Natural geographic boundaries such as rivers and mountains as well as 
the concept of territorial unity have also been described as contributing to the 
establishment of specific cultural and political identities as well as a sense of 
distinctiveness; elements essential to the development of nationalism (Llobera, 
1994). Nevertheless, it should not be the sole determinant in developing a 
conceptual matrix of nationalism or in detailing the authority and functional 
domain of the state. It is merely a factor of the equation. In the Catalan case, the 
issue of territoriality appears to be marginal. In reality, the Catalan nationalist 
movement has filtered the concept of territoriality through its nationalist 
discourse. Its efforts to secure greater participation in the EU decision-making 
process reflect a non-territorial form of public recognition necessary to legitimise 
and sustain the nationalist movement.
Institutional arrangements
Institutions and administrative arrangements, i.e. the internal structure of the state, 
also play an important role in the study of nationalism and state-formation. 
Rokkan and Urwin (1980) attribute the origins of nationalism to the dynamics of 
centre-periphery relations. Administrative divisions dating back from Roman 
times in certain areas of Western Europe have arguably contributed to the 
development of specific identities and more generally, national self-consciousness 
(Llobera, 1994). In the Catalan case, institutions created since the re­
establishment of the Generalitat during the Spanish transition to democracy have 
played a fundamental role in channeling the Catalan nationalist movement’s 
policies. They have provided an institutional and administrative base from which 
the movement can consolidate its position within Catalan political life.
Actors
Determining the actors involved is another problem in the study of nationalism. 
In the specific case of Catalonia, special attention will be given to the Catalan
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government, the Generalitat and some of the political parties that have played an 
important role in the evolution of the Catalan nationalist movement. 
Nevertheless, when referring to the Catalan nationalist movement, the focus will 
be on Convergencia i Unio (CiU), not as the sole representative of Catalan 
nationalism but as its most important political actor since it first came to power in 
1980. Alter (1989) has described three types of nationalist movements that can be 
applied to the Catalan case. The first type is a movement generated by 
secessionist risorgimento nationalism. The second is based on a form of integral 
nationalism that seeks to represent the traditionally isolated peripheral minorities 
and attempts to incorporate them into a process of national integration. Finally, 
the third model, nationalism by trade, attempts to explain the often moderate 
nature of nationalist movements based on economic cost-benefit analyses rather 
than political considerations. Thus, nationalist parties subscribing to this view 
attempt to establish some sort of political separation from the state while 
continuing to foster economic ties. It is this third model that directly applies to 
CiU.
Detailing the networks and ideological strategies constructed by the Catalan 
nationalist movement and specifically the ruling party, Convergencia i Unio 
(CiU) over the years allows for a thorough description of Catalonia’s objectives 
within the process of European integration. This approach will be based upon the 
assumption that nationalist parties such as CiU act as agents of the nationalist 
movement, channelling resources and actions towards specific goals and 
objectives. Furthermore, this approach has been employed in other studies 
analysing the relationships between nationalism, regionalism and European 
integration (Lynch, 1996) providing a detailed yet simple analysis of the case 
study in question .
Federalism
23 Lynch (1996) employs three concepts to classify and define nationalism within the process of 
European integration: goals, ideology and strategies, Lynch, P. (1996) Minority Nationalism and 
European Integration. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, p. 4-6.
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Although the focus of this thesis is not whether or not the Spanish constitutional 
framework is increasingly moving towards a federal model, it is important to 
define federalism when examining the legal and constitutional implications of the 
participation of sub-national authorities in the EU’s policy-making process. Many 
authors have argued that Spain has increasingly been moving towards a federal 
model, perhaps not in structure but certainly in function (Aja, 1999). The 
definition used in this study refers to a constitutional framework in which “two 
sets of governments, neither being fully at the mercy of the other, legislate and 
administer within their separate yet interlocked jurisdictions”24. This definition 
assumes that the institutionalised internal division of powers refers to jurisdiction 
over specific geographical delineations and involves a constraint over centralised 
political power. Distinctions can be made between ‘unitary’ and ‘cooperative’, or 
‘competitive’ or ‘concurrent’ federalism (Moreno, 1997), but for purposes of 
simplicity, the federal model toward which arguably the Spanish constitutional 
framework is shifting, could be characterised as ‘asymmetrical’. This definition 
refers to the flexibility of the present process of devolution, in which regions can 
voluntarily opt of the process. This decentralisation process has been described as 
seemingly unlimited which could feasibly allow regional governments to assume 
increasing levels of power with few limits imposed on them by the central 
government. As a result, this has led to a system in which Spain’s seventeen 
autonomous communities enjoy very different levels of autonomy, a type of 
“institutionalisation of diversity”.
Distinguishing between nation and state
Another problem in the study of nationalism is in distinguishing between the 
concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘state’25 as well as the relationship between the two. 
Attention has focused on redefining the boundaries of these two concepts. 
Frequently these concepts have been indistinguishable or blurred in writings on
24 Duchacek, I. (1990) “Perforated Sovereignties” in Michelmann, H. J. and Soldatos, P. (eds) 
Federalism and International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units, Oxford: Clarendon Press,
Is3-The most obvious example of the confusion stemming from distinguishing both concepts is the 
study of ‘international relations’ which is in fact nothing else than ‘inter-state relations’ or ‘state 
relations’ rather than the study of relations between nations.
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the subject and sadly, the concept of ‘nation-state’ has been misused and 
misinterpreted. States have been referred to as nations and vice-versa. Often, 
cultural, political and historical hegemony is assumed when states are referred to 
as nations or the term ‘nation’ is seen as a necessary pre-condition for the state 
rather than as a separate principle. Marx failed to distinguish between either 
concept viewing both ‘nation’ and ‘state’ as a single political unit (Connor, 1984). 
Nevertheless, neither states and nations are monolithic entities. I intend to use the 
term ‘state’ when referring to the Spanish state and ‘nation’ can be interpreted to 
be the Catalan or Basque ‘nations’ or even Spain as a ‘nation of nations’ (Moreno,
1997). Thus, the terminology will distinguish between ‘state’ (political structure) 
and ‘nation’, an idealised objective generated by a certain ideological/political 
force and used to denote the territorial element of a specific community, ethno- 
national or ‘ethnoterritorial movement’ (Moreno, 1997) sharing similar cultural 
and linguistic, and sometimes also religious and racial characteristics. Although 
one interpretation suggests that the term ‘state’ refers more to a unit denoting 
reason and logic, and the term ‘nation’ denotes affection and sentiment, this 
generalisation is hard to accept in the Catalan case. Here the distinction is more to 
do with political vs. cultural phenomena. Nationalism can also be rational in its 
goals and the state as an institution can also be neither logical nor reasonable.
Within the discipline of international relations, realists and neo-realists have 
argued that among other issues, sub-national forces such as nationalism 
undermine the traditional strength and configuration of the nation-state and lead to 
a situation of ‘global ungovernability’ (Haymes, 1997). The realist school of 
thought ignores the distinctions between the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘state’. 
Along similar lines, another statist approach suggests using both terms to 
distinguish two conceptualisations of nation-states: (1) one in which its citizens 
share similar linguistic, religious and historical identities and where the new state 
has been artificially created by existing states and; (2) the concept of national 
states in which regions or territories are governed by a combination of centralised 
and autonomous structures (Tilly, 1992). This approach views the process of 
European state-formation as having a close association with the wars and 
conquests that have characterised history. Yet this approach focuses too much on 
the state. The classic Weberian approach of defining the state as the sole
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possessor of the legitimate use of force has become outdated. Indeed, the dual 
processes of nation- and state-building can no longer be assumed as evolving on 
parallel terms. In fact, as the case of Catalonia will show, nationalist movements 
and national identities evolved as a result of economic, cultural and political 
factors, even when the Spanish state had been united through dynastic union and 
the defeat of the Muslims (at the end of the fifteenth century) and reinforced its 
legitimising authority through a series of foreign wars and defeats of minority 
uprisings (eighteenth century).
The Catalan nationalist model
Aside from varying opinions regarding the definition of nationalism as well as the 
concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘state’, there are also conflicting views on the initial 
emergence of nationalism. Has nationalism always existed or is it an exclusively 
modem phenomenon? Have our definitions of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ been 
constrained by time? Hobsbawm argues that as late as the eighteenth century the 
term ‘nation’ was not employed to denote territorial limitations but as a point of 
reference to distinguish between varying cultures and traditions many of which 
coexisted within the same territorial boundaries (Hobsbawm, 1992). Other 
authors have argued that the terms natio and patria are in fact medieval terms and 
that despite their evolving definitions over time, do describe certain political and 
cultural realities (Llobera, 1994). Anderson has argued that the advent of 
nationalism as we know it today coincided with the gradual deterioration of 
universal religion and the need for groups of people to substitute the nation for 
religion (Anderson, 1991). Smith stresses the continuity of nationalism rather than 
its modernity as Gellner and Anderson have done. Other approaches treat 
nationalism as a product or function of the revival of ethnicity and national 
identity while others maintain that nationalism is merely a movement designed to 
claim and establish a new state. Keating (1997) has argued that the resurgence of 
present-day nationalist movements and its efforts to adapt to the modem era is 
reminiscent of the intense period of state-formation during the nineteenth century 
and that parallels can be drawn between the two.
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As with all nationalisms, it is difficult to categorise Catalan nationalism. Like its 
Walloon, Flemish and Welsh counterparts, it does not embrace violence or 
secession yet it claims to represent a nation without a state. It defies traditional 
interpretations of nationalism, which suggest that the end goal is self- 
determination or state-formation. Instead, Catalan nationalism belongs to the new 
wave of nationalism evolving during the last two decades which rejects secession 
or the right to self-determination and claims to embrace a moderate type of 
nationalism intent on building a nation within a state. It seeks to assert its sense 
of identity, distinctiveness and nationhood by operating within the Spanish state. 
It could be described as ‘bourgeois nationalism’, a product of a wealthy region or 
territory attempting to create a ‘distinctive consciousness’ (Harvie, 1994). Keating 
(1997) has differentiated between the type of nationalism that focuses primarily 
on a process of nation-building and the traditional approach towards nationalism 
focusing on the principle of self-determination and the process of state-building. 
Both models apply to the Catalan case. Nation-building is an important element 
in Catalan nationalist discourse. This refers to the political and social 
mobilisation engaged in to build on a nationalist movement’s differentiating 
features, i.e. language, culture, history and identity. In order to survive, 
nationalist movements must continuously adapt to changing circumstances but 
this process does not necessarily involve state-building. Thus, the Catalan case 
suggests that the principle of self-determination does not always lead to or desire 
statehood. A nationalist group can seek to determine their own destiny within a 
state, as the Catalans have done, by pursuing a nation-building process (Catalonia) 
within the confines of a separate state-building process (Spain). This 
interpretation of nation-building is accompanied by an implicit reject of the right 
of territorial secession. The process of state-building in the Catalan case refers to 
the Spanish state, more specifically the process of state-building initiated with the 
territorial unification of Spain in the fifteenth century. In this thesis, the emphasis 
on the process of state-building in Spain will focus on the creation of the State of 
Autonomies with the 1978 Constitution. This assumes that the process of state- 
building in Spain, particularly the modernisation of the state, has developed over a 
period of five centuries culminating (but perhaps not ending) in the creation of the 
State of Autonomies.
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Another approach used to describe Catalan nationalism argues that the Catalan 
nation is an artificial creation, an image fabricated by an elite. According to this 
approach, national identity is artificially constructed through the actions and 
discourse of the political elite (Conversi, 1995) (Shafir, 1995). The constructivist 
approach suggests that leaders manipulate events and the evolution of the 
nationalist movement by setting goals and channelling interests and resources. 
They also reinterpret historical myths and symbols to broaden the movement’s 
appeal, selectively choosing symbols that suit their cause. Thus, all political 
events and processes can presumably be traced to elite initiative. This approach 
coincides with a Weberian interpretation of nationalism, which would understand 
it as the “activity of a status group which is monopolising resources through social 
closure”26. According to this approach, the concepts ‘nation’ and ‘national 
identity’ are ideological tools employed by those controlling the state to ensure 
the unity of the ‘nation’ and build on the legitimacy needed to ensure obedience to 
the state’s authority. Thus, national identity and/or ethnicity by the political elite 
are politicised to contribute to the evolution of the nationalist movement.
The rise of nationalist movements is a result rather than the cause of the 
weakening or transformation of nation-states. This approach has been used to 
explain the rise of nationalist movements in Central and Eastern Europe following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, the state continues to play an important 
role in the emergence of nationalist movements and in the consolidation of 
national identity, be it at the core or periphery. One approach to understanding 
Catalan nationalism suggests that we have inevitably misconstrued nationalism as 
a “hard, static concept based upon a quest for the nation-state”27. Like the 
definition of the terms ‘nation’ and ‘state’, nationalism is an ever changing 
process. Nations have also been denoted as ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson,
1991) and successful nationalist movements existing in such places as Catalonia, 
Quebec and Scotland have been described as engaged in ‘state-less nation-
26 Fevre, R., Denney, D. and Borland, J. (1997). “Class, status and party in the analysis of 
nationalism: lessons from Max Weber,” Nations and Nationalism. Vol. 3, No. 4, December 1997,
?7 559'Haymes, T. (1997) “What is nationalism really? Understanding the limitations of rigid theories 
in dealing the problems of nationalism and ethnonationalism,” Nations and Nationalism. Vol. 3, 
No. 4, December 1997, pp. 543.
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building’ (Keating, 1997). Marxists have traditionally viewed nationalism as a 
’false consciousness’ preventing people from pursuing their true goals. Still other 
approaches suggest we explore psychological or ‘human nature’ assumptions to 
enable us to conceptualise nationalism (Finlayson, 1998) or stress the role of class 
interests in the political mobilisations of nationalist movements (Hobsbawm, 
1990) (Diez Medrano, 1995).
A primordial approach would describe Catalan nationalism as a “spontaneous
9 8process stemming from a naturally given sense of nationhood” . It suggests that 
this particular brand of nationalism merely involves demands for territorial 
autonomy from a stateless nation, an argument not sustained in this thesis. There 
was little spontaneous about the evolution of Catalan nationalism as demonstrated 
by its development in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The 
historical context of this cultural or national differentiation is important in 
understanding the evolution of a particular nationalist movement. It is this 
historical context, fabricated or not, which is employed by the Catalan nationalists 
to provide a particular type of ‘adhesive’ to the movement. Political mobilisation 
provides a similar type of ‘adhesive’ by reasserting the movement’s cultural or 
linguistic features, historical references and communal identity. This two-way 
process conjures up the image of a nationalist movement that is continuously 
undergoing a process of modification and adapting to changing social, political 
and economic circumstances.
The importance of the primordialist approach to nationalism lies essentially in its 
emphasis on a network of associations (Moreno, 1997) and the role of the 
intelligentsia (Llobera, 1994). This network of associations develops through 
cultural and social contacts within an individual’s community. Eventually, this 
network of associations reinforces the notion of an inextricable link between the 
individual and the nation. These links constitute the crucial elements of the 
process of social and political mobilisation within the nationalist movement. The 
role of the intelligentsia is seen as important as the primary ‘movers’ or instigators 
of the nationalist movement, both at the formative stages (political activists and
28 Conversi (1995) p. 73.
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authors during the late nineteenth century in the case of Catalonia) and through 
political activity in the modem state (representatives and leaders of Catalan 
nationalist parties). Although the primordialist approach does not apply to the 
Catalan case, the links and actors described above are important in explaining the 
social and political mobilisation over time of Catalan nationalism.
The modernist approach suggests that economic change in modem society has 
been conducive to the establishment of the nation-state and the advent of 
nationalism29. It suggests that nationalism and the concept of the nation are 
products of the modem era. Unequal economic factors, generated by capitalism 
or industrialisation, are used to mobilise nationalist movements (Gellner, 1983) 
(Anderson, 1991). This is particularly true in the context of centre-periphery 
tensions in post-colonial societies. This argument has little bearing in the Catalan 
case (Llobera, 1994) (Diez Medrano, 1995), in which - within the economic 
dimension - Catalonia has historically been situated at the core.
The political outcome of a particular nationalist movement depends on differing 
patterns of economic development and the levels of internal class conflict, an 
economic approach useful in analysing the differing characteristics of the Basque 
and Catalan nationalist movements (Linz, 1973) (Diez Medrano, 1995). 
Horowitz’s (1985) explanation that nationalist movements in regions with a high 
degree of economic development mobilise their members to pressure the state for 
greater regional development is useful in describing the Catalan case. However, it 
does not explain the varying historical outcomes of different nationalist 
movements with similar patterns of economic development. An economic 
approach in the modernist tradition can explain the roots of nationalist 
development in terms of cultural rather than political elements (Gellner, 1983). It 
describes nationalism as a fabricated ideology and cultural instrument employed 
for economic objectives. Gellner presents economic reasons as the cause of the 
rise of nationalism. This approach has a strong functional but not primordial 
element. Economic objectives can include the domination of the capitalist 
classes over the proletariat or the adoption of protectionist tendencies to ensure
29 See Gellner (1983) and Hobsbawm (1990).
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domestic economic survival. Nevertheless, this structural determinist approach 
and cause-effect relationship between capitalism and nationalism does not begin 
to unravel the complexities of nationalism. Non-economic structural variables 
such as language, political leadership and nationalist discourse are also key 
elements in describing the evolution and nature of nationalist movements.
In this thesis, Catalan nationalism will be described as a form of what Moreno 
(1997) denominates ‘minority’ nationalism. This defines a particular nationalist 
or ethnic group as a “self-conscious community characterised by a set of shared 
beliefs, attitudes and values, a common language, a unique nationality or 
communal sense of belonging, and an association, real or perceived, with a 
specific history and territory, thereby granting it differing and peculiar 
characteristics in relation to other groups.” This definition fulfils most or all of 
the components outlined by Smith (1986) in defining or distinguishing a 
nationalist or ethnic group. It defines the movement in sociological terms. It 
allows for a deeper explanation of the affective content of the nationalist 
movement and how this is defined, as well as using the term ‘nation’ as a central 
unit of analysis. As part of a political analysis however, the argument will be 
based on a cultural pluralist approach. Applying the former approach generates a 
detailed historical description of the nationalist movement and explains its origins 
and subsequent development. It explains what it is and what it is not by 
employing the theoretical assumptions of historical determinism and cultural 
pluralism. The cultural pluralist approach explains the present day moderate 
nature of the Catalan nationalist movement, that elites are forced to act within the 
constraints posed by historical and cultural developments. They are forced to rely 
on pre-existing cultural values, symbols and myths, i.e. language and traditions, as 
well as a process of continuous reinforcement of a historical consciousness to 
keep the process of nation-building alive. Thus, it is within this process of nation- 
building that elites must operate employing a strategy based on cultural 
determinism, i.e. utilising the concept of the hecho diferencial as a political 
resource or weapon in reacting against perceived state interference. This strategy 
is then used as a rational logic to shape and defend the institutional arrangements
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and dynamics of interaction between the Catalan nationalist movement and the 
Spanish state on the one hand and the Catalan nationalist movement and the EU 
on the other. This unique strategy is what characterises ‘Catalanism’, a nation- 
building process based on cultural and historical determinism that rejects 
territorial secessionism or other forms of state-building. This inherent moderate 
nature is then translated into an aggressive defence of institutional and 
participatory arrangements to secure a non-territorial form of public recognition 
both within the confines of the state and at the supra-national level.
Identity
The question of a common identity is crucial in defining Catalan nationalism, 
which necessitates a common element to justify its existence. The question of 
common identity points to a “key difference between nationalist movements on 
the question of who constitutes the nation and on the basis for legitimacy of 
nationalist demands” . The primordial approach to nationalism also regards the 
question of identity or ethnicity as static. Other approaches suggest that identity 
and ethnicity are artificial creations. Another possible approach implies that 
minority nationalisms are in fact ethnic groups striving for recognition and 
survival. For purposes of clarity and simplicity, however, identity and ethnicity 
will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis, as the Catalan case does not 
warrant an extensive differentiation of both terms. The underlying assumption 
will continue to be that like nationalism, identity changes over time and its 
survival is assured by those that shape and control it. The issue of identity is also 
particularly important in the Catalan case as it is a key factor in the nationalist 
movement's evolution combined with a shared sense of history, language and 
culture. In other words, the issue and protection of identity in the face of a real 
(during the Franco era) or perceived threat has substituted the quest for a ‘state’ - 
in secessionist or self-determination terms - as the primary force behind Catalan 
nationalism.
30 Moreno, L. (1997). La Federalizacion de Espana. Poder politico v territorio, Madrid: Siglo 
Veintiuno, p. 4.
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Common identity is based on a common history, language, culture and the Catalan 
nationalist movement has made the preservation of language and culture its 
primary concern. This feature has often been described as cultural nationalism 
(Hutchinson, 1987). Its transmission and socialisation from generation to 
generation ensures its survival. As real or imagined threats grow, a sense of 
cultural deprivation rises among nationalists. This is particularly true in the 
Catalan case where language took on a particularly political significance during 
the Franco regime (Conversi, 1997). Nevertheless, Catalan nationalism cannot be 
identified solely by cultural protection and language differentiation. It has been 
argued that language has been an artificial creation to symbolise national identity 
rather than existing as an inherent feature of national differentiations (Hobsbawm,
1992), or that it has been employed as a symbol of a fabricated shared history 
(Anderson, 1991). The issue of language is particularly important in the Catalan 
case and will be highlighted in subsequent chapters as part of a notion of 
‘linguistic nationalism’ and the “exclusive association of one language with one 
nation”32. In other words, the issue of language in Catalonia remains an integral 
part of Catalan collective identity shaping the essence of nation (Llobera, 1994). 
Linguistic distinctiveness is not the only necessary pre-condition for creating a 
national consciousness or identity. However, the Catalan nationalist movement 
has made a great effort to incorporate a strong linguistic element into its platform. 
The political significance of linguistic factors has risen with the emphasis Catalan 
nationalists have placed on the educational system, in particular the study of 
language and history to cultivate loyalty to Catalonia.
Some authors have focused on differentiating between varying types of identity 
including cultural and political identity (de Bias Guerrero, 1994) and ethnic and 
civic identity (Smith, 1991). The issue of language can also be viewed as part of a 
fabricated historical consciousness to accommodate specific political and/or social 
objectives (Hobsbawm, 1992). In the Catalan case, the issue of language 
determines identity. Although it is not part of a fabricated historical
31 Keating, M. (1997) “Stateless nation-building: Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland in the changing
state svstem.” Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 3, Part 4, p. 690.
32 MacClancy, J. (1996), “Bilingualism and Multinationalism in the Basque Country” in Mar- 
Molinero, C. and Smith, A. (eds) Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula. Oxford:
Berg p. 207.
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consciousness, the issue of language and its protection has been employed by the 
Catalan nationalist movement to justify its nation-building strategy by laying out 
the foundations to define identity. This pluralist notion of national identity 
suggests that competing identities have emerged over the last few decades within 
Catalan society to consolidate into a continuously evolving notion of Catalan 
identity. These competing identities have emerged to create a ‘dual identity’ or 
‘shared loyalty’ (Moreno, 1997). This cultural pluralist approach is not fixed and 
immutable but subject to processes of historical and political change, generating 
increasing levels of multiple identity (Llobera, 1994).
Historical consciousness
In addition to the phenomenon of multiple identity, the development of a national 
consciousness is closely related to selective history, not necessarily fabricated but 
subject to wide varying interpretations. Historical myth or historical 
consciousness is important in the creation of a nation. Viewing the past in a 
symbolic way or through what has been called ‘ethnic prisms’ is a central 
component in the construction of Catalan nationalism. Thus, the impetus behind 
the movement is based on common historical traditions and specifically in the 
case of Catalonia, shared experiences of past political autonomy and more recent 
political, cultural and linguistic subjugation by the Spanish state. Catalan 
nationalist discourse relies on the image of Catalan identity and sense of distinct 
history traced as far back as 1300. This sense of continuity as well as the 
perceived threats to autonomy and culture emanating from the state have served to 
reinforce the sense of national identity.
In basing this thesis on a cultural pluralist approach to ethnicity and nationalism, 
“the emphasis is not merely placed on the distinctiveness but rather on those 
relationships of interaction among the different ethno-territorial groups within the 
state”33. These interactions are guided by a competent political and ideological 
leadership and supported by a consolidated democratic institutional framework. 
In addition, by accepting Keating’s argument that one of the pre-conditions for the
33 Moreno, L. (1995) p. 21.
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success of any nationalist movement is its ability to project itself effectively both 
within the state and the international arenas, then the study of these relationships 
becomes important in evaluating the past and future developments of the Catalan 
nationalist movement.
The various groups involved compete with each other to improve their positions 
of power by attempting to secure increasing levels of political and economic 
influence. Thus, certain groups are able to exploit the dissatisfaction or 
resentment felt towards the state or another group or institution by their members. 
They can mobilise the particular group to engage in active policies and adopt 
common positions that seek to enhance the group’s interests and consolidate its 
position vis a vis the state. The ensuing conflict, rising to fluctuating degrees over 
time, continues as the interaction among the various groups increases. The 
conflict takes place within a political and institutional framework characterised by 
intertwining groups functioning within a framework of transnational networks, 
high levels of communication and interaction, and significant degrees of co­
operation and dependency. Thus, the cultural pluralist approach explains the 
channelling of the resentment felt towards another group about perceived unfair 
and/or unequal distribution of wealth and power within a certain institutional 
framework.
As the case of Spain demonstrates, often this conflict results in a certain degree of 
polarisation, political stagnation or even violence. If resolved successfully, 
groups enter into a period of continuous political bargaining and negotiation 
aimed at maximising their political and economic power along with a process of 
consolidation and institutionalisation. In the case of Spain, this process has led to 
a reordering of existing political and institutional arrangements. The same can be 
said for the process of European integration.
European Integration
One of the aims of this thesis is to analyse the participation of one European 
region in the process of European integration. The process of European 
integration and specifically, its impact on the nation-state has been explored in
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depth from a variety of approaches and disciplines including economics, 
international relations and political science. To explore each approach in detail 
would be an enormous undertaking and is beyond the scope of this exercise. 
Nevertheless, employing a multidisciplinary approach to the process of European 
integration allows for the development of a broad yet balanced overview of many 
of the concepts in question.
How do we explain the reorganisation of contemporary European society from a 
multidisciplinary approach? Many authors have argued that sub-national entities 
within both the EU and the individual member-states have been strengthened by 
the process of European integration through institutional links, transnational 
networks, policy networks, informal contacts, and participation in European 
institutions and the policy-formulation process (Kohler-Koch, 1992) (Scharpf, 
1990). Many have argued that this is particularly true in states where sub-national 
actors or regions play a strong domestic role such as the Lander in Germany and 
the Comunidades Autonomas in Spain. The strategies employed by nationalist 
movements and parties both at the European and national levels demonstrate the 
influence the process of European integration has had on their objectives. 
Essentially, the process of European integration has Europeanised these goals, 
providing a set of institutional arrangements through which nationalist movements 
can channel their resources to further their interests. Sub-national actors have 
been able to develop their own power base at the European level. In the case of 
Catalonia, these developments are examined later in a comparative context by 
analysing Catalonia’s position both within the Spanish and European political 
systems. From a theoretical point of view, both the legal/constitutional 
explanation detailed in Chapter 6 and the institutional explanation put forth in 
Chapter 7 provide a more balanced approach in examining how sub-national 
actors have increasingly become more involved in the process of European 
integration.
Over the last few decades, substantial research has been conducted in examining 
the nature of co-operation, whether it be political, cultural, economic or social, 
between the various member-states. Other research has been conducted to analyse 
the impact of European integration and more specifically the impact of EU
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legislation and institutions on member-state legislation and political institutions. 
Recently however, research has begun to shift towards the impact of European 
integration on the structure of the domestic political system and nowhere is this 
more evident than in Spain. The establishment of the internal market, the 
proliferation of EU directives and agreements, a gradual shift of powers and 
competencies to the supra-national level and the advent of monetary union have 
all changed the traditional composition, role and functions of the nation-state. 
What is obvious is that the EU no longer fits the description as an alliance among 
states or an alliance of states. It has moved beyond this towards a political system 
with corresponding institutions, i.e. the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches. Whether these exercise power as other institutions in more traditional 
democratic systems, which are fully legitimised and held accountable, is 
questionable but detailing this is not an objective of this thesis. What is clear 
however, is that a proliferation of forces will continue to exert pressure on the 
process of integration. These pressures include demands for devolution, 
autonomy and decentralisation justified by nationalist claims or administrative 
and institutional efficiency in the name of subsidiarity. The pressures for 
institutional change within the EU will increase over time concurrently with 
pressures for democratic accountability and legitimacy as the process of European 
integration deepens.
It is difficult to measure in quantitative terms how European integration has 
affected Spanish domestic political arrangements. Since Spain’s accession to the 
EC in 1986, studies have been conducted measuring the costs and benefits of EU 
membership using economic and social indicators. Quantitative analysis is much 
more difficult to evaluate the level of perceived or real changes in the domestic 
political system. It is even more difficult to establish a causal relationship 
between domestic political change and exposure to the process of European 
integration. Determining the relative weight of the role of value systems and 
political culture is a difficult balancing act to maintain but their consideration 
remains essential in assessing the impact of European integration. The difficulties 
of these approaches as well as the varied interpretations of the process of 
European integration mean that the analysis has to be flexible in nature and must
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encompass a variety of disciplines. This would allow for a balanced approach 
towards complex and often conflicting concepts.
Studies have been conducted in this area and the difficulties in doing so have been 
acknowledged (Moravcsik, 1994) (Borzel, 1997) as well as rejected. Measuring 
the perceived strengthening or weakening of the state in its relationship to sub­
national or other actors is difficult as is outlining the triangular linkages between 
supranational actors/institutions, domestic political arrangements, and sub­
national actor/institutions. Although Moravcsik (1993 and 1994) does construct a 
solid model to demonstrate that European integration has strengthened the state 
vis-a-vis other sub-national actors, others have rejected this assumption by 
presenting the case study of Germany (Borzel, 1997). Nevertheless, increased 
European integration has led to quite the opposite results than those presented by 
Moravcsik’s model. Instead, the relationship and the decision-making 
mechanisms between the Bund (federal government) and the Lander (regions) in 
Germany have been reinforced. The same case can be made for Spain.
Moravcsik’s liberal intergovemmentalist model and ‘strengthening-the-state’ 
assumption do not hold for the argument sustained in this thesis. The model 
ignores the powerful role of institutions and domestic constraints. Furthermore, 
the model determines actors’ behaviour by rational choice in light of the 
limitations placed on it by the international system. The process of European 
integration is not the result of a rational actor intergovemmentalist approach to 
actors’ behaviour but the result of domestic bargaining processes in which the 
state acts as a single agent vis-a-vis other sub-national actors34. The 
intergovemmentalist tradition supports the view that the EU decision-making 
process, and by extension its policies, in fact strengthen the national dimension 
vis-a-vis sub-national authorities at the latter’s expense. Moravcsik also argues 
that ideas of European integration play a critical role in the state’s policy 
legitimisation process. However, in the case of Germany, the Lander have also 
been able to employ the ‘European idea’ to their advantage, more specifically in
34 Borzel, T. (1997), “Does European Integration Really Strengthen the State? The Case of the 
Federal Republic of Germany” in Regional & Federal Studies. Vol. 7, No. 3, Autumn 1997, p. 88.
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opposing Federal policies or ‘to justify their interests and demands vis-a-vis the 
Federal government”35.
The other problem often encountered in researching these issues is the unit of 
analysis. Should the Union as a whole be analysed in a comparative context? To 
simplify the issue, the methodological choice employed is that of a sub-national 
entity rather than the state as the appropriate unit of analysis. The state (in this 
case the Spanish state) and the EU are used as points of comparison to 
demonstrate the intent at ‘bypass’ which is occurring at all levels of governance 
within the EU (both at the supranational and national levels). This notion 
contradicts a broad consensus held until recently that in policy dimensions such as 
EU regional policy, the national dimension is the primary unit of analysis as the 
key actor within the European decision-making.
The participation of sub-national authorities in EU matters has served as a base 
from which theories on the process of European integration have been constructed 
(Hooghe and Marks 1995) (Kohler-Koch, 1997) particularly that of multi-level 
governance to counter the theories on European integration from an inter­
governmental approach (Moravcsik, 1993). The multi-level governance approach 
seems to be, at face value, the most appropriate model to employ in the study of 
the role of sub-national authorities in the process of European integration and 
particularly appropriate in the case of Spain. After all, multi-level governance 
describes a "patterning of authority that is unstable, contested, territorially 
heterogeneous, and non-hierarchical, rather than stable, consensual, territorially 
uniform and hierarchical" , a fairly accurate description of Spain’s present-day 
State of Autonomies. Multi-level governance describes territorial and institutional 
relations between the various levels of governance within the EU by explaining a 
collective decision-making process that spreads across various levels of 
government. Thus, the relationship among these levels of government influences
Ibid, p. 93.
36 Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (1995) “Channels of Subnational Representations in the European 
Union” in Dehousse, R. and Christiansen, T. (eds.) What Model for the Committee o f the 
Regions? Past Experiences and Future Perspectives. EU Working Paper EUF No. 95/2, Florence: 
European University Institute, p. 23.
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the coherence and stability of both the national and European policy-making 
process. Thus, the focus is on the nature of the institutional relations themselves.
Although institutional deadlock may occur both at the European and domestic 
levels, this should be considered a normal feature of two concurrent processes 
which have yet to be completely defined and for which outcomes are still very 
much unknown. The question of whether the European system of governance can 
handle the two pressures is a recurring theme in academic literature. 
Unfortunately, the multi-level governance approach suggests that governments, 
whether at the sub-national, national or supranational levels, engage in conflict- 
minimising strategies leading to a lowest common denominator policy process, 
something the Catalan case clearly disproves. Indeed, the approach employed in 
this thesis will explain the factors behind the dual approach inherent in the 
Catalan case. On the one hand, Catalan nationalists employ a co-operative almost 
regionalist approach, by seeking links with other regional actors both in Spain and 
throughout the EU. On the other, Catalan nationalists employ a confrontational 
strategy at the level of the state full of nationalist rhetoric, the outcome of which is 
very much dependent on governance pacts with ruling parties. This strategy has 
thus far been successful for Catalan nationalists. However, the stability of the 
system is vulnerable to the entry of third parties, which may force it to change. 
The Catalan nationalist tradition to seek the fulfilment of their goals within the 
Spanish state by co-operating with the central authorities and other political 
parties has remained a feature of Catalan politics from the nineteenth century 
onwards. Whether this tradition will continue with a change of government 
remains unknown. In policy-making terms, there is an uneven character to 
governance in both the Spanish and EU’s process of decision-making. Rather 
than the co-operation and consensus-building character of a multi-governance 
approach, the system is very much of an ad-hoc kind, based on the personal 
authority and charisma of the actors involved, electoral outcomes and nationalist 
rhetoric. Although at times threatened by deadlock, the system has managed to 
develop based on these alternative forms of conflict and co-operation, policy 
networks and a general change in Spanish political culture with greater 
recognition of the political participation of sub-national actors.
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However, it is not merely the reconfiguration of power and relationships among 
the three levels which is occurring. This thesis attempts to take an approach that 
goes beyond a pure focus on policy-making or institutional analysis. It is not that 
multi-level governance is ill-defined as some have argued (Benz and Eberlein,
1998). Multi-level governance only analyses the different levels of the decision­
making structure without looking at the motivating factors. It is not only that the 
process of European integration has affected the domestic territorial distribution 
of power. The converse is true as well. Furthermore, the multi-level governance 
approach ignores the importance of individual actors and the ideological or 
power-based factors that drive them. An actor-centred approach is important in 
analysing the developments occurring at the EU level.
According to the multi-level governance approach, the establishment of 
formalised institutions or mechanisms allowing for regional participation in EU 
matters could be vulnerable to bureaucratic deadlock and inflexibility. 
Nevertheless, the informal and personalised networks forged among the various 
actors in the process have led to a high degree of co-operation. In this thesis, there 
will be an implicit assumption that all actors involved are trying to enhance their 
own authority and power base. That is why focusing merely on a multi-level 
approach to governance will not allow us to attain a clear picture of relations 
between the various levels. The interplay between politics at the sub-national 
level, electoral outcomes and nationalist discourse on the one hand and EU 
governance on the other has been virtually ignored despite the fact that the 
approaches described above all offer a high degree of validity in explaining both 
the process of European integration and decision-making within the EU. This 
thesis proposes to offer an alternative explanation, by examining nationalist 
discourse, electoral influences, and legal/constitutional implications, to generate a 
clearer picture of the driving forces behind the strategies to transform EU 
governance.
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Regionalisation
Related to the question of European integration is the issue of the regionalisation 
of Europe. The concepts of the ‘region’ and ‘regionalisation’37 have troubled 
researchers throughout history. Our cultural boundaries and subjective reality 
have shaped our conceptualisation of these terms. Our disciplinary 
predispositions limit our definitions in geographical, administrative, economic, 
political or social terms. Even once we have succeeded at defining these 
concepts, other doubts surface. What is the difference between regionalisation 
and regionalism? Regionalism and a regional movement? How closely tied are 
nationalism and regionalism in contemporary Europe? What is the difference 
between ‘regionalism’ and ‘federalism’?
I do not intend to use the regions as the focus of an analysis of institutional 
change. The focus is on the broader concepts of regionalism and nationalism and 
their role in the process of European integration. The regionalisation of Europe is 
developing as a political and institutional response to the cultural and national 
divisions occurring at the sub-national level. Again, like nationalism, our 
conceptualisation of regionalism is bound by historical and cultural constraints. 
Had we lived in the nineteenth century, we might have regarded regionalism as a 
‘conservative distortion’ or even as sometimes referred to today as ‘Balkanisation’ 
(Harvie, 1994). Obviously, these terms have all sorts of negative connotations. A 
conceptual distinction is further hindered by the occasional emergence of a 
nationalist movement from an initial regionalist movement.
Moreno (1997) has described both the similarities and differences between 
‘regionalism’ and ‘nationalism.’ The similarities include the emergence of a 
national/regional consciousness, the presence of a centre-periphery conflict within 
the cultural, economic or political dimensions of the state, and the development of 
social and political mobilisation to further specific objectives. Moreno describes 
the primary difference between the two concepts as an affective one. In the case 
of a nationalist movement, this has to do with the prior existence of a collective
37 These terms are employed interchangeably throughout the thesis.
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identity. In the case of a regionalist movement, this has to do with the modem 
emergence of a regional consciousness as a result of the restructuring of the state. 
Thus, the cases of north-east England, Bavaria, Lombardy and even the US states 
of Massachusetts and New York as well as some Russian oblasts (provinces), 
could be categorised as examples of the impact of regionalisation and the 
development of a regional consciousness. In contrast, the well-known cases of 
Scotland, Flanders, the Basque country and Catalonia cover both categories as 
territories or sub-national units with both strong nationalist movements and a 
willingness to lead demands for greater regionalisation at the global and European 
levels. Within the Spanish context, the term ‘regionalism’ has often been denoted 
in academic and media circles as signifying ‘nationalism’ (Ehrlich, 1998). In this 
thesis however, the term will be interpreted as a move towards 
functional/administrative territorial re-organisation of the state. Furthermore, the 
term ‘federalism’, described above, is assumed to be an example of the process of 
regionalisation sweeping Europe, as a shift towards federalism also implies a 
functional/administrative territorial re-organisation of the state.
The importance of the emerging phenomenon of ‘regionalisation’ is that the 
region or sub-national unit has essentially taken over many of the functions 
traditionally contested by central and local governments (Sharpe, 1993). In other 
words, the region provides a link between the central and local governments. The 
proliferation of such public services as social security, health, and education with 
the modernisation of the post-Second World War economies and the subsequent 
establishment of the welfare state, placed an enormous demand for services on the 
central government. The limited scope of work of antiquated local governments 
proved incapable of taking on additional demands for services. Co-operation 
between the central and local government in periods of high-growth and in areas 
where infrastructure and communication were underdeveloped proved to be an 
increasingly difficult task for central governments. Regional planning based in 
part on the French indicative model became inevitable with the drive to alleviate 
or eradicate regional economic inequalities. This led to partnerships or 
associations with regional agencies, institutions, or individuals, inducing the 
growth in importance of these entities. Regional plans were set up which 
inevitably led to the public policy structure taking on a regional dimension,
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indirectly granting the region a certain status within the state. Further co­
operation between the centre and the region led to a high degree of resources 
being transferred to the regions to carry the central government’s regional plans. 
The primary reason behind the growth of regional administration and transfer of 
functions from the state to the regional level was not to enhance public 
participation or promote decentralisation or the devolution of powers and services. 
Instead, it became a necessary step towards improving the efficiency of indicative 
planning and economic modernisation.
Thus, the transformation of the nation-state and the rise of the regions and 
resurgence of nationalist movements in Europe are inextricably linked to the 
proliferation of public obligations taken on by the state with the modernisation of 
the economy and the increasing economic interdependence among the states. This 
has required an internal adjustment to its political and administrative structure to 
be able to take on these new obligations. The ability of central and local 
governments to provide services was limited in its scope and territorial domain, 
all of which required the state to create an intermediate political unit, above the 
local government and below the state itself, to undertake many of the new services 
provided. Merely creating a territorial administrative unit no longer seemed to be 
enough, in light of the increased demand by the electorate of accountable and 
efficient government. The creation of regional governments and the transfer of 
services and responsibilities from the central to the peripheral levels allowed the 
state to ease its burden within the growing complexity of government in an era of 
modernisation and interdependence.
The rise of regionalisation throughout Europe over the last few decades has also 
been attributed to post-industrial social ills such as uneven economic development 
and urban and regional problems. These challenges also include easing 
administrative and bureaucratic burdens, the streamlining of procedures, 
directives and norms and the association of regionalisation with democratisation 
(Scharpe, 1993)(Henders, 1997)(Newman, 1996). As with the modernisation of 
the state in the late nineteenth century with greater state involvement in the 
economy - in such areas as land reform, industrial relations, the extension of
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taxation and the establishment of a welfare state - the state and sub-national 
authorities have had to cope with greater demands.
Many approaches have emerged in recent years to describe the apparent decline of 
the nation-state and growing patterns of regionalisation and nationalism. Some 
authors have prescribed the death of the traditional concept of the nation-state 
with the acceleration of the process of European integration while others have 
argued that rather than substituting the nation-state, regions will complement 
and/or share the EU decision-making process with the nation-state (Newman, 
1996)38. The concept of sovereignty has played a role here too with some authors 
who argue that the traditional concept of the nation-state has been eroded by the 
growing influence of sub-national actors (Loughlin, 1994). Others suggest that 
the tendencies displayed in recent years to transfer powers from central 
government to both regional and local authorities imply a rapid functional and 
territorial fragmentation of policy-making. This fragmentation could undermine 
the state’s effectiveness in coping with political, social and economic reform 
(Hesse and Wright, 1996). What is clear is that a high degree of regionalisation of 
the administrative and political processes has occurred which had remained the 
exclusive domain of the state. Thus, functional importance and territorial 
belonging remain two important characteristics of the state, despite its changing 
nature.
The Europeanisation of nationalism
The originality of this thesis derives from its multidisciplinary approach in 
employing concepts such as nationalism, regionalism and European integration in 
reference to the Catalan case. Although these concepts have been researched and 
analysed individually in great depth since the 1960s, little research has focused on 
combining these concepts and approaches. One of the few authors to tackle this 
complex web has been Lynch (1996), who details the relationships between 
European integration and minority nationalism. Nevertheless, Lynch’s argument
38 Newman, M, (1996). Democracy. Sovereignty and the European Union. London: Hurst and 
Company, p. 117. Newman describes this as ‘co-operative regionalism’ but doubts its immediate 
feasibility.
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is based upon case studies which include the Scottish Nationalist Party, Plaid 
Cymru, the Breton Movement and Volksunie, omitting the use of other nationalist 
parties such as CiU and the PNV as case studies.
Lynch devises three approaches to analysing the relationship between nationalist 
movements and the process of European integration: a) the incompatibility of 
European integration and minority nationalism; b) the compatibility of European 
integration and minority nationalism; and 3) Europe as an external support system 
for minority nationalism . Thus, the process of European integration is seen by 
nationalist movements as a means of undermining the structure and functions of 
the nation-state. In essence, as functions are transferred to the European level and 
as the nation-state undergoes a fundamental transformation as a result of 
Europeanisation and regionalisation, nationalist movements and parties 
increasingly support the process of European integration. Accordingly, they seek 
to enhance their roles and position within its institutional framework. Does this 
mean, however, that the nation-state will eventually disappear or merely that its 
fundamental composition and functions will undergo an integral process of 
transformation? Furthermore, history has demonstrated that nation-states have 
proven in many cases to be capable of withstanding both external and internal 
threats.
The Europeanisation of many nationalist movements within the EU is an integral 
part of a process of internationalisation undergone by sub-national entities to 
further their demands within the international arena and to attract support for their 
cause both at home and abroad. The process of European integration has been 
employed as a ‘political resource’ by nationalist movements everywhere (Lynch, 
1996). The premise employed by this thesis is that the Europeanisation of the 
Catalan nationalist movement has occurred as a result of a need to acquire a non­
territorial form of public recognition. Both the state and sub-national authorities 
share similar tasks, acting as national economic managers and planners in an era 
of increasing globalisation. Day-to-day administrative and regulatory functions 
are carried out at both levels to similar degrees of importance. But more
39 Lynch (1996), pp. 12-16.
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importantly, the two share a similar function, that of a source of legitimacy and 
governance for the people. In this respect, the state has not lost any of its 
importance. On the contrary, it is merely sharing this legitimacy and governance 
with other entities at the sub-national and supranational level. The question 
merely remains whether governments at these two other levels will be able to 
carry out these functions successfully.
In addition, the question of sovereignty must be addressed in looking at the 
Europeanisation of nationalist movements. Sovereignty has persisted as an 
integral element in the discussion of changes to the nation-state from the classic 
Weberian interpretation of modem state as retaining a monopoly on the legitimate 
use of force to a more functional interpretation which sustains that globalisation 
and regionalisation mark the transformation or even demise of the state. 
Sovereignty defined as a claim or control of a specific territory is an outdated 
definition but it remains important, not subject to a process of erosion. It is 
divisible and can be shared, thus becoming a variable concept. Policing one's 
borders ensures sovereignty over one’s territory. However, deciding on the 
transfer of functions of governance to one or another level is a distinguishing 
feature of sovereignty as well. This entails the distribution of power in general but 
also sovereignty as a source of the mle of law. Until recently, the state retained its 
monopoly on the source of law. Again, the mle of law has seen a process - if 
uneven - of transfer to both the supranational and sub-national levels. This does 
not mean that the law-making process has entirely disappeared from the grasp of 
the state.
In these relatively peaceful times and without the threat of war, the question of 
sovereignty in Western European states has taken on a new dimension. In the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the crucial element determining the 
success of a state-building process has been the stmggle of control over 
sovereignty. This approach essentially entails a zero-sum view of sovereignty in 
which there are only winners and losers, leaving no prospects of survival for the 
nation-state. This static approach to the dual processes of European integration 
and regionalisation does not provide a balanced examination of the nature and 
importance of the impact of these dual processes on the nation-state.
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Nevertheless, the importance of sovereignty as a decisive element of a successful 
nation- or state-building process has been undermined by the dual processes of 
European integration and regionalisation. This new interpretation of sovereignty 
has been embraced by nationalist movements and forms one of the key elements 
of nationalist discourse.
Like sovereignty, the state has until recently retained the monopoly of 
governance. The state may attempt to set limits on the sharing of functions of 
governance but may not always succeed. Thus, the scope of governance has 
extended over three levels of government, neither one replacing the other. 
Despite being conflictual at times, the coexistence of competing and overlapping 
authorities is possible. It is not a constant source of conflict, yet it may be 
conflictual until a coherent system develops. The state retains a central role in 
this process, filtering through the transfer of functions and competencies within 
this intricate framework of constitutional measures and institutionalised 
mechanisms of co-operation. Thus, the transformation of the political 
organisation of the state will redefine the source of political legitimacy.
Methodology
An outline of the chapter structure has been detailed in Chapter 1 and the 
emphasis here is to illustrate any potential methodological complications 
generated by tackling subjects as broad and diverse as those listed above.
The study of comparative politics has been accused of being vague and 
superficial. Nevertheless, it does allow for a simple framework within which 
enormous amounts of information can be processed to generate some concrete 
answers to difficult questions. I have developed a comparative framework within 
which a variety of crucial political phenomena interact: European integration, 
nationalism and regionalism. By examining these phenomena from a 
multidisciplinary approach, a clearer picture emerges outlining the origins, 
characteristics, dynamics, structure and even perhaps the future of these elements 
or processes.
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Another difficulty encountered is in the development of a comprehensive 
description of Catalan nationalism in its present form. In other words, when one 
refers to the Catalan nationalist movement, does one refer to the ideological 
framework which encompasses an entire movement both in historical and 
theoretical terms, highlighting the common elements accepted by all domains 
within the movement? Or does one refer to Convergencia i Unio as it has 
represented the majority of the Catalan citizenry in political and electoral terms 
over the last two decades? Does one merely limit oneself to describing the 
positions and actions adopted by the Catalan nationalist parties as sole 
representatives of the movement? Or does the description extend to other sectors 
of society to include cultural and literary movements? Although the sections 
describing the development of Catalan nationalism will contain a brief description 
of the political party system in Catalonia, the remainder of the thesis will refer to 
the Catalan nationalist movement primarily in terms of policies and actions 
undertaken by CiU despite occasional references to other parties. Furthermore, the 
strategy of the Catalan nationalist movement will be analysed by examining its 
rhetoric and nationalist discourse, as well as through the accounts of its 
participants through interviews. Like Hobsbawn, one should be sceptical of 
nationalist discourse and its simplistic approach towards cultural and political 
complexities. Nevertheless, by filtering through the discourse and carefully 
analysing the objectives, the overall strategy and motives of the Catalan 
nationalist movement in securing a greater role for sub-national authorities in EU 
policy-making matters can be ascertained.
The importance of employing historical analysis to describe many of the 
processes (evolution of the Catalan nationalist movement, the consolidation of the 
State of Autonomies, etc) detailed in this thesis must be stressed. It is of course 
questionable to what extent historical analysis can have any predictive force. 
Nevertheless, as the Catalan example will demonstrate, the historic context of 
events has played a significant role in outlining future developments.
Furthermore, care has been taken in isolating events and characteristics which 
have affected the evolution of the Catalan nationalist movement with cautious 
regard to their importance over time. Whilst economic considerations and a
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widespread perception of excessive burden-sharing might have played a powerful 
role in inciting Catalan nationalist sentiment, they seem to be far less important 
than cultural and linguistic considerations as well as concerns for autonomous 
decision-making institutions. Moreover, these demands and considerations all 
fulfil the pre-conditions needed to engage in the nation-building process. 
Although in the case of Catalonia it might be correct to identify cultural and 
linguistic concerns as the dominant force behind Catalan demands for autonomy 
and decentralisation, these hardly suffice to describe the evolution and 
development of the Catalan nationalist movement. The importance of these other 
factors in explaining this process of development has been stressed by other 
authors and this thesis merely attempts to highlight their importance despite the 
topicality of the subject. It has to be noted however, that the individual factors 
leading to the resurgence of the nationalist movement cannot be considered in 
isolation from one another and are often mutually conditional. This issue is 
acutely relevant to other nationalist movements' attempts to secure power and 
influence. Thus, the example in question illustrates the complexities of some of 
the issues tackled in this thesis. Care has been taken by using historical analysis 
to uncover as many background conditions as possible without losing perspective 
of the main arguments.
In employing the case study of Catalonia, another methodological pitfall is again 
that of generalisation. For obvious reasons, a single case study provides a 
backdrop of fairly uniform case conditions and hence has little explanatory value. 
Obviously, the conditions uncovered in the Catalan case may not be applied to all 
case studies. The case study of Catalonia presents a range of valid empirical 
evidence in the form of interviews and documents of policy actors which 
generates a set of predictions often limited to the Catalan example. Nevertheless, 
the importance of a single case study is that an in-depth approach is used to 
examine the processes whereby all the initial case conditions (history, actors, 
institutions, policy-making, legal and constitutional) are translated into specific 
case outcomes. On an empirical level, the Catalan example is also unique because 
it is a region with sufficient institutional capacity to project its objectives at 
several levels. Nevertheless, the study of Catalonia is useful because the 
dynamics of territorial mobilisation both within the EU and within Spain have
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become increasingly important in recent years. The relatively recent 
consolidation of the State of Autonomies and the as yet unconsolidated process of 
European integration provide interesting examples of parallel processes that look 
set to remain intertwined. Indeed, the processes of regionalisation and European 
integration are not divergent but in fact coincide.
I intend to present a range of empirical evidence on the enhancement of the power 
of sub-national authorities in EU matters using the case of Catalonia. By tracing 
the historical, ideological, legal, constitutional and policy-making processes 
leading up to the state of affairs at the end of the twentieth century, we can begin 
to observe how these initial case conditions translate into specific outcomes. The 
cause-effect link is divided into a series of mitigating factors and conditions, each 
of which will be examined closely. A serious attempt will be made not to over­
emphasise the explanatory power of the dynamics under scrutiny. Thus, the case 
study in question is of course a unique example. Other case studies put to the test 
of these conditions may not result in the same pattern of events. The antecedent 
conditions employed to predict the outcome enjoyed by the Catalan example may 
have to be different in each case but detailing these conditions does remain an 
important task and can only be done by exploring other case studies. Still, the 
Catalan case remains a solid example and in the final chapter, I will speculate on 
the broader implications of the study. The question of how the issues discussed 
are limited by time will be broached as well as the relevance of the Catalan 
example to other case studies. Although the final chapter will avoid being 
predictive, no study of the issues at hand could be valid without speculating on 
future events which may raise other questions and may call for further research.
60
Chapter 3
The Evolution of Catalan Nationalism: From Prat to Pujol
Avui ja  per a molts Espanya es 
sols un nom indicatiu d ’una 
divisio geografica, com ho es 
Europa. Avui son molts los que 
veuen clar que Espanya no es 
una nacio, sino un Estat: i que es 
penetren de la diferencia que va 
de VEstat, obra d ’homes, entitat 
artificial, a la Nacio, entitat 
natural, producte de 
I ’espontaneitat del desenrottlo 
histdric.
Enric Prat de la Riba 
La nacio i l ’Estat. 
Escrits de ioventut 
1888.
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. It traces the historical development of what 
Keating (1997) has labelled as ‘stateless nation-building’ in Catalonia. This 
overview is important in establishing the historical framework40 within which the 
unique characteristics of Catalan nationalism have developed. The second purpose 
is to outline some of the characteristics surrounding the consolidation of Catalan 
identity in the late twentieth century, including a brief overview of the myths and 
symbols used to reinforce the multifaceted features of Catalan identity. Particular 
emphasis will be placed on the issues of culture, language and linguistic policy, as 
these have played a central role in the raison d ’etre of Catalanism and as will be 
explained in the following chapters, Catalan participation in the process of European 
integration. The moderate element of Catalanism is explored in depth as one of the 
primary features of the evolution of the Catalan nationalist movement. It is the 
moderate element of Catalanism, the proliferation of the use of the Catalan language 
and the reinforcement of dual identity which has provided the Catalan nationalist
40 A chronological sequence of key events in the evolution of the Catalan nationalist movements 
is listed in Appendix I.
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movement with widespread support in its quest for greater participation in both the 
Spanish and European decision-making processes.
Both the historical framework and an examination of some of the features of 
Catalanism which have reinforced a sense of national identity and differentiation 
will contribute to an analysis of a movement which has had clear traditional and 
Catholic roots, creating the concept of a Catalan nation based on strong sense of 
historical unity and national spirit in which language and culture have played central 
roles. On the other hand, the movement has embraced an ambiguous policy, both 
within the Spanish state and the process of European integration, which 
encompasses concurrent strategies of moderate confrontation based on nationalist 
justifications and of co-operation of an almost regionalist motivation. An analysis of 
this dual strategy will be detailed in later chapters.
Historical Background
Catalonia, which belonged to the Crown of Aragon41, and Castille were unified by 
the marriage in 1469 and the subsequent Union of the Crowns of Ferdinand and 
Isabella, the Catholic Kings, in 1479. In the century that followed, Castille 
followed its imperial ambitions by establishing a presence throughout the world. 
Catalonia continued to sustain the small feudal empire it had forged throughout 
the Mediterranean, remaining marginalised from the rest of Spain’s imperial 
ambitions. It was able to retain many of the privileges and a substantial measure 
of autonomy it had enjoyed under the Crown of Aragon, an exception to the trend 
of royal absolutist and centralised power characteristic of other European states 
(Moreno, 1997). Nevertheless this ended in 1640, when under increasing pressure 
from Castille to contribute financially to the Spanish empire - along with the
41 Catalonia entered into a confederate agreement and subsequent political agreement between 
the Count of Barcelona, Ramon Berenguer IV with the Crown of Aragon in 1137. During the 
subsequent two centuries, Catalonia under the auspices of the Crown of Aragon simultaneously 
enjoyed a substantial degree of institutional autonomy and rapid economic development, 
strongly preserving its identity at all levels through so-called pactisme, a political concept 
characteristic of Catalan politics dating back to the fifteenth century, organising relations 
between the monarchy and its people based upon strict adherence to the pact. The Crown 
managed to expand territorially to include Valencia, the Baleares islands, and Murcia, and its 
realm of dominance spread to many areas of the Mediterranean. This period has often been
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simultaneous decline of the Kingdom of Aragon’s traditional hegemony in the 
Mediterranean - the Catalans revolted in the Segadors rebellion. This event 
would subsequently lead to the War of Spanish Succession against Castille, which 
Catalonia entered in 1705. Catalonia was eventually abandoned by its Dutch and 
English allies, leading to the capture of Barcelona by the Bourbon troops on 
September 11, 1714.
Catalonia’s defeat by the Castillian forces was followed by a period in which its 
autonomy became increasingly curtailed by the central government. Following the 
introduction of the Decree of Nova Planta of 1714, most administrative matters 
were centralised. This period has often been described as crucial to modem 
Spain’s state-building process (Moreno, 1997)42. The central government began to 
exert greater control over economic, political, and social matters, many of which 
had traditionally fallen under the domain of the Catalan authorities. The 
traditional model of a highly centralised state favoured by the French was adopted 
and “geared to the assimilation of all Spanish territories into the cultural and 
political patterns of Castile”43. The historic Catalan institutions of the Generalitat 
and the Consell de Cent were abolished and Catalonia lost the Mediterranean 
territories of Menorca, Sicily, Sardinia and Naples. A special tax for Catalans, the 
cadastre, was introduced, much to the discontent of Catalonia’s emerging 
bourgeoisie. Symbolically, Article 5 of the famous decree ruled that Castilian be 
used in appeals court cases. In Catalan nationalist discourse, the Decree of Nova 
Planta would be forever associated with the beginning of a period of political and 
administrative repression to destroy Catalan language and culture.
Despite its decline in political influence following the dismantling of its 
autonomous institutions and decreasing leverage in the Mediterranean basin 
during the nineteenth century, Catalonia became one of the cores of the uneven
described, particularly in nationalist circles, as Catalonia’s Golden Age. See Moreno (1997)
and Llobera (1994).
42 This period was followed by events in the nineteenth century consolidating the centralising 
tendencies of the Spanish state as well as the providing for elements of cohesion for Spanish 
nationalism in the form of symbolic reforms such as the establishment of the Guardia Civil 
(Civil Guard, later a close collaborator of Spain’s authoritarian regimes in the twentieth century 
and a key player in the 1981 attempted coup) and the Bank of Spain in 1844.
43 Moreno, L. (1995), p. 12.
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and overdue process of industrialisation that had begun in Spain. While the rest 
of Spain continued to suffer from inherent poverty, corruption, and the inefficient 
administration of the Bourbon dynasty, the Basques and Catalans continued to 
enjoy growing economic prosperity. The Catalans’ successful economy and their 
modem outward looking views contrasted sharply with their limited participation, 
like the Basques, in the Spanish political process. This lack of incorporation into 
the political process and the refusal of Catalan society to assimilate the imposed 
homogenising cultural, economic and political policies contributed to many 
Catalans’ sense of differentiation. Nevertheless, throughout the Middle Ages and 
until the late nineteenth century, the notion of Catalan identity was fairly limited 
to intellectuals and did not extend to other sectors of Catalan society. The 
introduction of this element of differentiation into the Catalan collective 
consciousness was however, reflected in the positions adopted by many leading 
Catalans resisting the process of state homogenisation initiated by the Bourbon 
kings of the eighteenth century44. As a result of this process, “state-building in 
Spain did not involve a successful national integration of the pre-existing 
communities”, something which had succeeded in the unification of city states 
elsewhere in Europe, most notably in Germany and Italy45. As would occur 
during the latter part of the Franco regime, the Restoration (1876-1923) and the 
Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923-1930) were characterised by an imposed 
system of cultural, economic and political assimilation. These policies generated 
a backlash characterised by growing manifestations of nationalist sentiment and 
simultaneous demands for democratisation and autonomy.
The process of state building in Spain will be discussed in the following chapter. 
The primary concern in this chapter is to trace the evolution of the Catalan 
nationalist movement over time. Space limitations do not allow for an extensive 
analysis of the movement and the period of time chosen is limited from the mid­
nineteenth century onwards, marking the failure of the Spanish state to modernise,
44 Heiberg (1986) argues that the Basque nationalist movement and its demands for an 
autonomous state for the Basque people emerged from the fight to preserve the historical 
autonomy, rights and privileges granted to the Basque country by the Spanish crown. A similar 
case can be made for Catalonia particularly with regard to the centralising ‘liberal’ attempts at 
reform throughout the nineteenth century and the resistance to these efforts voiced by growing 
sections of Catalan society. See Moreno (1997) and Madariaga (1979).
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democratise, legimitise successfully and to assimilate or incorporate varying 
identities.
The rise of Catalan nationalism during the nineteenth century
The rise o f Spanish nationalism and the role o f economic differences 
The nineteenth century was marked by a series of events which would shape the 
process of state- and nation-building in Spain. First, the French invasion in the 
early part of the century would shape Spanish national identity in the century to 
come by providing it with myths and references to draw from. These myths 
would frequently be referred to during both the Primo de Rivera and Franco 
authoritarian regimes to glorify Spain’s position abroad and its sense of historical 
continuity. Along with the unstable political situation which characterised the 
first few decades of the twentieth century, the growth of nationalist movements in 
various regions led to the emergence of a conservative authoritarian right-wing 
movement which would dominate Spanish politics for much of the twentieth 
century with its own strand of nationalist discourse (Balfour, 1996). Secondly, 
with the loss of the Spanish empire, notions of a ‘Spanish national identity’ were 
weakened by the emergence of peripheral nationalisms in Catalonia and the 
Basque country with a strong social base. As with British national identity and the 
notion o f ‘Britishness’, Spanish national identity towards the end of the nineteenth 
and beginning of the twentieth centuries continued to revolve around imperial 
identity, a “supranational identity deriving from an imperial past”46.
The loss of the Spanish empire and particularly Spain’s 1898 defeat in the 
Spanish-American war were factors in the gradual erosion of Spanish national 
identity. The imperial nature of Spanish identity, while sustainable for several 
centuries, proved unable to adapt to the needs of a modem state without relying 
upon an imperial legacy. In addition, the disastrous political and economic 
consequences of the Spanish-American war weakened the Spanish state (Balfour, 
1997) and its control over its population by breaking the links between the state
45 Moreno, L. (1995), p. 12.
46 McCrone, D. (1997) “Unmasking Britannia: the rise and fall of British national identity”, 
Nations and Nationalism. Vol. 3, Part 4, pp. 594-595.
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and Spanish identity. The Spanish state lacked the resources and/or will to 
effectively carry out processes of cultural assimilation and social integration 
which could lead to a greater sense of national identity and loyalty to the Spanish 
state (Alvarez Junco, 1996). This rupture can arguably be described as an 
inherent phenomenon of the modem era in which the separation between the state 
and national identity becomes more common-place. This results in the emergence 
of a multiple or multi-faceted form of national identity (Keating, 1997). The loss 
of Spanish empire and the events of 1898 contributed to the prolonged 
disintegration of Spanish identity in Catalonia and the Basque country. Therefore, 
it was no coincidence that the rapid development of many of the nationalist 
movements in both Catalonia and the Basque Country coincided with the events 
surrounding the 1898 tragic defeat47. In Catalonia, the ‘Disaster’ of 1898, marked 
the moment when a growing group of Catalan intellectuals and bourgeoisie began 
to refer to Catalonia as a ‘nation’ rather than as a ‘region’ and Spain as the ‘state’ 
(Balfour, 1997) (Marfany, 1995).
Within the economic dimension, the loss of Cuba significantly hurt the Catalan 
economy for which exports to the former Spanish colony had constituted a 
valuable part. In addition, the ensuing taxes levied by the central government on 
commerce and industry to finance the debts accrued by the costly conflict affected 
important sectors of the Catalan economy, primarily its upper and middle classes. 
During the latter part of the nineteenth century, la Febre d ’Or (Gold Fever), 
characterised by enormous stock market speculation swept through Spain during 
1875 and 1882 leading Catalan textile producers to intensify both production and 
technological innovation resulting in an essential Catalan monopoly on Spanish 
textile imports (Balcells, 1977). This was followed by an industrial crisis 
commencing in 1885 which witnessed the mobilisation of Catalan industrialists 
and its petty bourgeoisie against the weak attempts by the central government to 
open markets and introduce liberalising economic reforms. A group of Catalan 
industrialists, intellectuals and both moderate republicans and monarchists
47 Attempts at defining a Catalan historical consciousness, its collective identity and the 
development of its nationalist movement preceded attempts in the Basque Country which did 
not fully manifest itself until the late nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the impact of the 1898 
crisis should not be employed as a deterministic explanation of the mobilization of nationalist 
movements in both Catalonia and the Basque Country (Diez Medrano, 1995).
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presented King Alfonso XII in 1885 with the Memoria en defensa de los intereses 
morales y  materiales de Cataluna or as it was later called the Memorial de 
Greuges, which became the first expression of political Catalanism.
It has often been argued that one of the primary reasons for the adoption of 
Catalan nationalist sentiment by the bourgeois and middle classes was their 
acquired ability to exert more political and economic influence both within and 
outside Catalonia (Sole-Tura, Jordi, 1979). The Catalan bourgeoisie, intent on 
furthering their economic interests, depended on the Spanish state for the 
protection of its economic interests (Balfour, 1997). They now found themselves 
in a precarious position: should they continue to support the Spanish state with its 
weaknesses or should emphasis be shifted towards strengthening their political 
and economic influence in Catalan society? Nevertheless, an economic 
deterministic approach is not sufficient in explaining many of the structural and 
programmatic features of nationalism. Connor and Diez Medrano have 
respectively used the comparative cases of Maine and Quebec and Catalonia and 
the Basque Country to illustrate this point48. Indeed, one of the leading thinkers 
behind the Catalan nationalist movement recognised that “..if nations did not have 
any other cohesive force besides politics...they would all have disintegrated by 
now. They survive because they are bound by ties one hundred times stronger: 
the community of history and feelings, civil relations and economic interest.”49. 
Moreover, the benefits derived from Catalan economic development, process of 
rapid industrialization and its overall success during the late nineteenth century 
seemed to reassert Catalan national identity (Conversi, 1997).
Nevertheless, economic differences do play a role in shaping the emergence of 
nationalism and in the case of Catalonia, the backlash towards the centralising 
tendencies of the Spanish state was particularly prevalent with the emerging 
Catalan bourgeoisie. This group favoured greater economic ties with industrial
48 Connor (1994) argues that whereas the two territories have suffered a similar economic 
predicament, unlike Quebec, Maine has not directed its discontent of the situation towards 
fueling nationalist sentiment against the federal government. Similarly, Diez Medrano (1994) 
argues that the disintegration of the Spanish empire and the loss of Cuba does not explain the 
differences in the development of Basque and Catalan nationalism [both with strong local 
economies in the nineteenth century], namely their separatist and non-separatist characters.
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Europe and sought to impose their vision of modernity - in both its administrative 
and economic forms, although perhaps not entirely democratic - on the Spanish 
state. Thus, Catalan economic success and the ongoing process of industrialization 
which led to the concentration of one-third of Spanish industry in the province of 
Barcelona by the mid nineteenth century (Balcells, 1977), did serve to reinforce 
an existing phenomenon, that of a national self-consciousness and sense of 
distinctiveness.
Furthermore, the emerging nationalist movement was successful in exploiting 
Catalan resentment towards the financing of what they perceived was a decadent 
and underdeveloped Spain. As we will see with an analysis of the present-day 
Catalan nationalist movement, the perception of Catalonia as the net financial 
contributor of the development and modernisation of the rest of Spain has played 
a prominent role in Catalan nationalist discourse. In the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century however, economic differences also influenced the emergence 
of Catalanism from within, with the issue of class. Diez Medrano (1994) argues 
that both class differences and economic interests in the form of ‘regional 
capitalism’ played an important role in the development of two distinct types of 
Catalan nationalism - bourgeois and progressive. Thus, economic factors would 
play an equally important role to political developments in the evolution of 
nineteenth century Catalan nationalism.
Political developments and social aspects o f nineteenth century Catalan 
nationalism
Following the frustrated attempts of the liberal movement in Spain during the mid 
to late nineteenth century to create a state modelled on the political systems 
emerging throughout Western Europe, many Spanish liberals began to turn to 
republicanism. Simultaneously, and in response to the increasing centralising 
efforts of the state, demands for the return of political and institutional autonomy 
escalated rapidly in both Catalonia and the Basque Country. The two views were 
seen as inextricably linked and many intellectuals, particularly from these regions, 
began to view the Spanish state as one composed by regions, each possessing a
49 Author’s translation. Francesc Pi i Margall (1911) quoted in Moreno (1997), p. 85.
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unique national identity, culture and language which was argued, should benefit 
from a high degree of autonomy. They began to advocate a policy of national 
solidarity and compromise with mutual respect for other cultures and languages 
by resisting demands for total assimilation within the Spanish state. As early as 
1835, the liberal Catalan left voiced the frustration felt by many Catalans, “tired 
of suffering from foreign petty bureaucrats, sent by intriguing decisions taken in 
Madrid, wanting more consideration and that the name ‘Catalan’ be referred to in 
the nineteenth century as that of an industrious and diligent people”50. The central 
government was also perceived by many Catalans as remote and out of touch with 
a description of life in Spain as being “in its peripheries; the centre is lifeless, 
emaciated, cold, little more than dead. Catalonia, the Basque provinces, 
Galicia...offer a movement, a vibrancy in which the heart of Spain does not 
participate” (Balmes, 1925)51. Nevertheless, the term ‘nation’ did not appear in 
Catalan nationalist discourse until the latter part of the nineteenth century until 
which time the term patria or ‘fatherland’ was employed to refer to any 
manifestations of emotional affect such as language and popular traditions 
(Colomer, 1986). Thus, when Francesc Pi i Margall, one of the key figures of the 
Federal Republican Party referred to the ‘historic’ regions as “...almost all of them 
were nations in their day. They still retain their specific physiognomy and some 
are distinguished from the rest by the particularity and unity of their language, 
customs and laws”52, this type of reference would not become more commonplace 
until the latter part of the nineteenth century.
While in the Basque Country, some nationalist discourse began to adopt racial 
overtones to justify special status or privileges, emphasis on a specific 
‘physiognomy’ or a ‘special people’ rarely appeared in Catalan nationalist 
discourse (Mar-Molinero and Smith, 1996). The emerging Catalanist movement 
did focus on the glorification of the Middle Ages as the Golden Age of Catalan 
nationhood and culture during which Catalonia had been a major Mediterranean 
trade and sea power and Catalan culture and language had enjoyed a period of
50 El Nuevo Vapor, Num. 7, November 2, 1835, p. 3 (author’s translation).
51 Author’s translation.
52 Pi i Margall 1877, 1936 edn, p. 274, quoted in Mar-Molinero, C. and Smith, A. (eds), 
Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula. Berg: Oxford, p. 5.
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renaissance. Catalan as well as Basque in the Basque Country and Galician in 
Galicia remained a widely spoken language and the desire to protect Catalan 
language and culture became increasingly widespread as the centralising 
tendencies of the Spanish became more and more evident resulting in new form of 
‘linguistic patriotism’ (Colomer, 1986).
This cultural revivalism, along with the role of economic interests and 
disenchantment with the Spanish state detailed above, combined to form the 
leading impetus behind the development of Catalanism. Catalan society was 
characterised by a strong bourgeois class with a progressive approach, specifically 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, towards the modernisation and 
industrialisation of Catalan society. These strong influences were channelled into 
the organisation of various social and political movements towards the end of 
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. Nevertheless, Catalanism, as 
the Catalan nationalist movement has been called, did not develop as a bourgeois 
political perspective, later to be transformed into a popular movement of mass 
appeal. Instead, Catalanism became a hybrid of differing political traditions - 
federalism, republicanism, separatism, regionalism, nationalism, urban radicalism, 
rural traditionalism - stemming from varying sectors of Catalan society; 
conservative landowners, protectionist industrialists, the enlightened bourgeoisie, 
working class radicals and intellectuals. From initial provincialism to republican 
federalism, Catalanism began to voice greater demands for regional autonomy, 
decentralisation of the Spanish state and recognition of the distinctiveness of 
Catalonia. Nevertheless, within these groups themselves, there were divisions on 
the degree to which this Catalanism should be expressed. Some of the same 
classes or social elites were also anti-Catalanist. Some were regionalist and others 
continued to be anti-nationalist. Thus, from the beginning the Catalan nationalist 
movement would continue to attract both supporters and critics from a variety of 
social backgrounds.
On the cultural and linguistic fronts, the latter part of the nineteenth century was 
characterised by a ‘renaissance’ of Catalan culture and the development of a 
historical consciousness with a renewed emphasis on the Catalan language and 
literature. This movement was partially inspired by nationalist movements
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elsewhere in Europe promoting Romanticist ideas and a new form of cultural 
nationalism (Mar-Molinero, 1996). The rapid process of industrialisation in 
Catalonia led to a heightening of the hecho diferencial53 which in its affective 
context represented the feelings of differentiation in historic, cultural, linguistic 
and economic terms experienced by numerous sectors of Catalan society. Unlike 
Basque nationalism however, Catalanism embraced modernisation of the Spanish 
state and industrialisation of the economy as part of a seemingly contradictory 
strategy. On the one hand, there was constant reference to a mythical past of 
Catalonia’s ‘greatness’ in language, culture and commerce which naturally 
consolidated its distinctiveness. On the other hand, Catalonia was seen as a key 
contributor to the modernisation of the Spanish state and economy.
These heightened feelings of differentiation were reflected in an emerging 
political literary movement during the latter part of the nineteenth century which 
addressed the themes of republicanism, regionalism, nationalism and federalism 
within the Catalan context. This movement was in part influenced by 
modernisme, a term which appeared in Catalonia in 1884 in the journal L ’Aveng, 
representing a movement which would prove to be the intellectual driving force 
behind the transformation of Catalanism from a regionalist and traditionalist 
background to a modem nationalist outlook. Towards the beginning of the 
twentieth century however, Catalanism increasingly became influenced by 
noucentisme, a doctrine based on the belief that human beings are able to control 
their surroundings over and above the forces of nature and society based upon 
rationality and classicism.
53 The hecho diferencial which in literal terms is difficult to translate represents the 
characteristics (real or perceived) which distinguish one community from another. These 
characteristics can be ethnic, linguistic, historical or cultural. In political and constitutional 
terms, the concept has been interpreted as applicable to any autonomous community which 
enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy in the form offueros or otherwise, or possessed 
institutions of self-government prior to the Second Republic. The concept has frequently been 
employed in Catalan nationalist discourse as a justification for certain policy initiatives (the 
Catalan linguistic law passed in 1997, Senate reform and autonomous community financing) 
and to ensure the differentiation between the ‘historic’ nationalities/communities and all other 
autonomous communities within the Spanish state. Its closest English translation would be the 
notion of ‘distinct society’ as employed in Quebecois nationalist discourse.
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Within this literary movement and cultural revival54, a series of individuals rose to 
prominence and collectively formed part of an influential Catalan civil society 
which led the emergence of a strong sense of national identity at the cultural level. 
Towards the end of the century this would become the core of Catalan nationalist 
ideology, later to constitute the ideological basis for a political movement of self- 
government (Llobera, 1994). The movement promoted a new form of cultural 
nationalism in which “Catalan national identity was seen as a result of historical 
destiny”55. These writers and intellectuals, predominantly from the Catalan 
illustrated bourgeoisie, played a key role in the development of a collective 
Catalan conscience, reinforced by a rejection of the dominant position of the 
Spanish state.
The desire to protect Catalan cultural and linguistic heritage56 was only one reason 
why the Catalan nationalist movement quickly developed into several strong and 
well-organised political parties. Mar-Molinero and Smith point out that despite 
the fact that the use of the Galician language was by far more common than either 
Catalan or Basque, the nationalist movement in Galicia was weaker than the 
movements in either Catalonia or the Basque country. This ‘type’ of nationalism 
attracted social groups that felt isolated from central government and targeted by 
its specific policies. Cultural revivalism seemed to tie in closely with the rapid 
economic development enjoyed by Catalonia throughout much of the nineteenth 
century. Nevertheless, it does seem clear that cultural nationalism in the form of 
the Renaixenqa and other expressions of Catalan culture and identity did precede 
any political articulations of nationalism.
One of the first authors to emerge from the political literary movement was 
Valenti Almirall, who, in his publication Lo Catalanisme (1886) equated the 
modernisation of Catalan society with both the defence of Catalan economic 
interests and traditional aspects of Catalan culture such as language and literature
54 The first Joes Florals were held in 1859 in Barcelona and newspapers published in Catalan 
began to appear in 1865, with the first daily newspaper Diari Catala published by Valenti Almirall 
appearing in 1879.
5 Balfour, S. (1997) The End of the Spanish Empire 1989-1923, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.
135.
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which he argued formed the core elements of Catalan national identity. Almirall 
referred to these elements of differentiation as particularisme or a type of special 
‘distinctiveness’ which marked, as he claimed, Catalonia’s special character. Like 
his literary successors, Almirall did not advocate separatism as a potential 
objective for the Catalan nation. Instead, until his defection from federalism and 
his shift towards urban republicanism in the 1880s, Almirall promoted a federalist 
framework for the Spanish state in his Bases para la Constitution federal de la 
Nation espanola y  para la del Estado de Cataluna (1868). This would entail the 
disappearance of the centralist state and the establishment of federal states 
observing the boundaries encompassing historical regions which constituted the 
former Crown of Aragon. Thus, the federalist vision advocated the creation of a 
Spanish state and nation through democratic, republican and federal channels. 
Nevertheless, the federalist movement was paralyzed by its failed effort to 
proclaim a Catalan State within a Federal Republic of Spain in 1873 following the 
Tortosa Pact, driven by Almirall in 1869, uniting the territories57 which had 
constituted the Crown of Aragon under a federal framework. The federalist vision 
would not attract widespread support among all sectors and classes of Catalan 
society. This was due to the Catalan bourgeoisie and upper classes’ opposition to 
social reform and their reliance on the central government to prevent any social or 
collective upheaval (Balcells, 1977). Despite its eventual failure to attract 
extensive support across all sectors of Catalan society, federalism was able to 
influence the ideological course of Catalanism particularly with regards to 
concepts of nation and identity. It was able to instil into the Catalan collective 
conscience notions of nationhood and the pursuit of political objectives from 
within a state framework. It also promoted the concept of a dual identity 
combining a strong emotional and historical attachment to Catalan identity with a 
pragmatic loyalty to the Spanish state in search of solutions of compromise and 
co-operation.
The conflict between progressive Catalan republicans and/or federalists and 
conservative regionalists characterized the emergence of Catalanism in the late
56 This followed the abolition in 1825 of the use of Catalan in schools and its regional
administration in 1845.
57 These included Catalonia, Valencia, the Baleares Islands and Aragon.
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Almirall himself would leave the 
Catalan federalist movement after intense disagreements with the more 
conciliatory Pi i Margall and go on to form the Centre Catala in 1882, an 
organisation created in the follow-up of the first Catalan Congress in which 
projects for the establishment of a Catalan Civil Code and an academy for Catalan 
language were approved. The establishment of the Centre Catala was an attempt 
to integrate the varying tendencies within Catalanism and despite its initial 
attempts to be a cultural forum, it quickly began to undertake varying forms of 
political activity.
Another key influence in the development of the Catalan nationalist movement 
was the historical and unquestionable dominance of the Catholic Church 
throughout the Spanish state. The well organised Church hierarchy in Catalonia 
played a crucial role in the Renaixenga. Bishop Josep Torras i Bages published La 
tradicio catalana in 1892 which highlighted the inextricable link between 
Catholicism and Catalan national identity. In addition, the Church was closely 
associated with the Carlist movement in rural Catalonia associating the defence of 
traditional values with the defence of Catalan identity and language (Balfour, 
1997). In 1880, the millennium celebrations surrounding the establishment of 
Montserrat transformed this religious sanctuary into a symbol of popular 
Catalanism. Despite not being central to Catalan nationalist political activity, the 
Church and specifically Catholic values have played a central role in the 
emergence of conservative traditional values in Catalanism, perhaps as a form of 
‘civil religion’ (Llobera, 1994), both at the turn of the century, during the Primo 
de Rivera58 and Franco59 regimes, and in contemporary Catalan politics.
The influence of the Church and the conservative tendencies of the Catalan 
bourgeoisie led to the creation of the Lliga de Catalunya, a predecessor of the 
Unio Catalanista and the subsequent Lliga Regionalista in 1887 from the most
58 Francesc d’Assis Vidal, Cardinal and Archbishop of Tarragona, struggled during this time 
for the autonomy of the Church vis-a-vis the State in allowing all Church business, including 
mass, sermons and cathecism to be conducted in Catalan. During the Civil War he was exiled
to France and never returned.
59 With the “volem bisbes Catalans” (we want Catholic bishops) campaign following the 
Vatican II.
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conservative wing of Almirall’s Centre Catala. This new entity promoted a 
romantic, historical and socially conservative view of Catalanism, inspired by a 
reevaluation and reinterpretation of Catalonia’s medieval past and its most 
glorious moments. The organisations supporting the Lliga included some of the 
more conservative elements of Catalan society including the Fomento del Trabajo 
National, the Instituto Agricola Catalan de San Isidro, the Ateneo Barcelones, the 
Liga de Defensa Industrial y  Comercial and the Sociedad Economica de Amigos 
del Pais. The two organisations collided frequently, most notably during the 1888 
Joes Florals60 in which Queen Maria Cristina was invited to preside the ceremony 
by the Lliga de Catalunya, an act opposed by the Centre Catala.
The first conference demanding the return of Catalan autonomy and the protection 
of Catalan language, culture and identity (Bases de Manresa) was held in 1892 
organised by the Unio Catalanista (Catalanist Union). The Bases de Manresa, in 
line with conservative and traditionalist Catalanism, supported by the Church in 
the form of Torras i Bages’ involvement in the drafting of the document, proposed 
an autonomous political framework for Catalonia, based on comarques (counties) 
and municipalities and organised by means of an elected assembly constituted by 
restricted suffrage. The Bases also established the concept of a Catalan 
nationality by stipulating that all civil servants and military officials working in 
Catalonia were required to be Catalan (Base 5). The Bases defended the official 
use of Catalan as the sole official language of Catalonia and despite its 
conservative objectives, would become the ideological manifesto relied upon by 
subsequent Catalanist movements or parties - such as the Lliga Regionalista. 
Again however, the defections suffered by the Centre Catala in 1873 and the 
subsequent friction among the various movements with Catalanism reflected the 
tension between the two main currents of Catalanism: the conservative agrarian 
and the urban radical or progressive wings (Balcells, 1977).
60 A manifesto signed by the Unio Catalanista was presented to the Queen which called for - 
among other things - the division of Spain in regions whose boundaries were determined by 
language and history, administrative decentralisation and the establishment of a central 
government whose only functions would include around maintaining the political unity of 
Spain, solidarity among regions and foreign relations.
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The Lliga Regionalista
The so-called ‘Catalan problem’ increasingly began to preoccupy the Spanish 
political elite with the introduction of universal male suffrage and even led to the 
proposal of a military ‘solution’ during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (Moreno, 
1997). This preoccupation stemmed from the establishment of a regionalist 
political party called the Lliga Regionalista61 (1901-33) founded by Enric Prat de 
la Riba and Francesc Cambo, among others. The Lliga differed from its 
predecessor Unio Catalanista in that the former was a proper political party while 
the latter remain a co-ordinated platform of varying ideological positions. 
Although the Lliga was predominantly composed of members of the bourgeoisie, 
many traditional rural conservatives echoed their demands for the decentralisation 
of the centralised political structure of the Spanish state. The Catalan bourgeoisie 
had grown increasingly bewildered at the inability of the Spanish state to foster 
industrial development and economic restructuring (Keating, 1997). Indeed, they 
became frustrated with the Spanish state’s inherent corruption and inability to 
impose law and order, and by voicing demands for greater tariff protection for 
Catalonia’s powerful textile industry. The disastrous economic consequences of 
the loss of Spain’s colonies was also the driving force of bourgeois Catalanism. 
The creation of the Lliga was a direct result of the central government’s refusal in 
1899 to honour a promise, in return for the Catalan bourgeoisie’s political support, 
to grant Catalonia a fiscal agreement with substantial measures of autonomy 
similar to that obtained by the Basques in 1882. Thus, the years following the 
1898 Disaster saw a frenzy of political activity developing in both Madrid and 
Catalonia with the emergence of a new political vision and strategy among the 
Catalan bourgeoisie: Spain would be regenerated from a politically active and 
culturally/economically superior Catalonia. The debate on the chaotic condition 
of the Spanish state intensified. Authors such as Joan Maragall in his poem Oda a 
Espanva which ended on the controversial note of “Adeu, Espanya/” (Goodbye, 
Spain!) reinforced a growing view that Catalan self-government was preferable to 
enduring the corruption and misadministration of the Spanish central government.
61 Renamed Lliga Catalana during the Second Republic.
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Generally however, organised Catalan nationalism was primarily distinguishable 
by class with sections of non-immigrant working class nationalists generally being 
isolated or ignored (Smith, A. 1996a). These groups considered Catalan 
nationalism as only an element of the greater goal of eliminating social and
f%yeconomic inequalities . Thus, Catalan nationalism increasingly began to be 
associated with traditional conservative Catalan ideology, incorporating the 
Church, family values, and rural culture (Oltra, Benjamin, Francesc Mercade, and 
Francesc Hernandez, 1981 and Smith, 1996). This was in sharp contrast with the 
urban radicalism, labour conflict and anti-clericalism that characterised working 
class political activism during this period culminating in the events of the Tragic 
Week (26 July - 1 August) of Barcelona in 1909. Following the Tragic Week, the 
cleavages based on class and demands for democratisation that characterised 
Catalanism became evident. The central government, in an attempt to appease the 
conservative Catalan bourgeoisie - fearful of the economic and political 
repercussions of a democratic modernisation of the Spanish state - granted various 
economic concessions and subsidies. The Lliga's toleration of the central 
government’s repressive actions following the Tragic Week merely served to 
reinforce the perception held by both the republican left and anarchist movements, 
that Catalan nationalism was synonymous with the protection of traditional 
bourgeois and capitalist interests (Smith, 1996) (Diez Medrano, 1994). Thus, the 
Catalan nationalist movement continued to be unable to attract support across the 
various classes of Catalan society reinforced by the Lliga's periodic alliance with 
Madrid’s centralist forces. This was particularly evident during periods of social 
and political upheaval when the Catalan bourgeoisie would back down in its 
demands for a transformation of the Spanish state and of fundamental democratic 
and decentralised reform if this entailed the institutionalisation of working class 
movements and the dismantling of economic protectionist barriers. This mistrust 
in the Lliga's true motives was clearly reflected in its disastrous electoral results 
in 1910 when the Catalan left and the Lerrouxists managed to defeat the Lliga to 
the point where it was no longer represented in the Barcelona city council.
62 In addition, there were inherent contradictions with left-wing support of nationalism and 
socialist centralism.
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Catalan politics would continue to be characterised by sharp divisions between 
rural conservative nationalism and urban working class radicalism throughout the 
first three decades of the twentieth century. The divisions were fuelled sharply by 
the continuous influx of immigrants from other areas in Spain. It has been 
estimated that over 547,000 immigrants entered Catalonia between 1910 and 1930 
up from 59,230 in the period between 1877 and 1887 and 110,439 between 1887 
and 1897 (Rebagliato, 1978) (Marfany, 1995). Working class politics threatened 
to destabilise many of the small measures of autonomy gained from the Lliga's 
dealings with the central government and served to fuel the bourgeoisie’s 
traditional fears of a breakdown in law and order. Working class organisations 
and political parties, many of which were anarchist controlled such as the 
Federation Anarquista Iberica (FAI), promoted violent strikes, bombing, 
murders, and demonstrations. Thus, the Lliga was countered by a variety of 
movements, most notably the fiercely anticlerical and antiCatalan movement led 
by Alejandro Lerroux and the Unio Republicana and left-wing splinter groups 
from within the Lliga itself. These groups were led, among others, by Francesc 
Cambo, who advocated the idea of Catalan identity as being more important than 
class differences (Balfour, 1997). With the creation of Solidaritat Catalana 
(Catalan Solidarity) by the Lliga in 1906 until its eventual demise following the 
Tragic Week, the expectation was that a political movement would be created 
which would go beyond class differences and unite Catalan demands for 
autonomy and the protection of Catalan language and culture. Solidaritat 
Catalana was created following the approval of legislation by the Spanish Cortes 
in 1906 which brought under military jurisdiction all written or spoken criticism 
against the unity of the state or the integrity of the armed forces. The platform 
attempted to integrated all Catalan political forces including the Carlists, Unio 
Catalanista, federalists, Unio Republicana, and the Centre Nacionalista 
Republica. Again however, this platform was unable to absorb all sectors of 
Catalan society, including monarchists, Lerrouxists, and representatives from 
Catalan organised labour. Its political platform presented in the 1907 general and 
provincial elections essentially revolved around opposition to the Jurisdictions 
Law but was able to gather 41 out of the 44 contested seats. Nevertheless, the 
platform which held together Solidaritat Catalana fell victim to its own internal 
dissent with opposing positions appearing with the Maura government’s local
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administration law and the debate over cultural provisions in the Barcelona’s 1908 
municipal budget. The 1909 municipal elections during which the left and right 
wings of the movement presented separate candidates and the events following 
the Tragic Week meant the end for one of Catalanism’s first attempts to integrate 
varying political forces in a common nationalist platform.
The Lliga’s programme, drafted in La nacionalitat catalana (1906) by Prat de la 
Riba voiced the party’s demands for an autonomous government for Catalonia 
and promoted the concept of a Catalan ‘nationality’ and nationhood without 
advocating separatism. Prat de la Riba’s writings, like his predecessors’, 
attempted to show the imbalance between Catalonia’s economic strength and its 
weak political position within the Spanish state. He considered the Spanish state 
as an artificial entity, no longer capable of responding to modem demands and a 
danger for the future well-being of Catalonia. Prat de la Riba’s writings were 
greatly influenced by German Romantic writers (Mar-Molinero, 1996) reflecting 
the pro-European and international sensibilities of the mainstream nationalist 
movement. They also reflected the influence during the first three decades of the 
twentieth century of noucentisme with its emphasis on setting European standards 
for Catalonia. The European dimension was emphasized with frequent references 
to the cultural and economic superiority of other European nations. Thus, the 
cases of Swiss nationality, French equality and English liberty were seen as 
applicable in the Catalan case (Ehrlich, 1998). Prat de la Riba’s concept of a 
Spanish state whereby the boundaries of its regions were based upon linguistic 
and historic differentiations clearly viewed a reorganisation of the state as a 
natural ordering of entities and peoples, based upon language and nationalities. 
Prat’s writings, as did the writings of other leading thinkers of the Catalan 
nationalist movement, reflect convictions that Catalonia’s situation was similar to 
that experienced by other nations or nationalities of the time (Hungary, Flanders 
and Ireland are only some examples). Conceptions at the core of Romanticism 
such as pluralism and nostalgia for the past (Llobera, 1994) became integral parts 
of Catalan nationalist ideology, elements which have carried over to modem 
nationalist discourse. Ironically, this pro-European vision contrasted sharply with 
the traditional conservative base of the movement, with rural Catalonia having 
been one of the bastions of Carlism during the three Carlist wars in the nineteenth
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century. Thus, Prat de la Riba’s writings would consolidate the conservative 
rather than progressive trends originated by federal and Catholic predecessors 
such as Almirall and Torras i Bages and would greatly influence Catalan 
nationalist discourse throughout most of the twentieth century.
Despite its conservative overtones, the Lliga's programme was seen by many of 
Madrid’s political class as a full fledged demand for a separate state with its 
republican ideals. The Lliga, however, was important in that it provided a political 
base for demands for regionalist autonomy, political decentralisation and 
federalism. It was a more a Spanish political party rather than the true political 
representative of the Catalan nationalist movement (Ehrlich, 1998) with 
regionalist yet deeply conservative objectives. It remained however, a powerful 
instrument of “regional representation, not the embryo of revolutionary bourgeois 
nationalism”63. It was able to extract concessions from the central government in 
the form of the creation of the Mancomunitat in 1914 with Prat de la Riba as its 
president. Despite its short existence64, the Mancomunitat it provided some 
semblance of institutional autonomy encompassing all four Catalan provinces. 
The Lliga retained its ambiguous policy of promoting timid attempts at 
regionalisation while at the time acting as pressure group within the Spanish 
political system without formally breaking away from the two main parties in 
power. It did not venture forth on a purely autonomist strategy hindered by its 
collaboration with the central government in times of crisis65. Although some 
have argued that the Lliga posed an obstacle to any real process of regionalisation 
or devolution in Catalonia (Sole-Tura, 1974), the Lliga's existence was important 
in consolidating the moderate element of Catalanism into an organised political 
entity.
Thus, its existence was important for several reasons. First, it promoted the idea 
of a dual identity for Catalans with loyalty, in ambiguous terms, to both the 
Spanish state and the Catalan nation. Secondly, it was a clear example of a
OJ Balfour (1997), p. 134.
64 The Mancomunitat was abolished by the Primo de Rivera dictatorship in 1923.
65 Ironically, Lliga deputies sat with other traditionalist and rightist forces such as the Bloque 
Nacional and the CEDA in the Spanish Cortes during the Second Republic.
80
movement, whether nationalist or regionalist by nature, which did not call for the 
creation of a separate state, clearly reflecting a high degree of moderation inherent 
in Catalanism. Instead, the Lliga’s contribution to the development of the Catalan 
nationalist movement was the growing realisation among many sectors of Catalan 
society (particularly those skeptical or fearful of radical nationalist/secessionist 
demands) that compromise solutions for the ‘Catalan problem’ within the Spanish 
state could be found66. The Lliga was also able to combine the forces of both the 
traditional Catalan rural conservatives and the emerging industrialist bourgeoisie. 
Traditional conceptions of nationalism promoting the recognition of the plurality 
of the Spanish state merged with regionalist and autonomist demands reflecting 
deep- seated dissatisfaction with the corruption, backwardness and inefficiency of 
the central administration. Not only was the affirmation of Catalan identity and 
autonomy seen as an objective but also the fundamental transformation of the 
Spanish state as a modem albeit conservative nation-state. Thirdly, the Lliga 
became the first of numerous attempts to provide a political front67 for the 
mainstream Catalan nationalist movement. Furthermore, its defence of the Catalan
/ • o
language and culture provided a politically symbolic link which went beyond 
economic and class cleavages despite its greater appeal in Catalan bourgeois and 
industrial circles. Its efforts in creating the Mancomunitat provided a brief sense 
of historical unity to Catalanism and established an administrative and 
bureaucratic framework to facilitate economic development in Catalonia. Even 
more importantly, the Lliga and particularly the intellectual movement 
surrounding it came to use language (advertently or inadvertently) as a political 
tool and symbol of the Catalan collective identity. Finally, the establishment of 
the Lliga reinforced a political strategy that sought to secure greater levels of 
Catalan autonomy within the legal configuration of the Spanish state. This 
political strategy allowed the Lliga to participate in Spanish politics by entering in 
the government by coalition in July 1917. The Lliga’s strategy reflected the 
underlying ‘nationalist ambivalence’ (Marfany, 1995) of the mainstream Catalan
66 Article 1 of the Lliga's statute stipulated that “the object of the Lliga is the defence of the 
interests and the recovery of the rights of Catalonia, working by all legal means to achieve the 
autonomy of the Catalan people within the Spanish state” (author’s translation).
67 For example, in its campaign for the defence of the Catalan Civil Code in 1889.
68 Prat de la Riba wrote in the Lliga's mouthpiece La Veu de Catalunya (13 January 1913) that 
the “possession of a literary language is the consecration of nationality”.
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nationalist movement. This ambivalence was clear with the interpretation of the 
concepts of sovereignty and independence but more often, the reassertion of 
Catalan identity, language and culture. Again, this concept of ‘nationalist 
ambivalence’ would remain an underlying theme within Catalan nationalist 
discourse throughout the twentieth century into modem Catalan politics.
Men such as Francesc Cambo, Jaume Bofill i Mates, Lluis Duran i Ventosa, Enric 
Prat de la Riba, Francesc Pi i Margall and Antoni Rovira i Virgili all played an 
important role in promoting the Catalan nationalist cause in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. The nationalist discourse on which these authors, 
thinkers and politicians elaborated, emphasized the primordialist origins of 
Catalan identity and historical consciousness. This emphasis was reflected in 
Duran’s 1905 publication Regionalisme i Federalisme in which he attempted, 
from a conservative and regional perspective, to define a national or ethnic 
consciousness as the “hereditary community of spirit, sentiment, and race between 
a group of men of different professions and status...(that feels united by culture 
and origin, especially by language and customs)”69. Rovira i Virgili, author of El 
Nacionalisme (1916) also attempted, from a romanticist point of view and clearly 
influenced by other European thinkers, to define a Catalan ‘nation’ as a natural 
entity that had evolved throughout history. He defined Spain as a federation 
based on the plurality, in linguistic and nationality terms, of its own ‘natural’ 
composition. Throughout the twentieth century, this sense of shared destiny and 
nationhood has been expanded upon in both the nationalist discourse and policy 
terms. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the political activity transpiring 
both in Madrid and Catalonia, the process of Catalan industrialisation and its 
benefits, the emergence of the Renaixenga, and the events following the 1898 
Disaster all contributed to the evolution of a conservative traditional form of 
Catalanism. The consolidation of Catalanism occurred despite high levels of class 
conflict and the marginalisation suffered by certain sectors of Catalan society in 
the new Catalanist project.
69 Quoted in Ehrlich, C. (1998), “Early twentieth-century Catalan regionalist theory: Lluis Duran i 
Ventosa, his times, and the influence of the Austrian Empire”, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 4, 
No. 2, April 1998, p. 209.
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The Second Republic and the outbreak o f the Spanish Civil War 
Following Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship, a variety of nationalist movements and 
parties were established to compete with the Lliga, most notably Francesc Macia’s 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC). ERC united several leftist parties 
and derived from Macia’s original separatist Estat Catala following the 1931 
Conferencia dEsquerres Catalanes (Conference of the Catalan Left). Unlike the 
Lliga Regionalista (renamed the Lliga Catalana in 1933), ERC united various 
sectors of the non-immigrant working class and represented a more progressive 
leftist view of Catalanism. Forming a coalition with the Socialist Union of 
Catalonia and the major anarchist union CNT, ERC received 47% of the vote in 
Barcelona during the municipal elections of 1931 while the Lliga only received 
20%. Throughout the Second Republic, ERC would remain the most powerful 
party of the Catalan nationalist movement occupying the presidency of the 
Generalitat and contributing to the approval of the 1932 Catalan Autonomy 
Statute. Other working class parties, mostly immigrant based, were not so 
fortunate and were not able to consolidate their position. They remained 
marginalised from the Catalan political system despite their efforts to introduce 
nationalist overtones to socialism and working class politics. ERC’s main 
contribution to the development of the Catalan nationalist movement was its 
attempt to integrate wider sectors of Catalan society into the nationalist project, 
not always successful. It also introduced a new interpretation to Catalan identity 
tying loyalty to Catalonia not to blood or birthright but to a desire to share a 
common political vision of economic and social reform.
The proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic in 1931 coincided with the 
proclamation of a Catalan Republic and State by Macia. Following negotiations 
with the Republican government in the San Sebastian Pact, the Generalitat was 
established with a promised Catalan Statute. Despite widespread fears within 
Spain that Catalan ambitions of separatism would be fulfilled, a Catalan Statute of 
Autonomy (Estatut de Nuria) was debated and subsequently put to referendum in 
August 1931, with an approval rate of over 90% despite the limited participation 
rate (only male suffrage being recognised). This concession by the Republican 
government was part of its project to transform the Spanish state into a regional 
state somewhere between a federalist and unitary state (Moreno, 1997). The
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‘Catalan problem’ or ‘regional problem’ proved to be so serious that it 
undermined the fragile institutional foundations set up by the Republic (Moreno, 
1997).
The 1932 Statute designated Catalonia as an autonomous region within the 
Spanish state (Article 1). The Catalan language was declared, along with 
Castilian, as the two official languages (Article 2) in Catalonia but Catalan itself 
was designated as the llengua propia or ‘own language’ of Catalonia in the 
Internal Statute (Article 3) approved by the Catalan Parliament in 1933. The 
Internal Statute also required primary education to be conducted in Catalan by 
nature of “its spirit” (Title II, Article 11). The Republic had already decreed 
Spain to be an “integral State, compatible with the autonomy of its municipalities 
and regions” (Article 1) in the 1931 Constitution. This vision of the state was 
intended to provide a compromise between the federal state sought by many 
Catalan nationalists and the unitary state sought by those who feared the 
disintegration of the Spanish state. The final result was seen by one of the drafters 
of the 1931 Constitution as a solution to “all that referred to the antithesis of the 
federal State and the unitary State” and whereby each region would “receive the 
autonomy it deserves according to its degree of culture and progress”70. The 
differentiations inherent in the Spanish state were recognised with the growing 
acceptance that the Catalan problem was inseparable from the need to transform 
the Spanish state. Catalan nationalists would continue to support the Second 
Republic throughout its existence until its demise at the end of the Civil War. The 
first few years of the Civil War witnessed the highest degree of autonomy enjoyed 
by the Generalitat with the establishment of the various Juntes de la Generalitat 
to guarantee internal law and order and the creation in 1936 of the Junta de 
Comerg Exterior to promote Catalan foreign commercial relations.
The development of the Catalan nationalist movement during the first third of the 
twentieth century also saw the resolution of several obstacles, which allowed it to 
attract broader support. The Catalan peasantry and agrarian upper classes began 
to adapt to the industrialisation and introduction of a market oriented society.
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Carlism and elements of traditional Catalanism were integrated into the nationalist 
movement, thereby increasing its support (Diez Medrano, 1994) (Marfany, 1995). 
At the time of the approval of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy and the 
subsequent outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, demands for Catalan autonomy cut 
across traditional cleavages such as the urban-rural divide. It attracted the support 
of the agrarian upper classes, intelligentsia, urban bourgeoisie and the peasantry, 
though not all. The primary difference within this broad platform was the degree 
to which each faction supported the desired levels of self-government. Internal 
dissent did not however reach the levels of polarisation suffered by the Basque 
nationalist movement. Nevertheless, support from lowest classes of Catalan 
society for Catalan nationalism continued to remain lukewarm.
The Franco Regime
The Civil War has been described as a “bloody manifestation of Spain’s multiple
<71 n*y
identity crises’ or “an obsession with ‘national unity’” . Those on the winning 
side viewed Spain’s regional problem, an internal issue, as an external enemy or 
conspiracy designed to destroy the unity of the Spanish state, against which all 
military efforts would be exerted. Catalonia’s Autonomy Statute was repealed in 
1938 with the military occupation of Catalonia. It was followed by the Franco 
regime with its brutal centralising tendencies and its denial of the existence of 
historic, cultural and linguistic minorities within the Spanish state. The Franco 
regime viewed the territorial organisation established by the Second Republic as a 
powerful threat to the unity of the Spanish state. This pervasive thinking was to 
remain one of the untouched foundations of the regime’s ideology throughout its 
existence, part of a longstanding political tradition in Spanish history to reject any 
attempts at internal territorial, political and cultural reconciliation.
Nevertheless, it was during this period that the Spanish state began to undergo an 
intense process of state-building with the creation of a large administrative and 
bureaucratic network designed to carry out the regime’s policies and ensure the
70 Speech by Jimenez de Asua in his presentation of the constitutional project in Diario de 
Sesiones de las Cortes, 27 August 1931.
71 Mar-Molinero, C. (1996), p. 81.
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maintenance of opposition-free law and order. This process of state-building was 
justified by the regime’s continual references to a Spanish patria or fatherland 
rather than a Spanish nation. This latter concept enjoyed close links with 
nineteenth century liberal interpretations of sovereignty and the modem state 
(Colomer, 1986) something emphatically rejected by the Franco regime.
Despite an official government policy of cultural and linguistic censorship, 
Catalan civil society flourished, particularly during the last few years of the 
regime. Within Catalonia itself, clandestine opposition groups, students, and 
intellectuals met on a regular basis to attempt to co-ordinate some sort of 
opposition to the Franco regime. Josep Tarradellas, Finance Councillor before 
and during the Civil War, took over the Presidency of the Generalitat in exile . 
The Assemblea de Catalunya was constituted in 1971 assembling most political 
forces and promoting important mass mobilisations and campaigns - such as 
Volem I ’Estatut and Per I ’us oficial de la llengua catalana - to demand amnesty 
for all political prisoners, democratic freedoms and the return of the 1932 
Autonomy Statute. Organisations such as the Consell Nacional de Catalunya and 
the Consell Nacional de la Democracia Catalana cut across party lines and class 
cleavages to unite much of the regime’s opposition forces in exile. They 
demanded the restoration of the Generalitat and the 1932 Statute despite 
diverging views of the exact nature of the eventual structure of the Spanish state.
One of the ConselV s leaders, Carles Pi Sunyer, parting from a federal vision of the 
Spanish state, attempted to define the Catalan nation as a historical entity with 
deep cultural and linguistic roots. He combined this vision with the idea of a 
political nation, one whereby all Catalans would unite in defence of a common 
political project, defending the Catalan nation as a natural phenomenon and 
promoting a reformulation of the Spanish state as a necessary complement. Pi 
Sunyer rejected the violent manifestations of nationalism of the German Third 
Reich experience yet recognised that the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century notions of sovereignty for the people had been destroyed by the 
ideological excesses of the Second World War. Instead, Pi Sunyer advocated a
72 Conversi, D. (1997) The Basques, the Catalans and Spain. London: Hurst & Company, p.
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model of national unity based upon the British experiment, with strong nationalist 
sentiment and loyalty to the state’s democratic institutions without resorting to a 
federal solution. In his writings, Pi Sunyer promoted a socially integrated vision 
of Catalanism with references to its glorious past to promote a sense of national 
unity. Again, the unity was cemented by a common political project, that of the 
modernisation and transformation of the Spanish state. Rovira i Virgili’s writings 
in exile also indicate a more socially integrated vision than his predecessor Prat de 
la Riba, encompassing all classes and sectors of society as a Romantic 
manifestation of the Catalan ‘soul’ combined with the pragmatic requirements of 
a political project. From a more separatist perspective at the end of the Civil War, 
Rovira i Virgili moved towards a more moderate solution of the Catalan problem, 
allowing for the expression of Catalanism from within the confines of the Spanish 
state by redefining Catalonia’s relations with the Spanish state.
The traditional political centralism envisaged by immigrant and non-immigrant 
working class politics and socialist parties, particularly the PSUC, also began to 
undergo substantial modifications, influenced by working with progressive 
Catalanists in the struggle against the regime. Thus, their ideological strategy 
began to shift towards combining an overhaul of economic modes of production 
and a renewal of nationalist sentiment. Transforming the state was seen as a 
solution to the social conflict which had characterised society for centuries. Social 
conflict was perceived as not only revolving around class struggle but also as a 
crisis of ‘nations’ or peoples that were bound together by linguistic and cultural 
ties as a new form of a collective conscience. Inequalities were to be viewed in 
socio-economic but also in political, cultural and linguistic terms. PSUC leaders 
such as Joan Comorera and Manuel Serra Monet envisaged a Spanish 
confederation based upon the regions’ right to self-determination and a European 
confederation which Catalonia could join independently. Again, the idea of 
joining European ‘high civility’ and the goal of becoming European citizens were, 
similar to the Lliga"s strategy, objectives for Catalonia to aspire to in order to 
become a modem and democratic society. Thus, PSUC leaders began to view the 
popular or working classes as a driving force in the Catalanist project and the
110.
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fundamental transformation of the Spanish state. Socialist and Marxist-Leninist 
ideology began to distinguish the concept of ‘nation’ in its affective and natural 
context from that of the ‘state’, as something artificial and a logical consequence 
of the ‘nation’. References to Catalonia’s medieval past and its distinct language 
and culture became more common place in socialist discourse. A more pragmatic 
approach to the structuring of Catalonia’s relations with the Spanish state, 
stressing Catalonia’s potential contribution to this project, was adopted. 
Nevertheless, much of the left’s discourse on the Catalan nation and its role within 
the Spanish state resonated with conceptual ambiguities with no clear definitions 
on Catalonia’s right, if any, to self-determination and to the definitive political 
and territorial organisation of the Spanish state.
The ideological debate during the Franco regime among leftist opposition forces 
both within Catalonia and in exile was important for several reasons. First, it 
reinforced existing nationalist sentiment among sectors of Catalan society, most 
notably the working classes and immigrant population, who had felt isolated from 
the political projects advocated by the Lliga and other nationalist platforms or 
parties. This new form of nationalist discourse focused on the social leadership of 
the Catalan working classes who would engineer the course of Catalan 
nationalism, taking over the role exercised by the Catalan bourgeoisie at the turn 
of the century. Second, the broadening of the criteria - to create a more inclusive 
interpretation - as to who could be identified as Catalan contributed to an informal 
enfranchisement among previously isolated sections of Catalan society. Third, 
new conceptualisations of what constituted the Catalan ‘nation’ and what the 
eventual makeup or political formula of the Spanish state would encompass were 
introduced to a leftist political class previously more concerned with the 
emancipation of the working class and a fundamental restructuring of economic 
modes of production. Finally and despite diverging opinions as to the political 
formula and final constitutional solution to Spain’s regional problems - 
confederation, federation or semi-unitary state with high degrees of autonomy for 
its regions - a general affirmation of Catalonia’s status as a ‘nation’ (Colomer, 
1986) emerged as well as a growing recognition of the plurality of the Spanish 
state.
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Francoist repression and the state’s refusal to acknowledge existing cultures and 
languages within Spain which did not conform with the so-called Castilian model, 
the attempt to homogenize Spanish society by forcefully imposing a culture and 
ideology linked to the Castilian history and language, and the excessive 
centralised nature of the state led to the emergence of peripheral nationalist 
movements with a social and political bipolar platform. On the one hand, these 
groups wanted to overthrow the dictatorship and restore democracy. On the other, 
the social platform was based on the denunciation of the regime’s offensive 
against Spain’s diverse make-up of varying ethnic identities and cultures as well 
as the demand for autonomy for Spain’s ‘historic’ regions. As described above, 
experiences in exile and of the excesses of both the Spanish Civil War and Second 
World War led many of the opposition democratic forces, most notably the PCE 
and PSOE, to incorporate the demand for the recognition of Spain as a 
multicultural state into the struggle for democracy. This resulted in the creation of 
a dual purpose attracting more broad based support for those opposing the regime.
Resistance to the regime was particularly fierce in Catalonia and the Basque 
country. Hence, the “political milieu for the development of peripheral 
nationalism, regionalism and home rule ‘autonomism’ can be regarded in this 
respect as an ‘unwanted effect’ of Francoist hyper-centralist practices”73. The 
consolidation of Catalan nationalism, particularly after the 1960s was a direct 
effect of the excessive centralized and interventionist nature of the Franco regime 
based on a cause-effect model (Conversi 1995). Because state sponsored 
repression was directed against particular core values ingrained in the Catalan 
nationalist movement such as language, this only served to strengthen the capacity 
of mobilisation of the movement. Thus, “because of the repressive centralism of 
the Franco regime and the anti-Spanish nationalisms’ identification with the anti- 
Francoist struggle, the demand for autonomy and respect for one’s own language 
and ‘culture’ came to be seen as consubstantial with the democratisation of the 
Spanish State”74. An example of this reactive phenomenon would be the growing 
efforts during the 1950s and 1960s to protect Catalan language and culture with 
the publication of numerous journals and books in Catalan.
73 Moreno, L. (1995), p. 26.
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The Catalan nationalist movement underwent a substantial transformation during 
the Franco regime. Along with the dual political vision (democracy and 
autonomy) embraced by the regime’s opposition forces and reinforced during the 
Franco regime, the gradual progress achieved by Catalanism to attract supporters 
from all sectors of society was aided by the changes in the mid-1960s occurring 
within the Spanish Catholic Church75. The Church became a growing civic 
movement supporting a Catalan cultural and linguistic revival along with the 
increasing support given to nationalist demands by trade unions, business leaders, 
students, and political representatives traditionally ideologically opposed to each 
other (stemming from the PSUC, Catholic organisations, etc.). The 1950s and 
1960s saw a massive wave of internal migration comprised mostly of immigrants 
from Southern Spain, which by 1980 would make up approximately 40% of 
Catalonia’s total population (Rebagliato, 1978) (Gallagher, 1991). Despite it’s the 
clandestine conditions, the Catalan nationalist movement was once again able to 
gather support by combining issues and spanning the ideological divide. This was 
achieved by encouraging social and immigrant integration as well as the issues of 
the Catalan national question and the protection of Catalan history, language and 
culture. Aside from new efforts to integrate traditionally non-Catalanist sectors of 
Catalan society, nationalist discourse during the Franco regime focused on the 
reiteration, reinterpretation or revision of many of the ideological foundations 
instigated by late nineteenth and early twentieth century intellectuals and 
politicians such as Pi Margall, Torras i Bages and Prat de la Riba. Not only was 
Catalonia’s past glorified, but new debates emerged within both the traditional 
conservative and progressive nationalist circles as a result of the new influx of 
ideas and thinking emerging from both the Spanish Civil and Second World Wars. 
Differing opinions continued to revolve around the final political and 
constitutional solution to the Catalan problem but a broad based agreement did
74 Smith, A. and Mar-Molinero, C. (1996b), p. 23.
75 These changes refer specifically to a growing opposition to the Franco regime by an 
increasing segment of the Spanish Catholic hierarchy, the political radicalisation of priests in 
the Basque Country, and the general shift in priorities experienced by the Catholic Church 
following Pope John XXIII’s Vatican II in 1962. For more on the Church’s impact on the 
Catalan nationalist movement, see Conversi (1997) and Llobera (1994)
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develop on the need to recognise and protect, by official means, the cultural and 
linguistic realities co-existing within the Spanish state.
The Transition
With the death of Franco in November 1975, the Catalan and Basque problems 
emerged at the forefront of Spanish politics and would continue to do so 
throughout the democratic transition, playing a prominent role in the 
consolidation of the democratic process. Even in the dying days of the Franco 
regime, the Spanish political establishment began to realise the importance of the 
problem of Catalan autonomy. In a feeble attempt to cope with the demands for 
political autonomy emerging from Catalonia, President Arias Navarro offered a 
“special administrative regime for the four Catalan provinces” in February 1976.
Arias Navarro’s successor, Adolfo Suarez, faced increasing demands for 
autonomy in the form of popular mobilisation and demonstrations such as the 
March of Liberty in 1977, the celebrations during the Catalan holiday of 
September 11 where more than 1 million persons marched through the streets of 
Barcelona demanding the restoration of the 1932 Statute of Autonomy. Many 
Catalans did participate in some of the more important tests of the transition, most 
notably in the Ley para la Reforma Politico (Political Reform Law), where more 
than 74 percent of the population turned up to vote. At the same time however, 
unease and dissension continued to characterise Catalan political life, with 
campaigns espousing slogans such as Volem TEstatut (we want the Statute), 
Salvem Catalunya per la democracia (let us save Catalonia for democracy) and 
Llibertat, Amnistia, Estatut d ’Autonomia (Liberty, Amnesty and Autonomy 
Statute), again linking the issue of the democratisation of the Spanish state with 
demands for autonomy. Nevertheless, most Catalan political parties and 
movements were more supportive than their Basque counterparts of the initiatives 
taken by the Suarez government in the continuing process of political reform.
Although political parties in Catalonia differed in ideological perspectives and the 
political formulas necessary to arrive at a solution, most agreed on the need to 
obtain substantial measures of autonomy for Catalonia. The platform of 
opposition forces, the Assemblea de Catalunya, was replaced in 1977 by the
91
elected Assemblea de Parlamentaris which called for the reestablishment of the 
Generalitat and the Catalan Autonomy Statute. Suarez, in an attempt to respond 
to demands for Catalan autonomy, invited the President of the Generalitat in 
exile, Josep Tarradelles, to return to Catalonia as a symbolic gesture of the central 
government’s willingness to generated a politically negotiated solution to the 
Catalan problem. On October 17, 1977, Adolfo Suarez, in the presence of King 
Juan Carlos I, restored the title of President of the Generalitat, albeit in a 
provisional capacity, to Josep Tarradelles. Tarradelles’ return was important to 
the Catalan collective conscience as it reminded many Catalans of the autonomy 
and self-government enjoyed during the Second Republic. Although the 
Generalitat lacked resources and powers, a commission of twenty senators and 
deputies of the Catalan assembly managed to draw up a draft statute for Catalonia 
during the months that followed. The statute was subsequently approved by a 
broad consensus on December 29, 1978. As a result of an intense process of 
political negotiations detailed in Chapter 4, this led to the proclamation of the 
1978 Spanish Constitution and 1980 Autonomy Statute.
Culture, language and identity: the binding forces of Catalan nationalism
The previous section lays out the historical framework within which Catalan 
nationalism evolved into its present form, detailing the ideological and socio­
political influences that characterised this process. Within the framework of 
events and developments which shaped the eventual outcome of Catalanism, the 
affective content of Catalanism has been the most constant feature of this 
consolidation process. The perpetuation of a historical memory with continual 
references to Catalonia as a ‘nation’ and the reinforcement of the need to protect 
and promote the Catalan language and its cultural heritage have resulted in a wave 
of cultural revivalism reflected in the Generalitat"s cultural and linguistic policies. 
Continual references to Catalan history, language and culture have managed to 
provide a particular type of ‘adhesive’ which sustains the unity of the movement. 
Although it has been argued that language is an artificial creation employed to 
symbolize national identity rather than existing as an inherent feature of national 
differentiations (Hobsbawm, 1992), language has been employed for both 
purposes in the Catalan case. Language has been used as an ‘adhesive’ to
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reinforce identity. In political terms, this has resulted in the Catalan nationalist 
movement’s primary interest in the preservation of language and culture, a form 
of cultural nationalism (Hutchinson, 1987) whereby the transmission and 
socialization of myths, symbols and language from generation to generation 
ensures its survival and unity by creating a strong sense of identity and shared 
history.
Various approaches can be employed to describe the socio-political mobilisation 
surrounding the cultural revivalist phenomenon which has swept Catalonia since 
1975. References to a sense of shared history by continuous exposure of myths 
and symbols, linguistic policy and the emergence of a strong sense of dual identity 
have all contributed to a nation-building process driven by the Catalan nationalist 
movement. Within this process, the concept of ‘nation’ within the nation-building 
process- or fer pais in Catalan terms - could be interpreted as an “imagined 
community” (Anderson, 1991) or “invented tradition” (Hobsbawm, 1992). From 
an instrumental approach, the ‘nation’ denotes a fabricated image in which 
national identity is artificially constructed through the actions and discourse of the 
political elite (Conversi, 1995) (Shafir, 1995). A constructivist approach to the 
cultural revivalism and policy diffusion that has taken place in Catalonia in the 
late twentieth century would suggest that Catalan leaders have manipulated events 
and the evolution of the nationalist movement itself by setting goals and 
channelling interests and resources as well as reinterpreting historical myths and 
symbols to broaden the movement’s appeal. Thus, all political events and 
processes can presumably be traced to elite initiative, an issue which will be 
explored in greater detail in Chapter 5 with an analysis of the Catalan political 
party system.
Myths and symbols
There are variety of myths and symbols that make up the Catalan historical 
consciousness and have been described as elements of the centuries long process 
of (ethno)nation-building (Llobera, 1996) and as instruments of the mobilisation 
of Catalanism. These myths and symbols, along with language, provide crucial 
ingredients to the reinforcement of a sense of shared history and self-defined 
nationhood. In the Catalan case, these myths and symbols are characterized for
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their inclusive and integrative nature (Conversi, 1997). The cultural revival 
experienced in Catalonia since 1975 has led to a strengthening of Catalanism in its 
social and political forms and in the reinforcement of a sense of differentiation 
among Catalans vis-a-vis the rest of Spain.
Among these myths and symbols is the Catalan national hymn, Els Segadors, 
which refers to the events of 1640 which precipitated the loss of Catalan 
autonomy within unified Spain. Popular culture involves dances and events noted 
for their inclusive and communal characteristics (Conversi, 1997) including the 
sardana and the colles de castellers (human towers). The Diada or National 
Remembrance Day of Catalonia is celebrated on September 11, commemorating 
the date in 1714 when the Bourbon troops entered the Catalan capital of 
Barcelona prior to Felipe V’s dismantlement of Catalonia’s autonomous 
institutional arrangements in 1716. The Catalan flag, the senyera, used by the 
Counts of Barcelona during the 12th century is particularly symbolic. Its use was 
banned during the most repressive times in Catalan history (following the Nova 
Planta decree and during the Primo de Rivera and Franco regimes) and restored 
during the so-called glorious moments of the restoration of Catalan political 
autonomy (the 1914 Mancomunitat, and the 1932 and 1979 Statutes of 
Autonomy). These commemorations are emphasized to arouse “specific 
recollections of the past in the form of images”76. The nineteenth century 
Renaixenga is often presented - along with Catalonia’s Golden Age from the 
eleventh to fourteenth centuries - as a glorified and romanticized historiography at 
the core of the Catalan culture and heritage or a “historicist reconstruction of an
• 77idealised past” . Celebratory days, popular traditions and events involving 
Catalan culture are central to the development of a historical consciousness or 
sense of shared history (Llobera, 1996). Furthermore, linguistic policy is also 
employed as a unifying element of Catalan collective identity reflected by the 
campaign sponsored by the Generalitat following the implementation of the 1993
76 Llobera, J. (1996) “The Role of Commemorations in (Ethno)Nation-Building. The Case of 
Catalonia”, in Mar-Molinero, C. and Smith, A. (Eds) Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian 
Peninsula. Oxford: Berg, p. 196
77 Conversi, D. (1997), p. 16.
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Linguistic Normalisation Law entitled El Catala, cosa de tots (Catalan, something 
of everyone).
Sport is another example of a tradition employed (consciously or unconsciously) 
by the Catalan nationalist movement as a symbol of Catalan unity, culture and 
identity. One clear example is the annual political and social frenzy surrounding 
the matches between the rival Barcelona and Real Madrid football clubs, in part 
due to the Franco regime’s open support for the latter. An example of the 
mobilisation of cultural and linguistic symbols by both the Catalan nationalist 
movement and the Generalitat was the use and portrayal of Catalan during the 
1992 Olympic Games, when Catalan was the one of the four co-official languages 
(English, French and Spanish) and along with other Catalan national symbols was 
granted equal status next to Spanish symbols. The organisation, funding, and 
presentation of the Barcelona Olympic Games was an example of the tensions 
existing between Catalonia and the central government in the way the Games 
would be perceived abroad and of each side’s political and economic objectives 
(Hargreaves and Garcia Ferrando, 1997). During the actual Games, the King of 
Spain was ushered into the Olympic Stadium to the Catalan national hymn of Els 
Segadors. The Games also served to consolidate Jordi Pujol’s image as leader of 
Catalonia with his dual strategy of encouraging the Catalanisation of the Games 
while emphasizing moderation to maximize Catalonia’s economic and political 
benefits of the Games (Hargreaves and Garcia Ferrando, 1997). The political 
controversy in the late 1990s surrounding the Catalan nationalist movement’s 
efforts at creating a Catalan national football squad - using the British sports 
arrangement as justification - as well as the adoption of a resolution by the 
Generalitat supporting the Catalan Olympic Committee (COC) in its bid to gain 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) recognition are examples of the emphasis 
placed by Catalan nationalists on sport as a symbol of Catalan identity as separate 
from Spanish identity and as a tool employed to achieve international recognition 
and prestige. The concepts ‘nations without a state’ or ‘stateless-nations’ have 
also frequently been employed in the nationalist movement discourse in sport 
highlighting the implicit meanings of the terms (Moreno, 1997). Prior to the 1992 
Summer Olympic Games, the international press (Time magazine and the
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Financial Times) ran advertisements for the Games funded by the Generalitat 
promoting Catalonia as a ‘country’ or ‘nation in Spain.’
Furthermore, the measures adopted by the Generalitat to encourage Catalan 
culture have included massive subsidies to Catalan publishers, the 
disproportionate emergence of Catalan folk and rock music, and the revival of 
long lost Catalan festivals and traditions. The importance of culture, its myths 
and symbols and its protection within the Catalan nationalist movement cannot be 
underestimated. Time and time again, issues dealing with Catalan culture have 
been transformed into widespread political manifestations, although in recent 
years there have been growing reactions against a perceived type of cultural 
imperialism, as will be described below in the case of Catalan linguistic policy. 
Nevertheless, these cultural symbols and historical myths and traditions are 
important to the emotional content and sense of continuity crucial to the 
consolidation of Catalan nationalism. Their promotion by the Generalitat 
demonstrates the importance of cultural politics as a central element of modem 
day Catalan nationalism.
Linguistic Policy
In the study of nationalist movements, it has often been argued that language is 
the single factor that overcomes the various internal divisions within the particular 
movement. In the case of Catalonia however, language has played a cmcial role 
in the development and consolidation of the nationalist movement and as a factor 
in establishing a common identity within the nation-building process (Keating, 
1997). It has been highly politicized in the post-Franco era to the point where it 
has been described as ‘linguistic nationalism’ (Harvie, 1994). More so than in the 
Basque Country, language has played a central and relatively stable role in the
7 8Catalan nationalist movement . It is seen as a basic sign of identity. Thus, 
language policy is often used to strengthen national identity, with the purpose of 
contributing to the nation-building process, rather than employed as an ethnic 
indicator (Keating, 1997) (Leslie, 1996). Because of its historical significance,
78 The proximity of Catalan to Castillian has facilitated the Catalan nationalist movement and 
Generalitat in adopting policies of both cultural and linguistic integration. See Conversi 
(1997).
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language policy remains a powerful cohesive force which unites and mobilises the 
various parties representing the Catalan nationalist movement79.
As Table 3.1 shows, the general use of Catalan has increased substantially since 
1980. This increased use is attributable to the end of Francoist repressive policies, 
a powerful linguistic policy by the Generalitat and a cultural revival encouraging 
all things Catalan.
Table 3.1
Linguistic ability in Catalan
1981 1986 1991 1993 1996
Understand 93,76 96 94,97
Speak 64,2 68,34 73,7 75,30
don’t
understand
19,02 9,4 6,2 5,03
Sources: 1991 Cens de Poblacio (Institut d’Estadistica de Catalunya, March 1993), 1993 
Centre for Sociological Studies (CIS) Survey, 1996 Coneixement del catala (Institut 
d ’Estadistica de Catalunya) 1996, Keating (1997), El Pais 16 April, 1998 and 1996 
Censo de la Poblacidn.
79 The use of the Catalan language in areas outside of Catalonia, specifically in Valencia, the 
Balearic Islands, the southern part of the French Roussillon region and even in the small town 
of Alguer on the island of Sardinia represents a symbolic reminder to Catalan nationalists o f the 
widespread use of the language during Catalonia’s Golden Age.
Table 3.2
Native Language Ability in Catalonia
Question: What is your native language, that is, the language you learned at home
speaking to your parents?
Language Percentage
Spanish - Castilian 55
Catalan 39
Galician 1
Valencian 1
Basque 0
Mallorcan, Balearic 0
Two languages 3
Others 1
Source: CIS Study 2,228, November - December 1996
The same 1996 data80 shows that within the age group of 5 and 24 years, 98.5% of 
those that have been able to learn Catalan in schools with the educational reform 
in the post-Franco era, are able to understand Catalan whereas 87% of students 
between the ages of 10 and 19 years are able to write the language. The influence 
of language policy is obvious here - despite population figures showing that 50% 
of the Catalan population is not native Catalan (of Catalan descendance)- with 
9.9% pre-school children between the ages of 2 and 4 years not understanding the 
language and the higher percentage with the following age groups (between 5 and 
9 years) to 1,7%. Not surprisingly, the age group with the least amount of 
knowledge of the Catalan language corresponds to the over 70 age group. In 
rough terms, those that understand Catalan account for 19 of every 20 Catalans, 
those that speak the language account for 3 out of every 4 Catalans and 
approximately half the population is able to write the language81. The linguistic 
policy implemented by the Generalitat in the 1980s and 1990s has emphasized the
KO 1996 Censo de la Poblacion.
81 El Pais, 16 April, 1998.
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practice of bilingualism with both Catalan and Castilian as co-official languages, 
rather than isolating each language from each other.
Table 3.3 Use of Catalan
Question: Regarding the use of Catalan, what do you think should be spoken in 
Catalonia?
Use Percentage
Only Catalan 9
More Catalan than Castilian 26
Equal use of Catalan and Castilian 61
More Castilian than Catalan 2
Only Castilian 1
Don’t know/No response 1
Source: Survey carried out by the Institut de Ciencies Politiques i Socials at the 
Autonomous University of Barcelona (1991).
The development of Catalan linguistic policy is a key factor in tracing the 
evolution of the Catalan nationalist movement. Whereas Catalan nationalism can 
be described as having mellowed with age, linguistic policy in Catalonia has 
radicalised over time. Within the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, Article 3 lays out 
the foundations for the co-official status of the Castilian and Catalan languages. 
The 1983 Llei de Normalitzacio Linguistica (Law of Linguistic Normalisation) 
was passed by the Catalan parliament with nearly unanimous consent stipulating 
that all school-age children should be required to learn both languages (Art. 14.1). 
It takes full advantage of the ambiguities inherent in the 1978 Constitution on the 
issue of language. The emphasis placed by the Generalitat on linguistic policy 
from the very early days of the transition has two underlying reasons: 1) to 
assimilate or incorporate the substantial Spanish immigrant population residing in 
Catalonia into Catalan society to avoid social or political polarisation between 
‘native’ and ‘immigrant’ Catalans; and 2) to protect and encourage the use of the
82 Despite official complaints lodged by non-Catalan speaking sectors of society, the 
Constitutional Court upheld the validity of the law on 23 December, 1994.
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Catalan language in all spheres of Catalan society. These underlying reasons are 
not mutually exclusive in that the process of assimilation of certain sectors of 
Catalan society is seen as preventing the disappearance by non-political means, 
i.e. demographic changes, of the Catalan language. This perceived threat to the 
Catalan language was reinforced by the publication of an article in 1979 (in Els 
Marges by Joan A. Argente et al) which argued that the advent of democracy in 
Spain would eliminate the dual strategy of democratisation and demands for 
autonomy which had dominated Catalan society during the latter part of the 
Franco regime (Barrera-Gonzalez, 1995). The authors of the 1979 article claimed 
that with the elimination of this strategy, political activity in Catalonia would no 
longer concentrate on the protection of the Catalan language. Needless to say, the 
article provoked massive reactions in numerous Catalan political circles and 
contributed to the Generalitaf s renewed emphasis on linguistic policy.
The 1983 law enjoyed widespread support among the Catalan population (Keating 
1997) with little or no opposition from most mainstream parties. Over the years, 
however, this has begun to change. The Llei del Catala (see Table 3.4) approved 
in December 1997 expanded the rights of Catalan speakers and among other 
stipulations, would require regional and municipal civil servants to have 
command of the Catalan language.
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Table 3.4
The 1997 Ley del Catalan stipulates that:
(1) Citizens will have the right to communicate in Catalan with their respective local 
and regional Catalan institutions and public enterprises;
(2) Citizens have a choice in languages regarding all official public documents. 
Should these be translated, citizens will incur no additional costs;
(3) All official forms will be issued in Catalan and will only be issued in Castilian 
upon request;
(4) Catalan is the official language for the Catalan civil service and admission to this 
service is reserved for those having passed an oral and written examination in 
Catalan;
(5) Catalan will be the official language in all non-university educational institutions;
(6) Quotas of films in Catalan are limited at 50% whereas Catalan songs broadcast 
over the radio are limited to 25% (unless the broadcasters posses a regional or 
local license, thus increasing the quota to 50%) and 50% of cable television 
broadcasting;
(7) Firms subsidized in any way by the Generalitat must conduct any transaction or 
interaction dealing with their subsidy in the Catalan language;
(8) Announcements, notifications and information disseminated by public and private 
enterprises must be carried out in the Catalan language (with the exception of the 
business’s name) and more importantly, customers have the right to be addressed 
in whatever language they choose; and
(9) The labelling of traditional products distributed in Catalonia will be in Catalan.
Source: El Pals, 31 December, 1997
It has been argued that the initial intentions of Catalan linguistic policy have been 
to encourage a maximum level of assimilation and that Catalan society has been 
characterised as possessing a tradition of bilingualism (Keating 1997). 
Nevertheless, the perceived bias in favour of the official use of Catalan in 
legislation in recent years has resulted in increasing opposition from various 
sectors of Catalan society. They have accused the Generalitat and the Catalan 
nationalists of discriminating against the Castilian only-speaking minority and 
shifting towards a linguistic policy more similar to the protectionist linguistic 
policy practised by Quebec than to the equal treatment of both languages. In 
1996, the Foro Babel was created, composed of a variety of intellectuals and 
professionals from differing political, social and ideological backgrounds, united 
in their criticism of three important issues: 1) the transformation of the emotional 
content of identity into exclusive political ideologies; 2) the enshrinement of 
nationalist ideology in the official ideology of Catalan political institutions; and 3) 
the forced submission of all political parties to the identity discourse {El Pais, 5 
July 1998). The Foro BabeVs first act was its protest in April 1998 against the 
new Catalan language law arguing that the 1983 Linguistic Normalisation Law
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had allowed Catalan to enter a “phase of normality”. In June 1998, it published a 
second manifesto promoting an alternative model to the nationalist model of 
‘cohabitation’ imploring leftist parties to distance themselves from the model of 
‘hegemonic Catalanism’83. The arrival of the Foro Babel and its ensuing 
participation in the debate of ‘how far’ modem Catalanism should go has 
challenged the ideological hegemony in the area of linguistic policy of the Catalan 
nationalist movement. A real danger exists that the radicalisation of linguistic 
policy may lead to the Catalan language become an exclusivist indicator, 
separating those that choose to speak only Catalan from those who choose to 
speak both Catalan and Castilian. This could hinder the processes of integration 
and nation-building so cmcial to the Catalan nationalist movement and lead to 
increasing sectors of Catalan society feeling isolated by their choice of language. 
Furthermore, as Keating (1996) has pointed out, the proliferation of Catalan as the 
main language of instruction at many Catalan universities has discouraged 
students from other areas of Spain from completing their education in Catalonia, 
an issue which could undermine the modem progressive vision embraced by 
Catalanism.
Despite the recent controversies however, linguistic policy continues to play 
several roles in the reinforcement of the Catalan nationalist movement. Firstly, the 
issue of language serves as a symbol of continuity of Catalan culture and identity. 
Secondly, it serves as a cultural instrument employed (or manipulated) to bind 
together a specific community, serving in a sense as an ethnic indicator, denoting 
a specific group, community, or nation. Finally, linguistic policy has provided the 
ideal tool to elaborate on the nationalist movement’s objectives of cultural 
integration. In other words, the growing use of Catalan has allowed the Catalan 
nationalist movement to grant immigrants from other areas of Spain the ‘status’ or 
‘citizenship’ of being Catalan without the latter having to ‘prove’ their Catalan 
identity through race, ethnicity, place of birth, religion, ancestry or any other 
indicator used to distinguish one group from another. Jordi Pujol has referred to 
those that are Catalan as someone “who lives and works in Catalonia and wants to 
be Catalan”. Thus, linguistic policy constitutes a fundamental element of
83 Foro Babel (1998) Por un nuevo modelo de Cataluna.
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Catalanism’s efforts to integrate immigrants from other areas of Spain (Shafir, 
1995). The emphasis placed on language over the last two decades provides an 
additional symbol of continuity and moderation within the Catalan nationalist 
movement as expressed by nineteenth century Catalan ideologues highlighting the 
centrality of language as a key feature of Catalan national identity. The efforts 
exerted by the Catalan nationalist movement over time on the protection and use 
of the Catalan language and the current linguistic policies adopted by the 
Generalitat have managed to provide Catalanism with a high degree of strength 
and stability (Conversi, 1997) as well as nurtured its moderation.
Dual Identity
Catalan identity has often been described as an integral component of a form of 
‘dual nationality/identification’ or ‘shared nationalism’ in which Catalans identify 
themselves as both Spaniards and Catalans (Herranz de Rafael, 1998) (Guibemau, 
1997). This is perhaps most noticeable in the dual vote phenomenon which has 
characterised both Catalan and national elections in recent years. In general 
terms, the dual vote phenomenon implies a greater share of the Catalan vote for 
nationalist parties in Catalan elections than in national elections. A brief 
overview of the Catalan political system will be detailed in Chapter 5 reflecting 
the continued existence of this dual vote phenomenon which has allowed the 
mainstream CiU coalition to remain in power since 1980.
Catalan identity has also been described as ‘dual identity’ (both within the 
Spanish and Catalan spheres) or ‘shared loyalty’ (to the institutions both at the 
central and sub-national levels), a phenomenon which does not seem to recede 
with the advent of the process of European integration (Moreno, 1997). These 
categorisations are appropriate in light of the results of various surveys and public 
opinion polls conducted in recent years to ascertain the degree of loyalty or the 
nature of Catalan and/or Spanish identity (see Table 3.5).
103
Table 3.5 The dual identity phenomenon
Question: According to the following scale, where would you place yourself?
Average percentage 
(1990-1996)
Only Spanish 12,1
More Spanish than 
Catalan
6
Equal 43,4
More Catalan than 
Spanish
22
Only Catalan 14,7
NS/NC 1,7
Source: Data carried out 1990-1996 by the Institut de Ciencies Politiques i Socials at the 
Autonomous University of Barcelona.
The number of people in Catalonia who consider themselves as much Spanish as 
Catalan reached 45% in 1996 while those who feel more Catalan than Spanish and 
those who consider themselves more Spanish than Catalan remained around 22% 
and 6% respectively. Other studies demonstrate only slight fluctuations over the 
years (1986-1996) in terms of individual identification with one indicator over the 
other, reinforcing the moderate as well as stable nature of the nationalist 
movement (Bru de Sala, 1998).
The concept of dual identity has been consolidated and reinforced by the creation 
of the State of Autonomies, the development of which will be discussed in 
Chapter 4. The creation of institutions capable of accommodating and 
channelling nationalist interests and demands both at the central and autonomous 
levels has led to a fundamental reinterpretation of identity both in its affective 
content and legal/constitutional interpretation. Over time, the generally moderate 
nature of the Catalan nationalist movement and the ideological changes it has 
undergone - as outlined in the first section of this chapter - have contributed to 
both the reinforcement of a more exclusive vision of what it means to be Catalan 
and an acceptance or at least tolerance of the Spanish state. Furthermore, the
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emergence of a dual identity has prevented the radicalisation or polarisation of 
Catalanism (Moreno, 1997). More generally speaking, the gradual mobilisation of 
the Catalan nationalist movement during both the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries as well as during the Franco regime, can be explained by a growing 
resentment towards a perceived exclusion from both the process of modem state- 
building and the usual system of governance in Spain. As will be discussed in the 
following chapters, the success of the present system of the State of Autonomies 
is largely attributable to both the moderate nature of the nationalist movement and 
the willingness of the Spanish state to provide constitutional and political 
solutions to demands voiced by the Catalan nationalist movement.
Conclusion
As we have seen, the development of the Catalan nationalist movement over the 
past 150 years has been characterized by a gradual process of political, ideological 
and social evolution in which goals and objectives have constantly been 
reevaluated and redefined. Contributions from a variety of social and ideological 
formations, as contradictory as federalism and regionalism, republicanism and 
monarchism, Carlism and anarchism, and Catholicism and secularism, have each 
contributed to shape Catalanism’s objectives. Although political strategies and 
specific objectives varied from platform to platform, party to party and movement 
to movement, several ideals have remained consistent and continue to play a 
significant role in contemporary Catalan politics. These elements include the 
protection of Catalan culture and language, the transformation and modernisation 
of the Spanish state and full participation in the process of European integration. 
This process of convergence (Johnston, 1991) has been attributed to various 
circumstances and transformations experienced by the Catalan nationalist 
movement including: its moderate nature, the perpetuation of a historical memory, 
the fundamental democratisation of the Spanish state and the increasing influence 
of the immigrant population. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
Catalanism was faced with a variety of obstacles including the strength of local 
and religious identities and the slow pace of modernisation. These obstacles made 
it unable to attract broad support across many sectors of Catalan society. During 
the Second Republic and even during the Franco regime itself, Catalanism
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remained divided with no clear political vision as to the structure, dynamics and 
nature of the Spanish state and Catalonia’s position within this state. But by 1975, 
and despite diverging opinions as to the appropriate political formula, most 
political forces in Catalonia, in varying degrees, agreed on several issues: the 
defence and promotion of Catalan language and culture, measures of self- 
government for Catalonia, modernisation and democratisation of the Spanish state 
and full participation in the process of European integration.
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Chapter 4 
The State of Autonomies
La cuestion de Cataluna 
es la cuestion de Espana, 
es decir, la cuestion del 
Estado espanol.
Josep Colomer 
Cataluna como 
cuestion de Estado.
1986.
Introduction
In order to understand the present domestic political arrangements in Spain, a 
brief history of the process of nation-state building in Spain must be examined. 
Space limitations do not allow for an extensive overview of this issue but it is 
important to develop the historical context within which these events and 
developments have taken place. The arguments laid out in this chapter will focus 
on both the legal-institutional and policy-making provisions stipulated by the 
1978 Constitution and the establishment of the State of Autonomies as a 
constitutional response to a historical political, cultural and social problem 
hindering the stability of the Spanish state.
The creation of the State of Autonomies and the unique arrangements provided 
for the ‘historic communities’ were attempts to accommodate historical political 
and cultural cleavages within a climate of compromise and ideological change 
among the Spanish political leadership. In the Catalan case, the fundamental 
transformation of the Spanish state led to a widespread acceptance of the Spanish 
state and its new constitutional arrangements. It reinforced traditional Catalan 
nationalist tendencies - examined in Chapter 3 - to further objectives within the 
political realms of the Spanish state. From a policy perspective, analysing 
Catalonia’s position within the Spanish political system is crucial in 
understanding its subsequent role at the European level since “the participation of 
regional governments at the European level reflects their institutional capacity
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jMwithin their respective political systems” . The inherent ambiguity of the 
Constitution and the unfinished devolution process begun with the Statutes of 
Autonomy have resulted in a climate of constant political negotiation between the 
state and sub-national forces. For the Catalan nationalist movement, this has been 
beneficial in providing a favorable context within which constitutional and 
policy-making arrangements are re-interpreted to enhance its position within both 
the Spanish and EU decision-making processes.
History
Throughout Spanish history and particularly in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, the conflict between centralist unitary forms of statehood and a more 
decentralised arrangement played a key role in the consolidation and 
transformation of the Spanish state. This conflict crystallized in the ongoing 
power struggle among a variety of movements within Spanish society such as 
federalism, Carlism, Catalanism, republicanism, and Basque nationalism, 
including schisms within the movements themselves. These conflicts proved to 
be continuous obstacles to the creation of a modem nation-state.
Initially, the unity of the Spanish state was based upon the premise of conquest 
and occupation of the various regions that make up the Iberian peninsula. At the 
same time, unity was guaranteed in the short-term by a united front against 
Muslim aggression. Once the Muslims had been driven out of Spain, Castille 
remained the dominant unifying force despite growing resistance in the 
peripheries of the Spanish state. In principle, these regions had been granted 
some level of autonomy and governed themselves according to their own fueros 
or legal codes. This unstable political arrangement had been institutionalised with 
the Pacto Monarquico, which granted formal recognition and respect to the 
various regions under the Castillian crown. The situation following the expulsion 
of the Muslim forces from Spain resembled the current political and regional 
arrangements implemented by the 1978 Constitution in that the “Spanish regions
84 Hooghe and Marks (1995), p. 22.
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were regarded as having a contractual rather than subordinate position to the 
central, royal authority”85.
The political arrangements of the time have often been described as based on a 
confederate model (Solozabal, 1996). This has led some authors to argue that 
these measures of institutional and political autonomy led regional cultures and 
national identities to thrive86. What can be ascertained however was that the 
territorial unification which followed the Union of the Crowns of Castille and 
Aragon and the conquest of the Kingdom of Granada with the expulsion of the 
Moors was characterised by a peculiar situation in which territorial unification did 
not necessarily coincide with complete political unification. Thus, many 
traditional measures of political and administrative autonomy were left intact.
These regional and political arrangements began to change with the development 
of the Spanish empire overseas. Wealth and power increasingly became 
concentrated in the central region of Castilla incurring tension in the other regions 
of Spain, eager to see the empire’s profits evenly dispersed throughout the 
territory. Gradually, these tensions began to cause escalating conflicts between 
the central government and the regions, often translated into battles and ensuing 
repressive policies such as the unsuccessful Catalan struggle for independence in 
1640. Nevertheless, an overt process of centralisation did not occur until the mid­
eighteenth century (Linz, 1973) although the defeat of the Catalan struggle for 
independence and the essential disappearance of the Crown of Aragon arguably 
marked the beginning of the fragile process of state formation in Spain (Llobera, 
1994). Following the defeat of the Catalan separatist forces by Spanish troops on 
September 11, 1714, King Felipe V abolished the measure of self-rule of the 
principalities belonging to the Crown of Aragon - including Catalonia - and 
replaced these laws with Castillian ordinances inspired by distinctly French 
absolutist ideals. The result of these draconian measures was that many in the 
peripheries increasingly saw its political autonomy being curbed by a central 
government and state (through the Decreto de Nueva Planta in 1716) so unlike its
85 Heiberg, M. (1989). The Making of the Basque Nation. Cambridge, University Press, p.l.
86 Simon i Tarres, A. (1993), “Patriotisme i nacionalisme a la Catalunya modema. Mites, 
tradicions i consciencies collectives”, L’Avenc, no. 167, p. 8-16.
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own political and economic structures. These state-building efforts were 
characterised by attempts by Castile to integrate the various territories, impose 
one market and an overarching administrative structure. Felipe V’s actions 
heightened the tension between the central authorities and Spain’s peripheries, a 
conflict which would permeate Spanish politics throughout the 19th and 20th 
centuries in the form of bloody confrontations such as the Carlist wars in the 19th 
century87 and the Spanish Civil War from 1936-1939.
There have been many explanations regarding the failure of Spain’s political 
establishment to impose many of the nineteenth century liberal ideas of deposing 
the absolute monarchies or regimes. These explanations underline the traditional 
isolationism of Spain vis-a-vis the rest of Europe, the poverty of the Spanish state, 
a weak communications network, and a dominant political establishment 
conservative by nature and retaining many of the traditional religious and military 
values so common in many Southern European states88. These weaknesses were 
reflected in the 1812 Cadiz Constitution. The agreement represented an attempt 
to instigate reforms in the liberal spirit which characterised Napoleonic and post- 
Napoleonic Europe. Nonetheless, it continued to emphasize the highly centralised 
nature of the unitary state of Spain despite substantial attempts at reform in other 
areas such as the secularisation of the state. Thus, nineteenth century Spain was 
characterised by “liberal attempts of modernisation [which] remained trapped by a 
totalitarian and simplistic vision which did not take into account the territorial 
peculiarities of a largely pre-industrial and irregularly conformed society”89. 
Spain’s numerous constitutions during this period (six during the nineteenth 
century) reflect the inherent political instability of the time and the failure of 
reformers to consolidate support for their efforts among Spain’s political class.
During Spain’s Second Republic, Catalonia enjoyed a brief period of self-rule 
with the model of regional autonomy and territorial organisation established by
87 The three Carlist wars during the nineteenth century took place in 1833-1840, 1846-1848 and
1872-1875.
88 Alvarez Junco, J. (1996), “The Nation-Building Process in Nineteenth-Century Spain”, in Mar- 
Molinero, C. and Smith, A. (eds), Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula. Berg: 
Oxford, p. 89-107.
89 Moreno (1997), p. 60. (Author’s translation).
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the 1932 Constitution. The Constitution provided for autonomy statutes for the 
three historic nationalities, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia followed by 
various failed attempts to include these communities in the ongoing process of 
integration and state-building. This brief period of regional autonomy was 
abruptly interrupted by the political disintegration of the country with the eruption 
of the Civil War and followed by the authoritarian regime of Franco.
Spain’s authoritarian regime under General Francisco Franco (1939-1975) dealt 
with decentralising efforts of the Second Republic by imposing a regime which 
refused to recognise national, cultural, or linguistic differences among the Spanish 
regions. A single language, culture, administrative structure90, political system 
and economic structure based on the ‘sacred unity of the homeland’ was 
implemented to consolidate the centralist grip of the regime. Fear of social chaos 
led to the adoption of a strict state-imposed ideology based upon the purist notion 
of ‘one state, one homeland, one nation’. As argued in the previous chapter, 
demands for regional autonomy went hand in hand with demands for the political 
liberalisation of the Franco regime. As a result, the gradual “intensification of 
centralized power during the Franco regime resulted in the centralized model 
being equated with the abuse of power, despite the examples of the French and 
British centralized states...in which this model is perfectly compatible with 
democracy”91.
Democratic Transition in Spain: 1975 onwards
At the time of Franco’s death, certain sectors of Spanish society, most notably in 
the Basque country, no longer believed in the legitimacy of the Spanish state 
(Conversi, 1997). The Spanish state constructed under the Franco regime which 
relied on rigid centralism and the ‘unity of power’ was essentially the product of 
what has been described as ‘cosmetic constitutionalism’ (Carr, 1982). During the
90 This administrative system was based upon the province as a single administrative unit thereby 
bypassing traditional regional or territorial boundaries and established in 1833 loosely based upon
the Napoleonic system of territorial administration.
91 Solozabal, JJ. “Spain: A Federation in the Making?” in Hesse, J. and Wright, V. (eds.) 
Federalizing Europe? The Costs. Benefits and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 240.
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Spanish transition to democracy, the issue of regional autonomy coupled with the 
rejection of Franco’s oppressive regime and policy of cultural assimilation led to 
the ‘cantonisation’ of Spain. This resulted in “demands for liberalisation and 
democratisation [which] may coincide with demands for recognition of local 
identities and aspirations to local self-government” . The historical political 
context within which political and territorial settlements are negotiated is a 
significant determinant in the ability of the actors involved to address and/or 
resolve the issue of regional autonomy. In the case of Spain, the only real 
precedent for the concession by the central government of significant measures of 
political and institutional autonomy to the regions was set during the Second 
Republic with well-known unfortunate consequences. However, the general 
consensus among most political forces opposing the Franco regime was the status 
quo would merely perpetuate the antiquated administrative and institutional 
structures of the Franco regime (Solozabal, 1996).
The transition to democracy resulting from the death of Franco in 1975 has often 
been described as dominated by consensual politics and co-operation among the 
negotiating political factions (Preston, 1986) (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Within this 
framework, one of the most important issues became the question of regional 
autonomy and the political and administrative arrangements which would have to 
be made to accommodate regional demands for decentralisation. With varying 
degrees of enthusiasm, most politicians accepted the idea that unless the issue of 
the nations and nationalities that made up the Spanish state was addressed, little 
progress could be made to achieve a widespread acceptance of the Constitution 
and its political arrangements. It was widely acknowledged that a refusal or 
reluctance to address the issue of regional autonomy and cultural, linguistic and 
historical differentiations would endanger the consolidation and establishment of 
the post-Franco democratic regime. This new awareness provided the impetus to 
find a stable solution to the conflict (Preston, 1986) (Agranoff, 1993) (Conversi,
92 As defined by Henders (1997) p. 521-523, ‘cantonisation’ is the “granting of special autonomy 
by a central or federal state to a locally chosen legislative or executive body with jurisdiction over 
a territory whose boundaries delineate or approximate those of a regional cultural community” and 
involves the “assymetrical decentralisation along territorial-cultural lines.” Henders, S. (1997) 
“Cantonisation: historical paths to territorial autonomy for regional cultural communities” in 
Nations and Nationalism. Vol. 3, Part 4, December 1997, pp. 521-540.
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1997).
Nevertheless, finding a solution would prove to be a difficult task since “this 
meant accepting a political philosophy and a historic understanding of our 
common land that had little or nothing to do with the triumphant and verbal 
monolith that reigned for so many years”94. Co-operation with nationalist forces 
in Catalonia and the Basque Country needed to be secured. This meant 
recognising their demands for regional autonomy (to preserve the freedom of the 
‘historic’ nationalities and other regions), guaranteeing their participation and 
representation in the Spanish state. This formed a key element of the 
legitimisation of the new regime which was struggling with two potentially 
destabilising issues: regional nationalism and industrial strife (Perez-Diaz, 1990). 
During the Franco regime, corporatist policies had provided a sub-national link 
between the central government and industrial sectors (Perez-Diaz, 1990). The 
recognition of the regions as official sub-national units within the political and 
economic structures substituted corporatism as a legitimising factor within the 
emerging regime. The perceived economic benefits of decentralisation became of 
the sources of consensus over the devolution process. This came as a result of the 
post 1950s modernisation process in Spain with its economic, social and cultural 
convergence. Thus, what remained clear was that the consolidation of the 
democratic regime would not occur without the implicit recognition and 
resolution of the regional problem. However, the solution to the issue of the 
decentralisation of the Spanish state was also highly dependent on the stability 
and endurance of the democratic regime (Henders, 1997).
Attempts were made immediately following Franco’s death by the government 
presided by Carlos Arias Navarro to allow for a small degree of decentralisation 
of powers, mostly in the form of administrative functions. Nevertheless, demands 
for devolution and for a new Autonomy Statute similar to the one enjoyed during 
the Second Republic grew in Catalonia and the Basque Country. In Catalonia, the 
government attempted to appease nationalists by promising to set up a General 
Council of Cataluna, designed specifically to deal with these issues. Nevertheless,
93 Ibid, p. 529.
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full participation by political leaders both in exile and in Catalonia was not 
guaranteed and the government’s attempts failed, as attested in the well attended 
demonstrations held in Barcelona during 1976. With Adolfo Suarez’s designation 
as president in July 1976, the pressure was placed on his government to come up 
with a solution to the so-called “regional problem”. Further pressure came from 
the defeat in Catalonia of Suarez’s political coalition, Union del Centro 
Democratico (UCD), in the first general elections on 15 June 1977, when UCD 
received almost the same percentage of votes as Jordi Pujol’s Convergencia 
Democratica de Catalunya (CDC).
The Suarez government’s first agreement with Catalan nationalists led to the 
establishment in September 1977 of a provisional Catalan autonomous 
government95. The move was largely symbolic, as the provisional government 
was not granted any specific powers or functions of great importance, but its 
establishment became a source of pride for many Catalans. By 1978 however, 
some services and functions had already been transferred from the central 
government to the Generalitat. Nevertheless, the future structure of the Spanish 
state remained an open question among the political forces of the time, an issue 
which had remained unresolved in constitutional negotiations during the Second 
Republic.
A constitutional committee, composed of 36 deputies from the Cortes, was 
created in July 1977 to discuss various constitutional proposals ranging from 
federal arrangements, administrative decentralisation measures and the 
organisation of political autonomies. A sub-committee was subsequently created 
to include 7 representatives of the various political formations, excluding the 
Basque nationalists who chose not to be represented. The model finally chosen, 
following over one thousand amendments in the Cortes and 1,200 in the Senate,
94 de Areilza, J. (1983). Cuademos de Transition. Barcelona: Planeta, p.155.
95 The Catalan representatives visited Suarez as a coalition named Entesa dels Catalans, or Accord 
of the Catalans, formed with the sole objective of securing autonomy and self-government.
Suarez’s immediate response, a highly symbolic one and following the UCD’s defeat in Catalonia 
in the 1977 elections, was to recall Josep Tarradellas from exile in October 1977 restoring him as 
President of the Generalitat in return for at least partial acceptance of Suarez’s programme of 
transition. Tarradellas would remain in power until the March 20, 1980 elections when Jordi 
Pujol’s CDC claimed victory.
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was a radical departure from the centralised state structure which characterised the 
Spanish political system throughout its history (with the exception from the 
Second Republic).
The problem of identifying this model was heightened by internal divisions 
among the main political forces involved. Leftist parties such as the PSOE, PSC, 
PCE, and PSUC supported a federalist state structure whereas the Catalan 
nationalist parties (UDC, CDC and ERC) and the Basque PNV oscillated between 
outright independence, a federalist state structure or a political system whereby 
the so-called ‘historic nationalities’ (called for by the March 1976 Coordination 
Democratica platform) would enjoy high degrees of autonomy. Parties on the 
right of the ideological spectrum (including UCD and Alianza Popular) hesitated 
between proposing a model of administrative autonomy, i.e. extending the 
administrative decentralisation cautiously initiated during the Franco regime, or 
adopting a system with limited political autonomy. This time around, however, 
most political leaders agreed that without a general agreement on the structure of 
the Spanish state, the future of democracy in Spain would remain in peril. A 
solution had to be found which would take into account the plurinational and 
multicultural reality of Spanish society protected by a judicial and constitutional 
framework.
The text finally agreed upon incorporated many elements of traditional Western 
liberal democracies: the recognition of basic civil rights, the creation of a 
constitutional tribunal, and the establishment of a parliamentary system as the 
legislative body. The drafting of the Spanish constitution was based upon a pick 
and mix system from various Western democracies (Aparicio, 1992) (de Vega, 
1978). Hence, the recognition of basic rights and privileges was chosen from the 
Italian system and the various powers granted to the executive branch of 
government was chosen from both the French and German models. These rights 
and privileges were based on the principles of equality, liberty, justice, and more 
importantly, political pluralism (Article 1.1). This last principle did not only 
include the implicit recognition of co-existing nationalities, cultures, political 
parties and groups protected by the Constitution but also the establishment of a 
political framework within which participatory measures for these groups are
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guaranteed. The final solution had a mixed reception and proved to be too little 
for the Basques, good enough for the Catalans, and too much for the Right”96.
Constitutional Framework
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 is a clear reflection of the political 
circumstances of its time, enshrining a variety of political ideals. The end result, 
based on a non-traditional model of territorial organisation which does not
0 7account as a centralised or federal model, emerged from the social and political 
dynamics of the immediate post-Franco era, preventing the constitutional drafters 
from selecting a more traditional framework (Solozabal, 1996). A plurinational or 
multinational state was not envisaged by the Constitution nor was the creation of a 
single nation-state. The text is often simultaneously contradictory and politically 
ambiguous, representing the spirit of compromise of the times. For example, the 
Constitution stipulates “the unity of the Spanish nation” (satisfying the traditional 
demands of the Spanish right) as well as the “autonomy of the nationalities and 
regions which constitute it”(recognising the historic nationalities and demands for 
greater autonomy). Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution states: “The Constitution 
is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and 
indivisible country of all Spaniards; it recognises and guarantees the right to 
autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed, and solidarity 
amongst them all”. The introduction of the term ‘nationalities’ was extremely 
controversial particularly amongst AP representatives who argued that the term, 
stemming from the wtrd ‘nation’ could not be used as it represented one and the 
same, and that a ‘nation’ could not be composed of other ‘nations’. Scarcely any 
reference is made in the text of the degree to which self-government is granted to 
regional authorities (devolution).
The highly complex and ambiguous nature of Article 2 again reflects great 
compromise on the issue of the territorial organisation of the Spanish state. While
96 Gilmour, D. (1985) The Transformation of Spain: From Franco to the Constitutional Monarchy.
London: Quartet Books, p. 200.
97 In this context, the term federal implies a constitutional solution intended to reconcile differing 
ethnic or sub-national tensions rather than interpreted in pure administrative or regulatory terms.
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the right attempted to preserve the centralised political structure established 
during the Franco regime, the more moderate Francoist forces as well as the 
political left sought to establish a model based upon the gradual devolution of 
power and services to the regional authorities. The compromise reached meant 
that the drafters of the Constitution recognised the various regions’ right to 
autonomy for either political or historical reasons. Linguistic, cultural and 
regional differences were to be recognised within a constitutional framework that 
would guarantee regional governments a certain degree of self-government. 
Formal recognition of the division of powers and responsibilities, both at the 
central and regional levels, would be outlined in the text although not specified.
The end result of the negotiations was Title VIII, one of the most controversial 
aspects of the Spanish Constitution, which in the end was incorporated without 
the full participation of Alianza Popular. Title VIII clearly illustrates the guiding 
principles of the 1978 Constitution: the democratisation and the decentralisation 
of the Spanish state. It outlines the territorial distribution of political power 
within the Spanish state and establishes the State of Autonomies. The principle of 
the right of autonomy granted to the nationalities and regions that make up the 
Spanish state stipulated in Article 2 is the fundamental premise upon which Title 
VIII is based.
The highly ambiguous nature of the text is clear in the area of protection of 
regional languages and culture. This is recognised by Article 3 of the Constitution 
as inherent to the cultural heritage of Spain (thereby under the responsibility of 
the central government), with the acceptance of cultural pluralism and the notion 
of the Spanish state as composed of a variety of cultures and languages granted a 
co-official status in the autonomous communities. Article 4, for example, 
stipulates that both the state and local flags hang from public buildings and during 
official holidays. However, the protection of this area is not taken on as such by 
the central government, but rather belongs to the regions of Spain.
The seemingly contradictory and often vague terminology of the final text has 
frequently led to conflicting interpretations. The indissolubility of the Spanish 
state outlined in Article 2 can be interpreted as the state’s right to obstruct any
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region’s attempts toward self-determination. Article 2 can also be interpreted as 
guaranteeing the participation of sub-national authorities in encouraging a sense 
of regional solidarity. The recognition and guarantee of territorial political 
pluralism was also seen as encouraging the acceptance of a fundamental 
constitutional premise: the unity of the Spanish nation. The continuous 
reaffirmation of the unity of the Spanish state and the recognition of its regional 
identities and culture in Articles 2 and 3 reflects these contradictions and the 
consensual politics characterising the negotiations. They illustrate a generalised 
rejection of the unitary centralised state and on the other, a rejection of a federal 
state structure.
The State of Autonomies thus took on a series of idiosyncratic characteristics. 
Firstly, that the process of political decentralisation is characterised by 
sovereignty being devolved and not divided. In other words, the entire process is 
based upon the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation as being one of the 
fundamental premises of the Spanish Constitution. Yet it is the same Constitution 
where the autonomies can derive the powers that they are entitled to execute. 
Second, this decentralisation is defined in the Constitution as “self-government”. 
This self-government of the regions and nationalities of the Spanish nation marks 
a territorial redistribution of power of the state and its structural transformation. 
Nevertheless, this structure is not imposed from above, either by the state itself or 
by the political arrangements envisaged by the Constitution. In other words, the 
Constitution does not establish a territorial design of the nationalities and regions 
but rather lays out the conditions by which the regions (with popular consent) may 
decide to proceed with the practice of self-government.
The Statutes o f Autonomy
The Constitution also stipulated the institutional arrangements for the 
restructuring of the state, including the political guarantees for the establishment 
of independently elected legislative assemblies and the creation of Statutes of 
Autonomy. Article 147 of the Constitution recognises the Statutes of Autonomy 
as a central component of the Spanish state’s legal and constitutional framework. 
Institutions of self-government including the judiciary and executive branches are
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organised and derive their power from the Statutes of Autonomy. Nonetheless, 
the Statutes do not act as individual constitutions for the individual autonomous 
communities but are considered part of Spanish organic law and accordingly fall 
within the jurisdictional framework of the central government (Solozabal, 1996). 
The Statutes represent the ‘framework within the framework’ (within the 
Constitution) within which the institutions of self-government of the autonomous 
communities operate and within which laws are formulated and implemented. In 
themselves, the Statutes are the end result of a series of negotiations and 
agreements between central government and representatives of each autonomous 
community. Each Statute of Autonomy is considered as a unique form of organic 
law “in that it cannot be modified by a norm of similar rank, but rather ‘according
QO
to the procedures established therein’” . Amending the Statute requires the 
formulation and approval of an organic law by the national parliament. The 
uniqueness of each Statute reaffirms the state’s recognition of the varying needs 
and demands of each autonomous community. Each Statute lists the distribution 
of competencies and powers between the central government and the respective 
autonomous community clarifying and/or extending the distribution of 
competencies as listed in the Constitution.
The Statutes of Autonomy were approved in Catalonia and the Basque Country in 
October 1979". The Statute of Autonomy of Galicia, the other ‘historic region’ 
was approved in 1981, following a delay imposed by the central government in 
the wake of fear that had arisen to the increasing trend of the devolution of 
powers. Although initially Andalucia was not deemed to be a ‘historic region,’ 
its Statute of Autonomy was approved in 1980 for political reasons100.
yo Solozabal (1996), p. 247.
99 The Catalan Autonomy Statute was approved by 87.9% of those who voted, below the 90.3% 
‘yes’ vote garnered by the Basque Autonomy Statute. Nevertheless, the vote in the Basque 
Country was marked by high degrees of abstention reaching 40.23% of voting age population 
reflecting the failure of Suarez’s government in his dealings with the Basque country which would 
subsequently contribute to his demise. In Catalonia however, 61% of eligible voters participated, 
partially attributed to large scale political apathy on the part of Catalonia’s immigrant population 
(Gilmour, 1985).
Andalucia’s status as a nationality has often prompted protests from Catalan, Basque and 
Galician nationalists who claim that this status has been artificially created and has no historical 
justification. Nevertheless, it has enjoyed the transfer of competencies in similar degrees to the 
other ‘historic’ nationalities although the disparities in the level of transfers have sharpened in 
recent years.
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For other regions in Spain, a different process had been outlined. This process, 
stipulated in Article 143 of the Constitution, is of a transitional nature and lays out 
the conditions that regions are obliged to fulfil in order to complete a formal 
application for autonomy. Once the autonomy status is granted, this becomes law 
and is required to go through an additional five-year transitional period in order to 
attain the same level of autonomy as the ‘historic’ regions. Typically, various 
exceptions were made to this category with Navarra101, Aragon, the Canary
109Islands and Valencia granted similar levels of rights and privileges to those laid 
out in the other Statutes of Autonomy by means of organic law rather than a 
Statute in itself. The other103 Spanish regions were granted the status of autonomy 
through the gradual process enshrined in the Constitution by Article 143.
Thus, the Statutes of Autonomy vary from autonomous community to 
autonomous community. Within each of these Statutes, the specifications of the 
institutional and administrative relationship between the central government and 
the government of the respective autonomous communities are enshrined. The 
separation of autonomous communities according to each level meant that regions 
such as Catalonia and the Basque country where nationalist and separatist 
sentiment had traditionally been deep-rooted, were appeased by being placed in 
the category of ‘historic nationality’ with a high degree of self-government. The 
process towards which an agreement was finally reached proved to be an arduous 
task for the both the central government and the Generalitat however. Both sides 
were forced to make concessions. The Catalan negotiators conceded that part of 
the administrative network set up during Franco’s regime would be maintained.
101 Navarra achieved its autonomy through special provisions designating it as a ‘foral community’ 
implicitly recognising its historical distinctiveness with its ‘fueros.’
The latter three autonomous communities have been recognised as ‘nationalities’ with
Valencia’s ‘nationality’ enshrined by its Statute and the reform of the Statutes o f the former two
approved by the Spanish Cortes in 1996 allowing for the recognition of these as ‘nationalities’.
Aragon’s nationality is referred to as a ‘historic identity’ thereby distinguishing it from the
‘historic nationalities’ of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia.
103 Castilla-La Mancha, Cantabria, Extremadura, Murcia, Balearic Islands, Asturias, La Rioja, 
Madrid and Castilla y Leon. Nevertheless, even among these autonomous communities, there are 
differences with Asturias, Castilla-La Mancha and Madrid refraining from any distinctive reference 
to nationality or any other form of historical or national distinctiveness. The other autonomous 
communities are referred to in their own Statutes as ‘historic regional entities’ although by late
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This included the Diputaciones, the single provincial administrative units and the 
position of the Civil Governors. In addition, the central government retained its 
exclusive control over the social security system as well as the appointment of 
magistrates to the Supreme Justice Tribunal of Catalonia. The Catalan negotiators 
also were forced to drop their request for a regional financing system similar to 
the one historically enjoyed by the Basque Country. Within this financing system, 
the Basque government reserves the exclusive right of fiscal revenue collection 
and where the percentage of revenues later transferred to the central government 
is negotiated by both parties. Instead, the Generalitat was to conform with a 
percentage of the revenues collected by the central government. On the other 
hand, the central government transferred education and communications policy 
and services to the Generalitat.
However, the autonomous fervour or ‘snowball’ effect that followed the 
ratification of the Constitution led to a growing fear among Catalan nationalists 
that this process would undermine their special position within the Spanish state 
(Henders, 1997). Despite the concept of interterritorial solidarity104 enshrined in 
Article 2 of the Constitution, relations between the autonomous communities have 
frequently been marred by bitter rivalries over the level of competencies 
transferred to any one community.
Conflict between the central government and autonomous communities
By the end of February 1983, autonomy statutes of varying degrees of 
responsibility and autonomy had been approved for all seventeen regions. The 
process did not end at this point, however. Once the process of granting varying 
levels of autonomy to the regions had been completed, the problem of the degree 
to which services and powers would be allocated to the autonomous communities 
and subsequently exercised by the regional authorities came to light. The
1997, Cantabria was attempting to reform its Statute to refer to itself as a ‘historic community’ {El
Pais, 31 December 1997).
104 Although this concept has been constitutionally interpreted as establishing the elimination of 
socio-economic disparities among the regions (with the creation of the Fondo de Compensacion 
Interterritorial or Inter-territorial Compensation Fund), it has frequently been employed by weaker 
autonomous communities for political objectives as a type of ‘us vs. them’ notion.
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broadness of these functions as well as the different interpretations of the true 
nature of the central government’s competencies gave rise to a growing number of 
conflicts between the central and regional governments.
One of these conflicts, highlighting the conceptual vagueness of the Constitution, 
is foreign policy. Article 149 stipulates the exclusive authority of the state in 
matters of foreign policy. This contradicts the powers laid out to regional 
governments in Article 148 in the areas of the environment and livestock which 
do involve an international component (Letamendia, 1997). The apparent 
flexibility of interpretation has led to inordinate numbers of cases being brought to 
the Constitutional Tribunal where disputes arising from a differing interpretation 
of the ranges of power allotted to either the central or regional governments are 
resolved.
The Constitutional Tribunal
The Constitutional Tribunal is a judicial institution which exists at the fringe of 
the ordinary judicial process and is independent from both the judicial branch of 
government as well as other government branches set out in the Constitution. The 
1978 Constitution allows for the creation of a regional court system assigned to 
protect the privileges and rights of the regions set out in the Constitution. These 
courts, called the Tribunales Superiores de Justicia, were not put into practice 
until 1989.
Some 800 cases were brought to the Constitutional Tribunal during the 1980s. 
Each actor in the conflict believed the other to have invaded its area of 
competency. The number of cases brought to the Constitutional Tribunal has 
decreased gradually since 1985 (from 131 in 1985 to 12 in 1993) since many 
cases are accorded by mutual agreement so as not to further burden the already 
heavy case load of the Spanish justice system. Nevertheless, the Constitutional 
Tribunal has remained a crucial institutional actor in the relationship between the 
central government and the autonomous communities. It serves as the institution 
which can ensure and enforce the division of competencies and power between 
the central government and the autonomous communities. The Tribunal’s 
decisions serve as limits to the power exercised by the autonomous communities
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reminding them of the division of powers stipulated by their respective Statutes 
and deriving other decisions directly from the principles outlined in the 
Constitution. In the years of its existence, the Constitutional Tribunal has gone to 
great lengths to protect one of the underlying assumptions of the Constitution: 
ensuring the unity of the Spanish state while at the same time respecting the 
pluralist character of the nationalities and communities that compose it 
(Solozabal, 1996). One of the most important decisions it has generated (Decision 
76 of 1983) “underlines the constitutional guarantee of autonomy, prohibiting the 
central legislator from proceeding to redefine the limits of its powers”105, a right 
retained solely by the Constitution and the Statutes of Autonomy.
The 1981 coup and its aftermath
Of particular importance to the ensuing conflict between the central and regional 
governments was the legislation approved by the Spanish Cortes in the aftermath 
of the attempted Tejero coup on February 23, 1981. Opposition to the democratic 
regime had increasingly become more concerned with the growing concessions to 
the nationalist forces, perceived as threatening the unity of Spain. The coup has 
often been described as being the catalyst to the second phase of the 
decentralisation of the Spanish state (Cuchillo, 1993) (Heywood, 1995). The 
legislation which emerged in the immediate aftermath of the failed coup was 
primarily designed to quieten the voices of dissent emerging from the right and 
former Francoist allies. It stipulated that state law would always predominate 
over regional law in any situation where a conflict of competencies had arisen. It 
specified that the government would define the criteria which would consequently 
be used by regional governments to introduce legislation. This would be achieved 
by imposing a system of unilateral co-ordination of the decentralisation process, 
as well as the uniformization of rights and services allocated to each of the 
regions.
In addition, the legislation was intended to restrain the pace of the process of 
granting Statutes of Autonomy to those regions which did not yet have any degree 
of self-government. The law, called the Ley Organica de Armonizacion del
105 Solozabal (1996), p. 252.
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Proceso Autonomico (LOAPA) was fought by the regional governments of 
Catalonia and the Basque country and was subsequently presented to the 
Constitutional Tribunal for a formal judgement. Catalan intellectuals and civil 
servants signed a manifesto proclaiming their opposition to the law. The 
promulgation of the LOAPA caused outbreaks of opposition all over Catalonia, 
which climaxed in a mass demonstration against the law in Barcelona on June 24, 
1982106. The Constitutional Tribunal decreed in August 1983 that over two-thirds 
of the LOAPA was unconstitutional. The Tribunal’s decision (Decision 76 of 
1983) was followed by the introduction and passage of the Ley del Proceso 
Autonomico (LPA) later that year which forced the government to revoke its 
position and continue the devolution process as initially planned.
Despite the repeal of the LOAPA, the central government proved to be reluctant 
to proceed with the process of devolution of powers to the regional governments. 
It attempted to take a more flexible approach towards the process by seeking to 
establish a model which would ensure that the central government would remain 
as the principal institution ultimately responsible for Spanish society’s interests. 
It saw itself as the ultimate authority in deciding if regional governments were 
fulfilling their obligations adequately in guaranteeing full citizen participation in 
the democratic process. However, the principles behind the central government’s 
framework for the continual process of devolution proved to be unacceptable to 
many regional leaders, particularly among Catalan nationalists. The initial 
consensus among leading political actors which had emerged in the early years of 
Spain’s transition to democracy disappeared once the process of devolution 
entered into the stage of defining the degree to which self-government and 
specific services and rights would be allocated to the regions. Issues which would 
mark the end of the transition’s political consensus included the regional 
financing system and the consolidation of regional administrative structures
Regional financing and administrative structures
The Spanish regional financing system is characterised by its highly asymmetrical 
nature. As an autonomous community, Catalonia’s financing system was
106 Most Catalan nationalist parties participated including CiU, Esquerra Republicana, the PSUC
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designed to be based upon government revenues, regional tax revenues, and funds 
generated from the Fondo de Compensation Territorial. This last fund has also 
been a source of disputes between the central government and the Generalitat, 
which is resistant to contributing to what it perceives as a disproportionate system.
The first agreement on the regional financing system, agreed for a six year period 
in 1980 through the Ley Organica de Financiacion de las Comunidades 
Autonomas (LOFCA), included a provisional formula for the regional financing 
system. The modification to the formula provoked anger among Catalan 
nationalists who regarded it as a barrier to increased financial autonomy. In the 
absence of an agreement, an additional period was approved in 1987 using the 
provisional formula until an agreement was reached. Once again, the process of 
arriving at this agreement proved to be contentious, since the Generalitat felt that 
the central government had ignored the requirements generated by Spain’s 
accession to the European Community in 1987. The Generalitat felt that the 
regional financing systems, and the Catalan system in particular, needed 
adjustment to the economic programmes imposed by the European Community. 
In addition, the Generalitat felt that the decision had been reached outside the 
normal bilateral consultation and negotiation process (Valles and Cuchillo, 1988) 
(Agranoff, 1993).
The continued presence of the central government within regional administrative 
structures to preserve its territorial presence also provoked widespread anger 
among the ruling Catalan nationalists. The Spanish civil service has been affected 
by the new regional administrative measures. In some case, “inefficient basic 
structures, together with jealous demarcation of areas of competence, have put a 
premium on administrative collaboration - leading to pointless duplication of
107services and constant frictions between administrative leaders” .
In other cases, the central government has furthered angered the Generalitat by 
by-passing its specific level of government and granting special powers to the
(Catalan Communist Party) and Nacionalistes d’Esquerra.
107 Heywood, P. (1995) The Government and Politics of Spain. London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 
p.141.
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local and provincial governments. On various occasions, the Generalitat has also 
accused the Constitutional Tribunal of being too centralised in its decisions on 
central vs. regional competency issues. In 1989, Jordi Pujol accused the 
Constitutional Tribunal of attempting to undermine the powers constitutionally 
entitled to the autonomous communities by refusing to approve the transfer of 
power over the social security budget from the central government to the 
Generalitat. The rise of conflict emerging in the aftermath of the LOAPA debacle 
in 1982 resulted in an effective abatement in the pace of administrative and 
political devolution of powers and services. Each phase of the process has been 
characterised by intense and lengthy negotiations between the central government 
and the Generalitat, resulting in delays and decisions based on compromise by 
both parties.
The example of the controversies generated by the financing of the autonomous 
communities and the nature of the decisions by the Constitutional Tribunal clearly 
reflects the often unharmonious nature of co-operation between the central 
government and the autonomous communities. This problem has been much 
debated in recent years reflecting a need for more institutionalised means of co­
operation. Despite the regular meetings and conferences held on various issues 
between the central government and the autonomous communities, relations 
(particularly true in the case of Catalonia) have often been based on stop and go
measures and coalition or stability pacts agreed by the political parties in 
1 08power . In other words, rather than carrying out relations or negotiations within 
a set institutional framework, these have often been carried out in other arenas, 
battled out by the political parties in a variety of fora.
Devolution through conflict
The issue of devolution in Spain has consistently remained one of the overarching 
features of Spanish politics since 1975. Among other issues such as terrorism, the 
failure to solve the nationalist issue has often been blamed for the political 
downfall of Adolfo Suarez’s, Spain’s first democratically elected premier. As
108 In the case of Catalonia, pacts between the ruling parting (CiU) in the Generalitat and the 
ruling party in the central government were agreed in 1993 (with the PSOE) and the govemability 
pact of 1996 (with the PP).
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mentioned before, disputes between the government and regional parties have 
often led to long drawn out conflicts in the Constitutional Tribunal. The central 
government’s fear of radical nationalism in Catalonia, reflected in the rise of 
terrorist groups such as Terra Lliure in the 1980s and separatist parties such as 
Esquerra Republicana, has led to a greater spirit of compromise towards regional 
autonomy. The 1991 elections proved to be a key turning-point for relations 
between the central government and the Catalan conservative nationalist coalition 
(CiU) in that the government’s narrow retention of its absolute majority in the 
Cortes required it to seek CiU’s support. One of the conditions for CiU’s 
agreement to support the PSOE was that a definitive model for the regional 
financing system would be established. Following the 1993 general elections, in 
which CiU won 4.94% of the national vote entitling them to 17 seats in the 
Congress of Deputies, the central government announced a programme intended 
to accelerate the process of devolution by which the autonomous communities 
would receive 15% of total income tax (IRPF). The plan, known as the impulso 
economico, proposed greater devolution of powers of behalf of the central 
government to the various regions. Following the 1996 elections and the ensuing 
pact between CiU and the conservative Partido Popular (PP), the Catalan 
government was able to extract substantial concessions with 30% of the IRPF to 
be returned to the autonomous communities. Thus, in the Catalan case, the 
process of devolution remained uneven and highly dependent on electoral 
outcomes and ensuing pacts of political co-operation.
Senate
Many battles have been won by the regional authorities not only in the courts and 
as a result of positive electoral results, but also in the national parliament. Reform 
of the Senate has a particularly symbolic importance for many of Spain’s 
nationalist movements. This importance derives from attempts during the Spanish 
Restoration (1876-1923) to democratise the Senate. Here again, the historic 
parallel demands for autonomy and democratisation by the Catalan nationalist 
movement are evident. A Senate debate on the autonomous communities in 
September 1994 led to the recommendation that the 1978 Spanish Constitution be 
amended to transform the Senate into a territorial chamber. This would put into
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practice the Constitution’s reference to the Senate as a ‘Chamber of Territorial 
Representation’. Catalan nationalists have repeatedly demanded that the 
composition of the Senate reflect the hecho diferencial inherent in the Spanish 
state with special representative status for the ‘historic’ communities. Catalan 
nationalists, priding themselves on their historic identity and special relationship 
with the central government, have thus placed constraints on the future possible 
effectiveness of the Chamber. Nevertheless, and in spite of its inherent 
weaknesses, the use of all regional languages in the Senate has proved to be 
symbolically important.
Article 155 of the Constitution grants the Senate a quota in the appointment of 
members of certain state institutions such as the influential Constitutional Court or 
the General Council of Judicial Power. The Senate also has the power to adopt 
legislative proposals from the different parliaments of the autonomous 
communities and present these to the Congress of Deputies as well as elaborate 
opinions on the central government’s economic plans. Nevertheless, its power 
remains limited with the Congress of Deputies’ right to overrule any Senate 
amendments and vetoes. The executive branch is not accountable to the Senate, 
denying this chamber any political power. In addition, the Senate often duplicates 
the functions constitutionally exercised by the Congress of Deputies and instead 
serves as a second forum for political parties to present legislative initiatives. Its 
lack of purpose has been viewed negatively by many sectors of the Spanish 
public. The PP government's plans to reform the Senate in 1996 came to an 
abrupt halt when Basque and Catalan nationalists demanded the inherent 
recognition of their hecho diferencial. Their demands were echoed by other 
autonomous communities paralysing the debate on reform. With the exception of 
1997, the annual debate on the State of Autonomies was not held during 1996, 
1998 and 1999 leading many to believe that Senate reform is unlikely to occur for 
a long time.
A General Commission for the Autonomous Communities was established in the 
Senate to facilitate the transition to a Chamber of Autonomous Communities. The 
objective was that the Senate could serve as the system’s officially recognized 
institution for the direct participation of the autonomous communities. The
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Senate would also serve as the autonomous communities’ direct link with the EU 
and would serve to represent their interest in financial matters. Instead of 
recurring to the Constitutional Tribunal for the resolution of disputes, the plan 
envisaged the negotiation process take place in the Senate.
The composition of the Senate, of which merely one-fifth109 of all Senators can be 
described as true representatives of the autonomous communities, in itself 
weakens these objectives. Institutional reform of the Senate would involve 
constitutional reform, leaving the Constitution itself open to other attempts at 
reform and perhaps unleashing a ‘fever’ of autonomy measures lacking co­
ordination and stability. As a result of the institutional weaknesses of the Senate, 
governments of the autonomous communities and regional and nationalist parties 
have been reluctant to use the Senate as a means of direct representation and 
dialogue with the government. Instead, they have tended to rely instead on their 
political weight in the Congress of Deputies and the intervention of their 
respective leaders.
Towards a federal Spain?
Attempts at modifying the role and composition of the Senate have led some to 
believe that Spain is moving more towards a more federal model, with the Senate 
acquiring many of the same functions as the Bundesrat in Germany as the centre 
of representation for the German Lander (Olles, 1994). Rather than individual 
negotiation processes between each regional government with the central 
government on the devolution of competencies, the autonomous communities 
would have an institution through which to channel their demands, encouraging 
multiregional initiatives vis-a-vis the central government. The legislative branch 
is generally considered to be a weak institution as power has traditionally been 
associated with the role of the prime minister. In the case of participation in EU 
matters, the reluctance of the central government to encourage the adoption of 
mechanisms or the support for effective institutions which would serve to promote
109 This one-fifth are the only Senators appointed by the parliaments of their respective 
Autonomous Communities. The rest are elected according to the same procedures as elected 
officials in the Congress of Deputies.
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regional participation in the implementation of EU legislation has increased the 
level of conflict between the central and regional governments.
Spain is still far from being a federal state, however, as much as some of the 
regional and national parties would like to see one emerge. The 1978 Constitution 
does accept the existence of a plurinational and multilingual state. Rather than 
adopting a federal model however, it envisages a decentralised state with an 
emphasis on its unitary character. “The Spanish system is based on the 
assumption that the recognition of the right of the regions to devolution is not 
contrary to the preservation of the unitary character of the state or to the concept 
of central institutions as the custodians and the promoters of the ‘national’ 
interest”110. Supporters of a federal system, such as the Catalan Socialist Party, 
argue that it is the only way to address the question of nationalism and to 
reconcile the needs and demands of ethnic or regional minorities. Others argue 
that the decentralisation and autonomy provided by the present system are 
sufficient to address Spain’s historic nationalist problems (Solozabal, 1996). A 
federal system would not necessarily solve many of the problems derived from 
nationalist demands. Successful federal systems involve assimilating 
communities sharing similar value systems and political cultures which reject any 
type of secessionist aspirations. Despite the perception that because of Spain’s 
multi-cultural and multi-national character, a federal constitutional system might 
have been more appropriate, the idea of federalism in Spain has historically been 
interpreted as a concept implying the dissolution of the state and the division of 
Spain (Guibemau, 1994 and Moreno, 1997).
The present-day Spanish State of Autonomies is the culmination of an uneven 
process in Spain which has lasted for centuries and has often manifested itself in 
bloody conflicts and ensuing authoritarian regimes. The current Spanish political 
structure is considered to be a unique form of both conserving the unitary 
character of the state and allowing for varying forms of self-government. It has 
often been criticised as having resulted in a piecemeal system of devolution 
without taking into account specific objectives (Cuchillo, 1993). Others argue
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that it is a weak constitutional framework which does not ensure the presence of 
mechanisms of co-operation in establishing a strong upper chamber (the Senate) 
and in reinforcing the conflicting underlying ideological principles established by 
the Constitution (Solozabal, 1996). Furthermore, the constitutional framework 
has been criticized for failing to restructure relations between the state and the 
autonomous communities in a meaningful way. It fails even to define the Spanish 
state as a ‘State of Autonomies’. In essence, the constitutional framework is 
conceptually vague and has often resulted in an excessive flexibility of 
interpretation as witnessed by Catalan nationalists demands in late 1990s for a 
relectura or ‘re-reading’ of the Constitution.
Varying demands by nationalist movements over the years have led to fluctuating 
degrees of pressure on the state to address these issues, resulting in a selective 
process of devolution. Although some have argued that it is the peripheral 
nationalist movements which justify the existence of Spain’s unique constitutional 
arrangements (Solozabal 1996), what is clear is that the constitutional 
arrangements have led to a political climate in which the balance of power 
between the central government and the autonomous communities is constantly 
being shifted by political pressures. The decentralisation process begun in the late 
1970s may at times seem to be deprived of a specific goal or model and as 
discussed previously, the goal of a federal constitutional model for the Spanish 
state still remains a distant reality. But the conflict between centralist and 
regionalist forces does not necessarily imply the end of the system. Rather, it is 
characterised by a “climate of permanent political bargaining among local, 
regional and central governments...bound to remain as the most characteristic 
feature of the - yet unfinished - Spanish process of decentralization”111.
Although this process remains a challenge to all actors and institutions involved, 
the case of Catalonia, in its pursuit of increasingly higher levels of autonomy 
within the Spanish state has successfully demonstrated the ability of one particular
110 Cuchillo, Montserrat. (1993) “The autonomous communities as the Spanish Meso” in Sharpe, 
LJ. (ed) The rise of Meso government in Europe. London: Sage Publications, p. 235.
111 Moreno, Luis. (1995) “Multiple Ethnoterritorial Concurrence in Spain,” Nationalism and 
Ethnic Politics. Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 24.
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region to achieve the constitutional and institutional recognition of its culture, 
identity, and language within a traditionally highly centralised state. It has also 
transcended institutional and political barriers to secure an influential role in 
national policy-making and in doing so, restricting the state’s ability to retain its 
historic distinctness, competencies, and power. In essence, this system has 
allowed for the “institutionalisation of diversity”112.
Acceptance of the State of Autonomies
The climate of political bargaining and continuing negotiations surrounding the 
consolidation of the State of Autonomies has had widespread effects on attitudes 
surrounding the so-called ‘institutionalisation of diversity’. This is clearly 
reflected in the changing attitudes of Catalan society as outlined in Tables 4.1 and 
4.2 which demonstrate one of the highest rates of acceptance (second only to 
Madrid) of the treatment received by the central government.
Table 4.1
Catalan perceptions of the central government’s treatment of Catalonia
Question: Thinking about your own autonomous community, do you think that, in
general, it receives worse treatment than the rest of the autonomous 
communities or in contrast, do you not think so?
Percentage
Yes, it receives worse treatment 21
No, I don’t think so 70
N/A 10
Source: CIS Survey 2,211, March 1996.
112 Moreno, Luis (1997), p. 39.
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Table 4.2
Perceptions of the central government’s treatment of the autonomous communities
(in percentages)
Question: Thinking about your own autonomous community, do you think that, in
general, it receives worse treatment than the rest of the autonomous 
communities or in contrast, do you not think so?
Andalucfa Canary
Islands
Castilla
-La
Mancha
Castill
a y
Le6n
Valencia Galicia Madrid Basque
Country
Yes, it 
receive 
s worse 
treatme 
nt
50 44 32 59 33 61 19 33
No, I 
don’t 
think 
so
35 42 58 29 59 29 73 60
N/A 16 15 10 12 8 9 9 7
Source: CIS Survey 2,211, March 1996.
Catalan perceptions of the territorial organisation of the Spanish state also 
demonstrate widespread acceptance of the constitutional arrangements as laid out 
by the 1978 Constitution and Catalan Statute of Autonomy, shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3
Catalan perceptions of the organisation of the state in Spain
Question: I  am going to present you now with some alternative forms of state
organisation in Spain. Please tell me which ones you think you are most 
in agreement with.
Options Percentage
A centralised state without autonomous communities 11
A state with autonomous communities as exists presently 47
A state with autonomous communities which possess greater 
autonomy than presently
18
A state where it would be possible for the autonomous 
communities to become independent
19
N/A 5
Source: CIS Opinion Survey 1,1996
As described in Chapter 3, Catalans also display greater pride in being both 
Catalan and Spanish (see Table 4.4), clearly reinforcing the concept of dual
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identity. The emotional loyalty directed towards one’s regional identity is thus 
combined with a more general form of acceptance towards the political 
arrangements emerging from the process of decentralisation.
Table 4.4. Basque and Catalan comparisons on levels of pride
—Proud to be Spanish------Proud to be a member of his/her country
Basque
Country
and
Navarra
Catalonia Spain Basque 
Country and 
Navarra
Catalonia
Very proud 13 33 45 26 36
Significantly
proud
31 40 40 43 46
Not very proud 19 15 8 15 11
Not proud at all 26 10 5 8 4
Don’t know/no 
response
11 3 3 7 3
Source: Andres Orizo, Francisco (Ed.) El Sistema de Valors dels Catalans published by 
the Institut Catala d'Estudis Mediterranis, Generalitat de Catalunya 1991
Conclusion
The question of arriving at a constitutional solution by which ethnic or sub­
national minorities or communities are incorporated within a unitary state has 
baffled politicians and researchers alike throughout the twentieth century. This 
chapter describes the constitutional framework within which Catalan nationalism 
has evolved and participated since 1975. It highlights the tensions between the 
historical centralising tendencies of the Spanish state and the process of 
decentralisation favoured by nationalist movements, and how the ongoing process 
of consolidation provides a framework from which present day demands for 
greater sub-national participation in the process of European integration have 
evolved.
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An understanding of the conditions and circumstances surrounding the 
consolidation of the State of Autonomies in Spain is important in analyzing the 
process of modem state formation in Spain. The process of devolution was 
accelerated by the realisation by the Spanish leadership and democratic opposition 
during the Franco regime that democratisation and decentralisation were 
interconnected and compatible demands, mutually dependent on one another 
(Henders, 1997). At the end of the twentieth century, the effects of European 
integration have begun to be noticed in the Spanish political system, which will 
inevitably face formidable difficulties in adjusting its constitutional arrangements 
to this process while simultaneously respecting the cultural and political diversity 
within its own state.
The unique asymmetrical arrangements that make up the Spanish political 
structure lead to questions as to how it should be categorized. Whether this 
structure, once firmly established, will fall under the categories of federal, unitary, 
quasi-federal, decentralised, or regional remains to be seen. Does the current 
State of Autonomies or Autonomous State (estado autonomico) as it has been 
called imply a divided state? Is it moving towards a model of ‘imperfect 
federalism’ (Moreno, 1995) or ‘concurrent federalism’ (Moreno, 1997)? What 
lessons can be drawn from the Spanish experience? Despite the uncertainty, this 
unique system has ensured a relatively high degree of institutional stability which 
some have likened to federal entities in other European states (Letamendia, 1997). 
The flexibility of the Spanish system in which regions can voluntarily opt out of 
the devolution process, has seemed to be an unlimited decentralisation process 
which could feasibly allow regional governments to assume increasing levels of 
power with few limits imposed on them by the central government. Consequently, 
the federalist model in which a new central power is created to supervise and 
guide separate governmental units seems yet to be a distant goal for Spain, with 
its emphasis on the unitary character of the state. It remains as one of the options 
available for minorities, nationalist movements or sub-national authorities to be 
endowed with effective political instruments and autonomy to engage in the 
process of nation-building using the traditional instrument of the state (Leslie,
1996). What can be asserted is that Spain has been undergoing a gradual process 
of decentralisation and devolution of powers since 1975 characterised by an
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absence of uniformity within its political and administrative structures. The 
Spanish case is therefore an interesting example of widespread decentralisation 
and the empowerment of regional and sub-national authorities without resorting to 
the adoption of a federal state.
An analysis of the Spanish case does however demonstrate that the unitary 
character of Spain has not been relinquished in favour of a complete shift towards 
a decentralised state unlike the comparable case of Belgium113. The Spanish 
constitutional arrangement provides a unique model of political decentralisation in 
which there is no identical model of autonomy for any of the regions. Each of the 
autonomous regions has chosen, with varying degrees of success, its own model 
with the inclusion or exclusion of competencies that it wishes to control. The 
process of the decentralisation of the Spanish state has not ceased with the 
drafting and eventual enactment of the 1978 Constitution. The process has been 
one of evolution, in which the regions have negotiated and re-negotiated their 
statutes and competencies with the central government; a series of “ongoing 
processes whereby central or federal governments and mobilised regional cultural 
communities continuously negotiate to maintain the latter’s acceptance of the 
legitimacy of the state’s claim to jurisdiction over them”114.
Throughout the Franco regime, most political forces in Catalonia agreed that the 
two principles of democracy and autonomy should go hand in hand. Historically, 
these principles have not been shared by the rest of the Spanish population and the 
transfer of power that ensued throughout the 1980s, from a centralised state to the 
State of Autonomies, represented a profound change in Spanish political culture. 
The creation of the State of Autonomies within Spain and the subsequent transfer 
of power occurred gradually, through the reorganisation of the Spanish state, 
rather than the regionalisation and polarisation of politics that had characterised 
the Second Republic. The unfinished process has allowed Catalan nationalists to
113 Debate in recent years has focused on the continuing disintegration and fragmentation of the 
Belgian state not as an effect of the process of European integration but as a result of failed 
attempts at constitutional reform which would ensure the unitary character of the state while 
recognising and respecting the pluralist nature of its composition and addressing demands for 
autonomy and devolution.
114 Henders (1997), p. 532.
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continue the active pursuit of regionalist objectives within the constitutional 
framework, employing, as pointed out in Chapter 3, nationalist justifications. It 
has also led to a fundamental change in Spanish political culture with an 
institutionalised recognition of the cultural and linguistic diversity of the Spanish 
state, as well as a change in Catalan political culture with a generalized 
acceptance of post-1975 constitutional and political reform. Although the State of 
Autonomies provides a stable framework within which conflicting ideals of the 
structure of the Spanish state co-exist, it does not prescribe solutions to future 
conflicts such as that potentially posed by the process of European integration. It 
is the process of political negotiation among the leading parties and the political 
activity exercised both in Brussels and Madrid by Catalan nationalists which will 
be described in subsequent chapters.
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Chapter 5
Policies on Europe in the Catalan Political Party System
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the concept of Europe as it is employed 
in the rhetoric of Catalan political parties. The pro-European component of the 
Catalan nationalist movement, as shall be argued, is a present-day terminological 
and ideological substitute for the traditional objectives of modernising and 
transforming the Spanish state inherent in the Catalan nationalist discourse. The 
consolidation of this pro-Europeanism within the Catalan nationalist ideology will 
be explored through the activities and discourse of Catalonia’s key political 
parties. The process by which this pro-European dimension has developed at 
institutional and policy levels will be examined in future chapters and the 
emphasis here is to provide the appropriate ideological context.
A brief overlook at the political party structure in Catalonia is necessary to 
develop a more accurate picture of the Catalan nationalist movement in its 
entirety. Only parties that have managed to attain representation in the Catalan 
parliament over the last two decades will be described. The Catalan political 
party system is an important dimension in the relations between Catalan 
nationalists and the rest of Spain, playing a crucial role in the evolution of Catalan 
nationalism. Indeed, this brief overview will highlight the importance of viewing 
the Catalan political party structure not as a mere reflection of the Catalan 
nationalist movement by underlining the characteristics that differentiate each 
party. The question of determining to what degree each party differs from one 
another is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, a concise examination of the 
fundamental differences among the parties with regard to relations with the central 
government and European outlook is essential to draw a more accurate picture of 
the general objectives of the Catalan nationalist movement.
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In addition, several general characteristics common to the nationalist party 
discourse will be highlighted to demonstrate the overall moderate nature of 
Catalan nationalism. Nevertheless, only two specific aspects of each party 
programme are examined in any detail. First, the party’s position with regard to 
European integration and Catalonia’s place at the European level is evaluated. 
Secondly, the party’s position in relation to the Spanish state is examined. 
Assessing a party’s strategy both at the European and national levels generates a 
greater understanding of the nationalist movement’s and party’s overall 
objectives.
Background to the Catalan political party system
As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the difficulties in describing the Catalan 
nationalist movement is in detailing the points of reference from which to develop 
the argument. As with other nationalist movements in Flanders, the Basque 
Country and Northern Ireland, the Catalan nationalist movement has been very 
divided in its political party representation and it would be wrong to refer to it as a 
unified movement. As described in Chapter 3, the Catalan nationalist movement 
remained fairly united during the Franco regime as a representative of the 
opposition seeking both democratisation and autonomy. This changed with the 
democratic transition. The process of democratisation of the Spanish state and the 
emergence of a distinct Catalan political system associated with the high levels of 
autonomy guaranteed by both its Statute and the 1978 Constitution have 
encouraged a fragmentation of the nationalist movement (Horowitz, 1985) 
(Newman, 1997). The traditional left-right bipolarity of Catalan politics has been 
losing force dramatically since 1975. After 1980, this bipolarity shifted towards 
a nationalist-centrist struggle, with each Catalan nationalist party and for that 
matter, Spanish political parties represented in Catalonia, being forced to choose 
between the two positions.
Nevertheless, the dual processes of state-building and democratisation in Spain 
described in Chapter 4 have led to the emergence of a relatively strong regional or 
autonomous community party system in Catalonia. Thus, the fact that few 
significant changes have occurred since the reinstatement of the Generalitat
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within the Catalan political spectrum illustrates the endurance of the political 
party structure. The Catalan party system is a class example of a system of 
nationalist parties which tend to provide one of two functions: 1) persist as a 
constant reminder to traditional parties of the need to regard the interests and 
demands of ethnic or national minorities; and 2) as an ally within a cross-party 
coalition owing to the small number of seats held within the national parliament 
and thereby wielding a significant degree of leverage within the domestic political 
system. These two factors are crucial in understanding the motivation behind the 
political activity embarked on by the principal Catalan nationalist party.
Although inevitable comparisons have been drawn in recent years between the 
two, the Catalan nationalist movement differs from its Basque counterpart in one 
fundamental aspect: the comparative lack of debate between moderate and radical 
elements of the nationalist movement. In addition, the political spheres in 
Catalonia and the Basque country differ in that within the former, there is no 
single strong separatist party or movement capable of winning any significant 
amount of votes in an election. The Catalan nationalist party spectrum is 
noticeably less fragmented than the Basque nationalist party system which 
includes Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), a breakaway PNV party formed in 1984, 
Euskal Herritarok (EH)115, ETA’s political arm, and the former Euskadiko 
Esquerra (EE), now integrated into the Basque branch of the PSOE. The Catalan 
political party system is dominated by the coalition of CiU. Both the Catalan 
nationalist movement and party system also enjoy greater widespread support 
among the electorate in their promotion of the concept of ‘inclusive’ (Conversi,
1997) (Hargreaves and Garcia Ferrando, 1997) or dual identity rather than the 
‘exclusive’ identity promoted by Basque nationalists. The fundamental difference 
between the two systems is not only reflected in the obvious absence of a 
significant terrorist movement116 but also in the absence of public debate on the 
question of independence and the relatively minor influence, in electoral terms 
(see Tables 5.1 and 5.2) of separatist parties such as Esquerra Republicana (ERC)
115 Herri Batasuna's successor.
116 This absence of Catalan terrorist activity has endured throughout the post-Franco era with the 
notable exception of a brief period during the 1980s when Terra Lliure, a loosely organised left- 
wing terrorist group did manage to carry out various terrorist acts before disintegrating in the early 
1990s.
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and the newly formed Partit per VIndependencia (PI)117. In addition, within the 
mainstream Catalan nationalist movement itself, cleavages exist along the degree 
to which Catalan identity and participation should be respectively protected and 
enhanced within the Spanish state, continuing the nineteenth century 
characterisation o f ‘nationalist ambivalence* (Marfany, 1995).
Table 5.1
Results of the 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1995 and 1999 Catalan autonomous 
community elections (in percentages)
1980 1984 1988 1992 1995 1999118
CiU 27,7 46,6 45,72 46,19 40,95 39,68
ERC 8,9 4,4 4,14 7,96 9,49 8,68
IC-EV 7,76 6,5 9,71 2,51
PSC-PSOE 22,3 30 29,78 27,77 24,88 37,88
AP (later PP) 5,31 5,97 13,08 9,51
PSUC 18,7 — —
UCD 10,5 — — — —
CDS 3,83 —
Sources: Coordinacio Electoral, Departament de Govemacio, Generalitat de Catalunya.
117 The PI was formed in May 1997 following the defection from ERC of its leader, Angel Colom 
and one of its most public figures, the Deputy Mayor of Barcelona, Pilar Rahola. It disintegrated
less than 2 years later.
118 Although the PSC won a greater share of the vote, CiU managed to obtain 4 more seats to the 
PSC’s 52 seats. At the time of publication, the post-election govemability pacts or coalitions 
remained undecided.
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Table 5.2
Results of the 1977, 1979, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993 and 1996 general elections 
(percentage of the overall Catalan vote)
1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996
CiU 16,8 15,80 22,48 32,04 32,68 31,82 29,60
ERC 4,5 3,86 4,02 2,67 2,68 5,10 4,18
IC-EV119 3,92 7,33 7,46 7,66
PSC-PSOE 21,3 30,31 45,84 40,98 35,59 34,87 39,30
AP (later PP) 14,65 11,42 10,64 17,04 17,97
PSUC120 19,03 4,61 —
CDS 1,99 4,13 4,32
UCD 16,90 2,04
Sources: Coordinacio Electoral, Departament de Govemacio, Generalitat de Catalunya. 
El Pais, 5 March 1998 and Boletin Oficial del Estado (BOE) num. 75,27 March 1998.
A simplified version of the Catalan political structure demonstrates that in reality 
there are only three ‘real’ Catalan nationalist parties whereas the others are merely 
regional ‘franchises’121 of mainstream Spanish parties (Newman, 1997). A brief 
summary of political life in the Generalitat starting from 1980 until the mid 1990s 
includes socialist and communist majorities in the municipalities, nationalist 
majority in the Generalitat, and socialist majority in the Cortes and in the 
European Parliament. These political discrepancies clearly reflect the volatile and 
pluralistic nature of the Catalan electorate, with voters choosing different parties 
at different levels of government, again reflecting the dual vote strategy. In 
elections to the Catalan parliament, the Catalan electorate votes for parties that it 
perceives as being more Catalan, while in general elections, voters elect party 
representatives perceived to be capable of influencing the central government. As
119 Prior to the 1989 general elections, Iniciativa per Catalunya had been known as Unio de
I Esquerra Catalana.120 Prior to the 1989 general elections, the PSUC became part of the IC coalition.
121 These parties are often condescendingly referred to as ‘partidos sucursalistas’ or branch parties 
(the Catalan branch of a Spanish party) by other nationalist parties.
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can be seen from the tables, over the last two decades, the Catalan nationalist vote 
has fluctuated little at the national level. Overall, electoral patterns in Catalonia 
have maintained remarkably stable.
Convergencia i Unio
The difficulties in situating nationalist parties within the traditional ideological 
spectrum with its left-right divide have been extensively detailed elsewhere (Ross, 
1996) (Newman, 1997). In the case of the Catalan nationalist movement, these 
delineations are slightly blurred. CiU, for example, claims to represent a 
perceived disadvantaged minority on the one hand and protects the advantageous 
economic ties and interests with the state. For purposes of simplicity however, it 
has been generally agreed that CiU is situated at the centre-right of this 
ideological spectrum (Lynch, 1996).
Under the leadership of the charismatic Jordi Pujol, the coalition party122 of CiU 
has been able to employ an ideological platform loosely based upon liberal and 
Christian Democratic ideas by espousing moderate reforms founded upon 
traditional values and symbols. Thus, it has created a unique type of Catalan 
populism by incorporating traditionally non-nationalist members of the Catalan 
middle class and immigrant populations. Its ideological position has often been 
described as of a “moderate nationalist and Christian Democrat formation”123. 
CiU has attempted to promote social integration by instilling both in Catalans and 
immigrants the notions of Catalan values and identity and adopting a number of 
assimilationist policies. The CiU has been able to penetrate the complicated 
framework of Catalan political associations without surrendering the overriding 
ambition of a continuous struggle towards further political autonomy within the 
Spanish state. In a sense, these policy orientations represent a strange dichotomy; 
a strong sense of self-determination but within the confines of the Spanish state. 
Thus, in a report published by Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya (CDC) in
122 CiU is a coalition composed of Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya (CDC) and Unio 
Democratica de Catalunya (UDC) headed respectively by Jordi Pujol and Joan Rigol. The 
coalition first appeared in 1979 and entered the Generalitat almost immediately.
123 Keating, M. (1996) Nations against the State: the New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec. 
Catalonia and Scotland, London: Macmillan, p. 121.
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1989, the party argues that the “claim for sovereignty that Catalonia needs to 
become a full-fledged nation”124. Again, the continual exchange and interplay of 
the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ when referring to Catalonia and Spain are 
visible in the Catalan nationalist discourse.
CiU has sought to mobilise electoral support on the basis of language, culture, and 
national identity rather than independence as means of expressing self- 
determination, often described as ‘cultural nationalism’ (Mar-Molinero, 1996). It 
has sought the transformation of the Spanish state as well as the emergence of a 
Europe of the Regions rather than full-fledged independence from Spain. Yet, 
despite the CiU’s efforts at portraying a unified and moderate version of Catalan 
nationalism, it has at times resorted to deliberate or accidental references to self- 
determination as objectives of the nationalist movement. This was clearly 
illustrated in December 1989 when the Catalan parliament passed a resolution 
declaring that the “observance of the Constitution does not imply the Catalan 
people’s renunciation of self-determination” in the wake of the fall of the Berlin 
wall and the emergence of the Baltic states. As recently as October 1998, CiU, 
together with the separatist parties ERC and the PI, reinvoked Catalonia’s right to 
self-determination without explicitly referring to any process of Constitutional 
reform (El Pals, 2 October 1998).
CiU hold approximately 80 percent of the nationalist vote which is why when 
references are made to the Catalan nationalists, this alludes to CiU. It has been 
described as the inheritor of the Lliga Regionalista (Ross, 1996) (Diez Medrano, 
1994). It has without doubt been the driving force of the Catalan nationalist 
movement over the last two decades, "...the new brand of Catalan nationalism 
emerged as a response to opportunities presented by the party competition arena. 
On the other, in exploiting those opportunities it has re-focused the concept of 
Catalan nationhood on a single party and, above all, on the person of Pujol, to the 
extend that his eventual disappearance will pose considerable problems for
124 Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya, Partido para la Cataluna de los anos 90, VII 
Congreso, 1989 (Party for Catalonia in the 1990s, Eighth Congress, 1989).
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Catalan nationalism"125. Like its predecessor, the Lliga Regionalista, CiU sees 
Catalonia and Spain as having mutual interests in the process of European 
integration. They are thereby dependent on one another. In a sense one could 
argue, that CiU views all three elements of the triangle (Spain, Catalonia and 
Europe) as mutually dependent; no piece can progress without the other. Progress 
is measured in terms of economic growth and political integration.
Since 1993, however, CiU has experienced a political situation that at best could 
be described as a double-edged sword. Its predominance in the Catalan 
parliament since 1980 and its consistent share of the vote at the national level has 
reinforced the Catalan nationalist movement. However, its electoral success has 
also allowed it to present itself as an unlikely coalition partner or voting ally for 
the ruling party. This was the case in 1993 with the PSOE and in 1996 with the 
PSOE’s successor in power, the PP. CiU’s participation in a govemability pact 
presented the party with a solid opportunity to influence Spanish politics at a 
direct level and at the same time to further its own policy goals. On the other 
hand, the compromises which CiU was required to make did place it in an 
awkward position vis-a-vis its own voters. However, its electoral success and 
willingness to pact with other Spanish mainstream parties have allowed it to play 
a significant role at the state level. Thus, CiU has been successful in not falling 
into the traditional nationalist party ‘mould.’ It has been able to move beyond 
issues regarding autonomy or linguistic reform and concentrate on social and 
economic issues affecting both Catalonia and Spain. Nevertheless, its long-term 
outlook remains uncertain. Once the process of devolution has been concluded 
and CiU's task as the defender of Catalonia's 'national interest' has been 
concluded, the question remains whether this will reinforce or undermine CiU’s 
political and electoral strength.
Pujolisme
According to Article 36.2 of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, the “president of 
the Generalitat is the current representative of the State in Catalonia”. In the case
125 Ross, C. (1996) "Nationalism and Party Competition in the Basque Country and Catalonia" in
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of Jordi Pujol, this job description has often been interpreted in highly literal 
terms. The personality and charisma of Jordi Pujol have often eclipsed analysis of 
not only CiU but also the mainstream Catalan nationalist movement. With 
descriptions such as “Jordi Pujol encompasses present-day Catalan nationalism, 
personifies its most powerful political expression and above all, its social 
influence” , it is difficult to separate the individual from the party, Catalan 
nationalism or even the office. Since 1980, the personality of Jordi Pujol has 
unquestionably dominated the Catalan political scene as the undisputed official 
representative of Catalonia and Catalan nationalism both within Spain and abroad. 
He personifies the nationalist challenge of interpreting the 1978 Constitution as 
broadly as possible and serves as one of the principle ideologues behind the 
moderate wing of Catalanism.
Pujol’s activities both as a member of the protest movement during the Franco 
regime and in his role as President of the Generalitat since 1980 have contributed 
significantly in the process of nation-building ifer pais) so central to the Catalan 
nationalist movement (Llobera, 1996). The effect of Pujolisme (Pujolism) on 
both the current Catalan (and Spanish) political situation and the development of 
the Catalan nationalist movement is not to be underestimated. Pujolisme has been 
described as a genuine Catalan secularisation of national-Catholicism (Lores, 
1985). It upholds traditional conservative Catalan bourgeois values by 
emphasising economic development, social integration and the incorporation of 
the Catalan autonomous community within the Spanish state (Llobera, 1996). 
The ideology behind Pujolisme focuses on the search for alternative 
interpretations of the Spanish state with frequent allusions to ‘two nations, one 
state’ and the plurinational nature of the Spanish state.
With the decline in recent years of CiU’s share of the Catalan vote, there has been 
general speculation regarding both the question of Jordi Pujol’s successor and the 
effect of the persona on the actual nationalist movement. In other words, is the 
consolidation of Catalan nationalism dependent on the character and ability of one 
particular individual? Will the Catalan political culture which has emerged after
West European Politics. Vol. 19, No. 3, July 1996, p. 501.
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two decades of CiU government control, Spanish democracy and Pujolisme 
disappear with the individual, regardless of the nationalist tradition in Catalonia? 
These questions will be addressed again in the final chapter of this thesis but 
remain important to bear in mind in an analysis of modem day Catalan 
nationalism.
Convergencia i Unio’s European position
The issue of European integration has been characterised by varying levels of 
interest, significance, and priority for nationalist parties throughout the EU. For 
CiU specifically, and the Catalan nationalist movement more generally, the 
process of European integration is seen as an important element along-side that of 
regionalisation in the process of transformation of the nation-state. The process of 
‘Europeanization’ is equated with the process of ‘modernisation’ of the Spanish 
state, a concept, as noted in Chapter 3, inherited from the nineteenth century 
Catalan nationalist movement. As early as 1953, one of the Catalan nationalist’s 
leading thinkers argued that the “ideal of Europe should never go against the 
normal existence of the nations that constitute it” and adding that national 
loyalties would never be substituted by an inexistent European loyalty”127. 
During the Franco regime, Europe was seen as a goal and for Catalan nationalists 
in particular, a base of support and resistance (UDC, 1998, Art. 143).
Among other things, the ‘modernisation’ of the Spanish state involves the 
articulation of a plurinational and plurilinguistic consciousness with the admission 
that the nation-state is not the only path to modernity (Llobera, 1994) and that in 
today’s day and age, the more common product is a multinational or plurinational 
state. In his writings, Pujol has outlined a vision of Europe in which member- 
states coexist with sub-national authorities on an equal level. This envisages a 
political union of member-states with substantial regional or sub-national 
decentralisation and the appropriate representative institutions. CiU’s political
Pi, Ramon, ed. (1996), p. 23.
127 Quoted in Ehrlich, C. (1998), “Early twentieth-century Catalan regionalist theory: Lluis Duran 
i Ventosa, his times, and the influence of the Austrian Empire”, Nations and Nationalism. Vol. 4, 
No. 2, April 1998, p. 209.
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leadership has attempted to promote various political strategies to reconcile the 
diversity of both the Spanish state and the European Union by promoting the 
notion of ‘inclusive’ nationalism, a form of nationalism which does not threaten 
the integrity of the Spanish state (Hargreaves and Garcia Ferrando, 1997). 
Throughout the period of CiU’s dominance in the Catalan political scene, Pujol 
and other CiU political leaders have consistently mobilised support for the process 
of European integration and Catalonia’s place within this process. An exception 
to CiU’s pro-European platform was the Spanish referendum in 1986 on the 
continuation of NATO membership, which did question the international 
commitment and pro-Europeanism of CiU since the party did not instruct its rank 
and file to vote any particular way and permitted a free vote. By the following 
year however, CiU had seemingly retained its pro-European position. It fully 
supported Spanish membership in the EC despite not participating in the 
accession negotiations.
CiU’s political leadership has been particularly successful in bringing the process 
of European integration to the fore of the Catalan nationalist movement not only 
by continued participation by its leadership within European institutions but also 
by adopting a pragmatic and international ideological position in its party 
platform. This position accepts many of the boundaries established by the 
Spanish state but questions the central government’s interpretation of these 
boundaries and attempts to push forward demands for increased decentralisation 
and the transfer of competencies and powers. In essence, the moderate nature of 
the Catalan nationalist movement and the international position adopted by its 
leadership have solidified support for increased participation at the European level 
and growing levels of transregional co-operation. The frequent presence of its 
political leadership abroad in both private and public visits, participation in 
international organisations and institutions, and cultural and economic exchanges 
have served to promote the concept of Catalonia as a ‘nation’ rather than as a 
region or another Spanish autonomous community, a key distinction in Catalan 
nationalist discourse128. In addition, participation in EU institutions such as the
128 Jordi Pujol’s speech at the London School of Economics in May 1996 was entitled “Two 
Nations, One State.”
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Committee of the Regions and European Parliament has encouraged its 
international and pro-European outlook.
CiU has consistently been committed to the ‘deepening’ of the EU rather than
enlargement. Aside from the obvious economic reasons, it views the ongoing
process of European integration as an opportunity to participate in the process of
institutional reform by which regions of Europe would gain greater institutional
recognition and a greater role for sub-national authorities in the European
decision-making framework. This involves a sharing of sovereignty among the
three levels of government: the supranational, national and sub-national,
essentially promoting a flexible interpretation of sovereignty. The process of
European integration is seen as contributing to this interpretation:
"the process of economic, cultural and social internationalisation 
and the practical disappearance of borders which it entails, 
suggests a weakening of the power of the State, which sees itself 
losing sovereignty over many of its traditional competencies”129.
The end result of this process and specifically how this process will affect the
nation-state remain to be seen as the process of European integration develops:
“it will constitute an inconsequential second way towards a more 
comfortable situation for Catalonia within the State and is not 
incompatible, rather it fulfils the definition of the new 
framework which we defend between Catalonia and Spain”130.
Thus, Catalonia’s position within the EU is viewed within the context of its
position within the Spanish state and its relationship with the Spanish government.
Unlike its Scottish counterpart the SNP (Lynch, 1996), CiU has been able to 
reconcile its desire to achieve political and administrative autonomy within the 
Spanish state with its desire to participate fully in the process of European 
integration. It has enthusiastically supported Spain’s participation in economic 
and monetary union as well as proposals for eventual political union and the idea 
of a ‘European Spain’ (Harvie, 1994). It has advocated the strengthening of the 
powers of the European Parliament with the extension yet simplification of the co­
decision procedure as well as the power to vote on the President of the 
Commission and the formal ratification of Treaty revisions. CiU, along with 
many of its EU nationalist party counterparts, has pressed for the adoption of
129 Ponencies, XX Congres, Unio Democratica de Catalunya, Sitges, 7-8 December, 1996, p. 23.
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regional electoral circumscriptions for European Parliamentary elections, the 
acceptance of which would clearly benefit the party. With regards to the Council 
of Ministers, CiU has advocated modifying the formal decision-making process 
with the gradual elimination of the unanimous voting procedure and the extension 
of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV).
Although as described above, CiU has consistently supported the current process 
of European integration, it has also at times questioned the institutional 
framework of the EU. Like its regionalist and nationalist counterparts elsewhere 
in the EU, it has sought the establishment of supranational structure encompassing 
national or regional communities rather than traditional nation-states. In its party 
platforms, CiU advocates a federalist Europe (UDC, 1998, Art. 147). The 
coalition sees the proposed enlargement as the opportunity for a Constitution to be 
developed for Europe and for a new political system to be devised {El Pais, 8 June 
1999). It argues that in matters affecting Catalonia, the Generalitat should be the 
only valid interlocutor in the European Union. The matter of presenting cases 
before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is one of its main objectives. This 
would allow the Generalitat to bypass the Constitutional Tribunal. In addition, 
CiU supports the presence of "sub-Commissioners" to represent the Generalitat in 
the European Commission as well as direct participation in the Council of 
Ministers. Furthermore, they propose the creation of various European agencies, 
which would entail the disappearance of Spanish state-controlled agencies such as 
the Renfe and the Spanish Ministry of the Environment's complete control over 
water works. If approved, this would allow the Catalan authorities to deal directly 
with Brussels in areas that have traditionally remained exclusive competencies of 
the state.
Like its Flemish counterpart, the Volksunie (Lynch 1996), CiU has tended to view 
the process of European integration in economic and political terms rather than in 
linguistic or cultural terms. Still, the issue of the protection and preservation of 
Catalan language and culture through the institutional channels of the EU has 
been adopted by CiU. It has sought the recognition of Catalan by the Council of
130 Ibid, p. 23.
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Ministers as an official language of the EU specifically in the promotion of 
educational and cultural programmes sponsored by the EU. CiU argues that 
Catalan should become an official language of the European Union citing its 
widespread use as the seventh most used language within the European Union, 
before Swedish or Danish (El Pais, 12 June 1999).
From an economic and ideological standpoint, the pro-European position of CiU 
has almost seemed a natural progression for a party which has traditionally been 
supportive of activities of business pressure groups and ffee-market policies, 
viewed as having a positive impact on the Catalan economy. It sees Europe as the 
place where its economic and perhaps political future lies and it has encouraged 
the Spanish government to adopt similar positions. The emphasis placed on the 
perceived economic benefits of greater integration into the European process has 
led some authors to describe Catalan nationalism as ‘bourgeois nationalism’ 
(Harvie, 1994). This type of nationalism is by nature conservative but claiming to 
defend a distinct identity, culture and nation. Thus, CiU has focused a great 
amount of time and energy not only in defining Catalonia’s place within the EU or 
promoting the perceived benefits of European integration but also on specific 
European issues such as the single currency and regional policy. By 
concentrating on these European issues, CiU has been able to further two 
objectives. First, it has generated broader support for the party and the Catalan 
nationalist movement more generally by elevating Catalonia’s profile within the 
EU. Secondly, addressing these issues has allowed the CiU to appeal to its 
traditional support group, the centre-right moderately nationalist pro-business 
sector of Catalan society.
The degree of elite consensus within the party over international and European 
matters has been relatively high despite several public discrepancies within CiU’s 
leadership. These discrepancies have mostly been related to Catalonia’s position 
within the Spanish state and the CiU’s electoral and political strategy within the 
Spanish political system. Nevertheless, the consistency of CiU’s position on 
European matters has been considerable over the last two decades. It has not 
suffered from the inconsistencies of other nationalist parties such as the SNP and 
Plaid Cymru. These parties have at times called for both independence within
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Europe and the increased regionalisation of Europe and have also questioned the 
potential benefits of European integration at other times. All in all, one of CiU’s 
great political successes has been the relative absence of dissent over its pro- 
European approach and other issues of integration.
In addition, its relatively high degree of electoral success both domestically and in 
European elections has allowed it to reinforce its political credibility both within 
the Spanish and European political systems. The electoral and political strength 
demonstrated by CiU in the post-Franco era has given the Catalan nationalist 
movement significant opportunities to advance its case for greater Catalan 
autonomy and participation in the process of European integration. Its status as a 
partner in the ‘govemability’ pact with the ruling PSOE and PP parties in 1993 
and 1996 respectively allowed it to be one of the key actors behind the devolution 
process which has characterised the transformation and evolution of the modem 
Spanish state. Thus, CiU employ their govemability pact with the PSOE and PP to 
enter Europe; then to impart their view of shared sovereignty and a new political 
culture (El Pais, 8 June 1999).
It is important to keep in mind however, that issues involving European 
integration have generally been little debated and enjoy a high degree of 
consensus across all parties both in Catalonia and in Spain. Furthermore, the 
subject of Spain’s participation in the European project has been depoliticized to 
the point where it is questionable whether the opportunities presented by 
European integration have been as politically beneficial as originally viewed by 
the Catalan nationalist movement. Nevertheless, questions do rise regarding the 
long-term outlook and prospect of CiU’s objectives in Europe. The issue of 
identity is an important concern in the future of the process of European 
integration. Will the emergence of a European identity undermine the long-term 
prospects for the perseverance of a Catalan identity which viewed from the 
nationalist point of view has taken decades to develop? Furthermore, the issue of 
post-Pujolisme and the survival of the often tense CiU coalition leaves the 
nationalist outlook on European integration uncertain. Has the charisma and 
notoriety of Jordi Pujol been the essential element in the drive to promote a 
European dimension to the Catalan nationalist movement? Will his replacement
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or a change to the existing elite consensus generate a decline in the appeal for a 
European dimension in both the ideological position and pragmatic policies 
adopted by the Catalan nationalist movement? These questions remain 
unanswered for the time being but will be reconsidered in the concluding sections 
of this thesis.
Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya
CiU’s dominance of the Catalan political scene during the post-Franco era has 
been aided by the absence of a coherent nationalist leftist force in Catalonia. 
Leftist parties such as the PSOE and its Catalan counterpart, the Partit dels 
Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC), as well as the coalition of communist, green and 
feminist forces grouped under Iniciativa per Catalunya (IC), have been unable to 
consolidate themselves within the Catalan political framework. Internal divisions 
and factions within these parties have contributed to the public’s perception of 
these parties, and specifically, the PSC, as the regional branches or ‘franchises’ of 
their national counterparts.
Throughout recent Catalan political history, the PSC party has remained fragile 
internally, being caught between loyalty to the centralised PSOE and the Catalan 
electorate. Thus, Catalan Socialists have often been described as having been 
nationalist and antinationalist at the same time (Calzada and Llorens, 1995). This 
dichotomy was most notable after the 1980 Catalan elections with the victory of 
CiU and the 1982 general election in which the PSOE captured the majority vote. 
Thereafter, the PSC was reluctantly forced to play the opposition role in Catalonia 
by its mother party. It opposed many of the Generalitat's demands for greater 
decentralisation reinforcing the perception of the PSC as a branch of the PSOE, 
rather than an autonomous Catalan socialist party. With the promulgation of the 
LOAPA in 1981, the PSC was put in a precarious position. Its internal divisions 
on the issue and its forced marginalisation from the issue by the PSOE, weakened 
its image as an alternative or ‘second’ nationalist party (Balcells, 1996) (Calzada 
and Llorens, 1995). It has even left critics accusing it of being a ‘vote collector’ 
for the PSOE (El Pals, 4 July 1998).
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The political turmoil surrounding the LOAPA proved to be a turning point for the 
PSC. The situation was further aggravated during the PSOE’s 14 year reign in 
Spanish politics. The PSC was forced to play a double role as both the central 
government’s political representative in the Generalitat and as the party in 
opposition within the Generalitat. In other words, it was forced to defend the 
ruling PSOE and the Spanish state in the face of Catalan nationalist opposition. In 
essence, the PSC, more than any other Catalan party, has been subject to the 
tensions and contradictions inherent in the dual process of the establishment of the 
State of Autonomies and consolidation of Catalonia’s position as an autonomous 
community within the Spanish state. As a result, it has been forced - in order to 
survive politically - to undergo a substantial process of transformation which left 
it increasingly isolated from the PSOE, remaining in a state of political turmoil 
and unable to challenge the powerful leadership of the PSOE.
The PSOE (founded in 1879) and its Catalan counterpart the PSC131, have 
historically supported the traditional conceptualisation of the nation-state. They 
have viewed nationalism as a tool employed by the bourgeois and capitalist 
sectors of society to further their own interests, a notion derived from liberal and 
republican nationalism emerging in the mid-nineteenth century (Hobsbawm, 
1992). Yet the PSOE did support Catalonia’s right to self-determination during 
the Second Republic, a demand which it only dropped in 1978. Again however, 
the issue of supporting self-determination has caused serious divisions within the 
party itself and tensions with the PSOE. This obvious dichotomy and ‘nationalist 
ambivalence’ has proven to be a historic handicap for the Catalan Socialists in 
their quest for the Catalan vote (Calzada and Llorens, 1995). Felipe Gonzalez, 
during his rule as the PSOE’s Secretary General and Spanish Prime Minister, has 
often criticised nationalism, even moderate nationalism, as exclusive {El Pais, 28 
May 1998).
In the post-Franco era, the PSC has consistently attempted to promote a federal 
vision of Spain which would constitutionally guarantee Catalonia a high degree of 
autonomy and powers. This federal vision is an underlying element of the
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relationship between the PSC and the PSOE. The PSC is in itself a Catalan party 
enjoying absolute sovereignty in determining its position on a particular issue 
within the Catalan political arena. At the same time, it pacts different agreements 
and united positions with the PSOE on issues within the Spanish political arena. 
Again, this has proved to be detrimental to the PSC within the Catalan political 
arena with a progressive decline in its share of the vote in the Catalan elections 
(see Table 5.1). Nevertheless, the dual vote characteristic of the Catalan 
electorate has benefited the PSC within the Spanish political scene. It has 
experienced a gradual increase of its share of the vote since the 1993 general 
elections partly due to voters disillusioned with CiU (see Table 5.2).
The issue of promoting a federal model for Spain, adopted by the PSC in its fifth 
Congress in 1987, has profoundly divided and to some extent damaged the PSC. 
The PSOE has seen the federal alternative as a means to consolidate Catalonia’s 
position within the Spanish state and address the issues of Catalan identity and 
self-government. Despite these initiatives to attempt to address the Catalan 
problem, the PSC has been criticised for urging Catalans to accept the cafe para 
todos (coffee for everyone, i.e. the same arrangements for everyone) solution. 
According to Catalan nationalists, this would not address one of the Catalan 
nationalist movement’s fundamental demands of widespread recognition of 
Catalonia’s hecho diferencial. Furthermore, the PSC has remained ambiguous as 
to whether the 1978 Constitution should be reformed so as to achieve the 
proposed objective {El Pais, 9 September 1998).
Some observers have argued that both the process of fundamental transformation 
undertaken by the PSC and its precarious position within the Catalan political 
arena owing to its inextricable relationship with the PSOE have led to the 
espanyolitzacio (Spanialisation) of the PSC (Calzada and Llorens, 1995). Over the 
last two decades, CiU has benefited from the PSOE’s national shift towards the
1 Ucentre of the political spectrum as well as the right’s lacklustre performance in
131 The PSC was founded in July 1978 composed by the Congress and Regrouping branches of
the PSC and the Catalan Federation of the PSOE.
132 Until the 1995 Catalan autonomous elections, when the PP more than doubled its share of the 
vote (see Table 5.1).
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the Catalan elections, by gathering votes along the way. Furthermore, CiU has 
managed to play on the sensibilities of many nationalists by portraying the PSC as 
the ‘immigrant’ party partly as a result of voting patterns indicating that the PSC 
possesses a large share of the so-called immigrant vote. This manipulation of the 
nationalist rhetoric has proved to be quite successful for CiU in its two decades in 
power. Nevertheless, with both parties, and to a lesser extent other parties 
constituting the Catalan political spectrum, adopting social integrationist policies 
to attract immigrant or ‘Spanish’ voters, the days when the PSC attracted large 
sectors of the Catalan working and immigrant classes are over. Both the PSC and 
CiU essentially attempt to attract moderate centrist Catalan voters with varying 
degrees of nationalist fervour. This pattern was reinforced following the PSOE’s 
move to the centre during the last 1980s and early 1990s, when the economic and 
social positions of the PSC began to be almost indistinguishable from those of 
CiU. Thus, the only real difference remains the degree to which Catalonia should 
enjoy self-government within the State of Autonomies (Balcells, 1996).
The election in early 1998 of the charismatic populist and former Minister for 
Public Works, the Catalan Josep Borrell , as the PSOE’s candidate for prime 
minister, reinforced the image of the PSC as a franchise party. In his open 
opposition to the 1997 Catalan linguistic law and his open support of the Foro 
Babel, Borrell clearly broke away from the PSC’s position, which had supported 
the linguistic legislation. In addition, the candidacy of Pasqual Maragall for the 
presidency of the Generalitat in the Catalan elections in October 1999 has led to a 
fundamental transformation of the PSC’s image in Catalonia. Maragall already 
proved a formidable rival to Pujol and CiU while Mayor of Barcelona by 
establishing a political and administrative network to counter the Generalitat134. 
Maragall has the charisma and personality to match his CiU rival and may reverse 
the fortunes of the PSC both in its roles in the Catalan and Spanish political arenas 
and in the shaping of the future of the Catalan nationalist movement.
133 Borrell subsequently resigned in May 1999 after a financial scandal involving his estranged
wife and lack of support from the PSOE’s Executive Committee.
134 Indeed, the symbolic position of the two entities is rather ironic. Both the Generalitat and the 
City Hall of Barcelona face each other in the Pla?a Sant Jaume in the heart of Barcelona with the 
presidential and mayoral balconies (where both the former Mayor and the President continuously
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PSC ’s European position
Essentially, the PSC’s position on the process of European integration and 
Catalonia’s role within the process differs very little from CiU except for its 
federal orientation. The PSC’s image abroad through its leadership has rivalled 
Jordi Pujol and the CiU. Pasqual Maragall’s tenure as President of the Committee 
of the Regions, President of the Barcelona Olympic Organising Committee and 
active participant in many European urban and even regional initiatives has 
generated widespread media and public attention both within Spain and abroad. 
Even Maragall’s political and ideological discourse has at times seemed to mirror 
Pujol’s with frequent references to a Europe of the Cities rather than Pujol’s 
Europe of the Regions. In an interview prior to the 1999 Catalan elections, 
Maragall proposed the “construction of a Catalan project with great respect 
towards Europe and the cities”135. Yes he has also rejected the notion of 
defending Catalan nationalism in its purest form arguing that “nationalism is 
indefensible in Europe”136.
Again, the schisms within the PSC are evident with the argument by some in the 
party that “like it or not, Catalonia is the most presentable [face of] nationalism in 
Europe137” and that Catalonia is continuing its process of nation-building within 
the integrative project of ‘Europe’. Its officials argue that unlike the centralist 
nature of the previous PSOE government, a Catalan position on Europe is 
viable138. The PSC has also extended its federal vision of the Spanish state to the 
relations among the three levels, Catalonia, Spain and the European Union. 
Nevertheless, it has repeatedly denied the need to address the issue of sovereignty 
arguing that the primary objective for Catalonia is “to strengthen and identify the 
political content of our [Catalan] self-government, specifically in view of the
attempted to outdo each other with the presentation to the public of various guests and celebrities)
also facing each other.1
Interview with El Pais, 29 June 1998.
136 Ibid, 29 June 1998.
1XI Fossas, E. “^Socialista y Nacionalista?”, El Pais, 7 July 1998.
138 Interview with Javier Sanchez, PSC
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European development”139. The PSC supports the strengthening of the CoR in 
transforming it into a second European chamber of territorial representation, a 
feature of its 'federal Catalanism'.
Partido Popular
The traditional right, embodied in Alianza Popular (AP), later in the Partido 
Popular (PP), remained unorganised and disoriented in Catalonia until the early 
1990s, unable to find its own direction or political strategy, with poor results in 
municipal or Catalan elections. The eventual disappearance of the centrist 
political forces, from a 19% electoral high in 1979 with the Centristes de 
Catalonia-UCD coalition, down to 2% in 1982 was the most obvious example of 
the changing political scene of Catalan politics during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
The PP was able to take advantage of the disappearance of any electorally 
significant centrist party and was able to attract many conservative Catalan voters 
for whom economic policies were more important than assertion and protection of 
Catalan culture and identity.
The PP, as inheritor of Spain’s rightist legacy, has traditionally opposed any 
measures of self-government, devolution or expressions of peripheral nationalism. 
By 1996, this position was forced to undergo a radical transformation when the PP 
entered into a govemability pact with the Basque and Catalan nationalists. This 
agreement has often led it to support policies that fundamentally contradict its 
own ideological position, generating tensions and disagreements from within the 
party itself. Nevertheless, it has often returned to its traditional stance opposing 
any perceived excesses by nationalists. An example of this was in 1998 when the 
PP Presidents of the Autonomous Communities of Galicia and Valencia (areas 
which traditionally have been characterised by relatively high degrees of national 
sentiment) rejected CiU proposals for the reform of the Spanish Senate which 
would recognise the special treatment or hecho diferencial of the different 
‘nationalities’ (Catalans, Basques and Galicians) within the Spanish state {El Pais, 
3 June 1998). In addition, the president of PP’s Catalan branch, Alberto
139 PSC, Per Catalunya. Ara. un nou federalisme. 1998.
158
Fernandez Diaz following his predecessor Aleix Vidal-Quadras, has often accused 
the Catalan nationalist movement of pursuing the ‘extinction’ of the Spanish state 
{El Pais, 20 July 1998).
The PP's European Position
The Catalan PP’s position on Europe does not differ from that of the central PP. 
Thus, the PP continues to resist the participation of sub-national authorities in the 
Council of Ministers although it did support the establishment of the Committee 
of the Regions. As mentioned above, the Catalan PP remained in an 
uncomfortable political position in Catalonia due to the PP's govemability pact 
with CiU. The pact forced the Catalan PP to accept CiU's demands for greater 
participation of the Spanish autonomous communities in the European decision­
making process. The govemability pact has also led to some internal dissent 
within the Catalan PP with some members reluctant to engage in any co-operative 
legislative activity with CiU. The substitution of Aleix Vidal-Quadras by Alberto 
Fernandez Diaz has often been directly attributed by CiU demands as a condition 
of the 1996 pact. Unless electoral outcomes prove otherwise, the PP will continue 
to reign in its Catalan branch by denying it an independent voice in Catalan 
politics.
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) is the Catalan political party that has 
transformed itself the most during the twentieth century. Founded in 1931 by 
three different groups including ultranationalists led by Francesc Macia, Catalan 
liberal intellectuals and social reformists, it was the hegemonic party of Catalonia 
during the Second Republic. Following the approval of the Catalan Statute for 
Autonomy in 1932, ERC dominated the Generalitat and supported policies 
promoting Catalan language and culture but was undermined by the more radical 
hard-line nationalist elements within the party itself (Smith, 1996c). During the 
Franco regime, ERC maintained a Catalan government in exile headed by Josep 
Tarradellas who was invited back by Adolfo Suarez to head the Generalitat
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during the transition. It abstained in the vote for the 1978 Constitution although it 
supported the 1979 Autonomy Statute.
The party saw its share of the vote drop from 8.9% in 1980 to 2.4% in 1987 in the 
Catalan elections, but made a steadfast recovery in the 1995 Catalan elections to 
gain 9,49% of the vote (see Table 5.1). It attempts to promote itself as a 
pragmatic and parliamentary party based upon the goal of total independence for 
Catalonia from Spain. Nevertheless, its image has been undermined by internal 
strife and frequently reported associations with a small separatist terrorist group 
relatively active until the late 1980s, Terra Lliure. In addition, during the 1980s 
and early 1990s, ERC alienated many Catalan conservative nationalist voters by 
refusing to accept the position adopted by the other two larger Catalan parties, the 
CiU and the PSC which primarily seek to foster greater autonomy for Catalonia 
within the Spanish state. In 1992, ERC dropped its outright demand for Catalan 
independence although it continued to secure the right to self-determination for 
Catalonia. For the November 1995 Catalan elections, ERC attempted to soften its 
image by emphasising sovereignty rather than independence to attract the CiU 
voter disillusioned with CiU’s preoccupation with the Spanish political scene 
(Pallares, Soler and Font, 1996). It has supported the adoption of a model of 
tolerance for Catalonia by promoting the concept of a double nationality to 
include all Spaniards and Catalans residing in Catalonia, again combining the 
notion of dual identity and social integration, so fundamental to the Catalan 
nationalist movement.
ERC’s European position
Following the 1995 elections, ERC’s leader Angel Colom and a group of 
dissenting members, unhappy with the end of ERC’s openly separatist position, 
broke away to form the Partit per la Independencia (PI). Since then it has been 
led by Josep Lluis Carod-Rovira, who has toyed with concepts such as 
sovereignty and federalism, criticising the concepts of joint sovereignty or ‘co­
sovereignty’ promoted by CiU arguing that “if we [Catalonia] are ready to share 
sovereignty, it is better to do it with Europe” {El Pais, 6 July 1998).
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Despite its claims of self-determination for Catalonia, ERC has consistently 
supported the outward looking European perspective and the process of European 
integration. Both the ERC and the PI have adopted a position based on 
independence within the European Union. During the early 1990s, ERC 
frequently called for the transformation of a "Europe of the nation-states" to a 
"Europe of the Regions" to accommodate the demands of regionalism, 
nationalism and the process of European integration.
Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, ERC's position on Europe shifted considerably. 
For the 1999 European Parliament elections, ERC allied itself with the Basque 
PNV and EA parties as well as Unio Mallorquina from the Balearic Islands. For 
these parties, Europe is the key for the development of Basque and Catalan 
sovereignty. The party seems more pre-disposed to accepting Brussels rather than 
Madrid as interlocutor for the negotiation of the transfer of competencies. The 
concept of "Europa de los Pueblos" or "Europe of the Peoples" seems to be 
omnipresent rather than a "Europe of the Regions". They argue that the EU must 
be redesigned to become a federation in which both the Basque Country and 
Catalonia become 'political entities' equal to France and Italy {El Pais, 12 June 
1999). They support the creation of a second chamber working alongside the 
European Parliament. This chamber would be a modified Senate where Europe's 
'peoples' would be represented. The establishment of this second chamber would 
be guaranteed by a European Constitution which would include a Charter of 
European Peoples incorporating the right of self-determination for Europe's 
peoples. Furthermore, like other Catalan nationalist parties, the coalition supports 
EU enlargement but for different reasons: "The size and population of some of 
these nations is less than that of the Basque Country (and Catalonia) which is why 
the argument that the sparse population of our people to prevent them from 
exercising their collective rights can never be invoked"140.
Despite their faith in the process of European integration, ERC remains convinced 
that this process continues to involve the European nation-states rather than its 
regions, nations or peoples. It criticises CiU for having monopolised Catalan
1 4 . 0 PNV-EA-ERC-UM Joint Platform for European Parliament Elections, 1999.
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participation in the process of integration and employing its cosy position with the 
central government to protect the interests of Catalan industrialists and business at 
the European level. The Catalan office in Brussels is seen by ERC as a personal 
fiefdom of CiU141. The initial hope that deeper integration would allow the 
Catalan government to bypass the nation-state in its dealings with the EU has 
faded. Again, a sense of disillusionment with what Europe can offer Europe's 
'state-less nations' prevails.
Iniciativa per Catalunya
Like its Socialist counterparts, the coalition formed by former PSUC and PCC 
members, the Catalan Greens and other leftist forces in 1987 called Iniciativa per 
Catalunya (IC), has suffered from internal divisions over the issue of Catalonia’s 
position within the Spanish state. Nevertheless, it has consistently supported the 
right of self-determination for both Basques and Catalans. This position diverges 
from the national leftist coalition, Izquierda Unida (IU), within which it is 
incorporated for general elections, which argues that the “principle of self- 
determination is nothing more than a useless reminiscence of the past, which does 
not respond to any of the present social issues”142. This reflects, like its leftist 
rival the PSC, the party’s dilemma in supporting the right to self-determination. 
On the one hand, it reflects the party’s recognition of the plurinational and 
multicultural reality of the Spanish state, faithful to the PSUC’s 1936 pledge that 
“nationalisms are good if they aid the triumph of the revolution”143 and the 
influence of leftist separatists from the Entesa dels Nacionalistes d ’Esquerra 
(ENE) which form part of the coalition. On the other hand, by promoting the 
principle of self-determination, the party is faced with an ideological obstacle as 
to the unity of the State and has attempted to address the nationalist problem by 
promoting the idea of deepening existing self-government. In addition, the 
tension existing between IC’s secretary general, Rafael Ribo and the IU’s former 
secretary general, Julio Anguita, over the former’s support of agreements with
141 Interview with ERC official, January 1999.
142 Carreras de, F. (1996). “Autodeterminacio i subsidiarietat”, in Nous Horitzons. Num. 142, Vol. 
36, October 1996, p. 27 (author’s translation).
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CiU or ERC on certain issues again reflects the dilemma posed by the Catalan 
branch and the central coalition, similar to that continuous discrepancy suffered 
between the PSC and the PSOE. Accordingly, the party has opted for supported a 
federalist vision within which the right to self-determination would be inherent 
and optional. This would entail reform of the Senate and the elimination of the 
provinces of Catalonia. To this end, IC has joined forces with other leftist groups 
in the remaining so-called Paisos Catalans (Valencia and the Balearic Islands) to 
present a united pro-Catalan leftist front.
Iniciativa per Catalunya’s European dimension
In ideological terms and as described above, IC has been faced by a dilemma as to 
whether or not to encourage the right of minorities to self-determination and the 
protection of the Spanish state. Accordingly, it has promoted the idea that while 
the principle of self-determination may be out of date and out of touch with 
modem society, the principle of subsidiarity and the ensuing necessary reforms to 
the organisation of the state is a modem concept which will encourage the 
“democratisation and extend the equality levels within the welfare state”144. It 
argues that this principle should be applied to all levels of government, from the 
municipal to the European level, to achieve twin objectives, improved democratic 
participation and political and administrative efficiency. Thus, “today in Europe, 
especially the EU, self-determination doesn’t make any sense from the point of 
view of the forces of progress. In contrast, the principle of subsidiary, which is 
already inspiring the competencies of the European Union, maintains a large 
scope of useful virtues from the point of view of the left”145.
Again, the moderate interpretation of nationalism is evident here. Specifically, IC 
views Catalonia’s participation in the process of European integration as a 
positive one, more for political than for economic reasons. Its proposed measures 
for Catalonia’s increased participation in the process of European integration are
143 Calzada, A. and Llorens, C. (1995). Reconstmccio Nacional. Barcelona: Edicions Destino, p. 
173 (author’s translation).
144 Carreras de, F. (1996), p. 27.
145 Ibid, p. 29.
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closely linked to Catalonia’s position within the Spanish state. Here IC differs 
from its national IU partners who are not against the EU but have criticised the 
institutional and economic system of the EU. They support a true European 
Constitution and argue that without it, the problem of the democratic deficit will 
continue. They argue that the Commission and Council of Ministers should 
equally share the legislative burden.
Yet, IC's leftist credentials often times overtake its nationalist leanings. It 
criticises both the institutional and economic system of the EU not only for not 
incorporating Catalan and other sub-national forms of participation but also for its 
free-market foundations. Nevertheless, its demands for a European Constitution, 
equality of the Commission and Council of Ministers in decision-making terms, 
and greater power for the European Parliament echo those voiced by other Catalan 
parties.
Partit per la Independ£ncia
The Partit per la Independencia (PI) is a staunchly left-wing party with a hard­
line separatist policy. Due its relatively recent establishment in May 1997146, it 
is difficult to provide an accurate overview of its policies with regards to the 
current constitutional reality of Catalonia remaining within the Spanish state. 
Nevertheless, its position on Catalonia’s participation in the EU is consistently 
viewed within the perspective of an independent Catalan state. Accordingly, 
Article 1 of the party’s statute establishes “the Catalan Nation within its own State 
within the European framework”. Like its Catalan separatist rival, ERC, and its 
Scottish and Welsh counterparts, the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid 
Cymru, it has also launched an Independence in Europe campaign, reflecting its 
desire to remain a part of the process of European integration despite its pursuit of 
full-fledged independence. This is where the similarities with the other separatist 
parties end however. The PI has blamed Spanish negotiators for the perceived 
‘bad deal’ which Catalonia received following Spanish accession to the European
146 It auto-dissolved in early 1999.
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Community147. In addition, it has argued that Catalonia has been unable to benefit 
from EU regional policy and that contrary to popular belief, it is actually a net 
contributor. The PI also maintains its belief in the traditional structure and power 
of nation-state, arguing that Catalonia’s participation in the EU is useless without 
the “voice and vote” of a member- state in its traditional form148. It has accused 
supporters of the process of integration of treating the citizens of EU regions as 
second-class citizens149. Nevertheless, the Pi's poor results in the 1999 European 
Parliament and municipal elections where they were virtually wiped out reflect its 
failure to establish itself as the second largest separatist party in Catalonia.
Impact of European Integration on Identity
As discussed in Chapter 3, the multiple electoral strategy employed by many 
Catalan voters depending on the level of elections (municipal, regional, national 
and European) reflects the sense of dual identity inherent in the Catalan nationalist 
movement. At the European level, this voting pattern has become even more 
fragmented. Despite the fact that the single Spanish circumscription in the 
European Parliament elections prevents an analysis of voting patterns purely at 
the Catalan level, the overall picture does show a fragmentation of the vote. 
Unique circumscription or constituency forces nationalist parties, strong in one 
region, to enter into coalition with other nationalist parties. Thus, it is clear that 
the Spanish vote generally in EP elections has become more pluralized as 
indicated below in Figures 5.3 and 5.4:
147 Partit per la Independencia (1997) Economic Report, pp. 14-15.
148 Interview with PI representative, No. 1, January 7, 1998.
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Figure 5.3 
European Parliament Elections 1994
CiU(3)CE(2)
PP (28)
Figure 5.4 
European Parliament Elections 1999
PSOE (22)
CE CN-EP BNG EH
CiU
Figure 5.3 (seats are shown in parenthesis)
Figure 5.4 Vote Breakdown
PP 27 seats
PSOE 24 seats
IU 4 seats
CiU 3 seats
CE (Coalicion Europea)a 2 seats
CN-EP (Coalicion Nacionalista -  Europa de los Pueblos)6 2 seats
BNG (Bloque Nacionalista Gallego) 1 seat
EH (Euskal Herritarok) 1 seat
a CE is a coalition encompassing several regionalist parties including Coalition 
Canaria (CC), Partido Aragones (Par), Partido Andalucista (PA) and Union Valenciana
(UV).
 ^ CN-EP is a coalition encompassing the Basque nationalist parties of PNV and 
Eusko Alkartasuna (EA) as well as ERC and Unio Mallorquina (UM).
Thus, the breakdown of regionalist/nationalist vs. centrist parties shows that the 
Spanish vote, at least in European elections, is moving away from a left-right 
divide to a centrist-regionalist/nationalist divide. These voting patterns also 
demonstrate a proliferation of the regionalist/nationalist vote in other areas of 
Spain, where traditionally this type of party has not had strong electoral results. 
Regionalist parties from Aragon, Andalucia, Valencia, Mallorca and the Canary 
Islands have joined forces with each other or with stronger nationalist formations 
to enter the European Parliament. According to this shift in voting patterns, 
Europe is seen from the voters' perspective as the appropriate institutional and 
political context within which nationalist objectives should be pursued or at least 
defended. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 reflect the importance given to Spanish and/or 
Catalan participation in the process of European integration. The view of Europe 
as the democratic prototype for Spain has historically prevailed and continues, 
albeit to a lesser degree, to dominate public opinion on Europe. In addition, 
Spain's membership in the EU has further fragmented the dual identity 
phenomenon in Catalonia.
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Table 5.5
Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “The 
Spanish democracy has not reached the level of European democracies?" (in
percentages)
1995 1996
Agree 61 51
Disagree 26 31
Don’t know/no response 12 18
Data carried out 1990-1996 by the Institut de Ciencies Politiques i Socials at the 
Autonomous University of Barcelona
Table 5.6
Question: Do you feel more European or more Spanish?
1996 Data (in percentages)
Only Spanish 17
More Spanish than European 26
Equally Spanish and European 43
More European than Spanish 8
Only European 5
Don’t know 1
No response 2
Data carried out 1990-1996 by the Institut de Ciencies Politiques i Socials at the 
Autonomous University of Barcelona
Conclusion
As Chapter 3 has described, many of the objectives pursued by the Catalan 
nationalist movement have changed remarkably little or have remained static. 
The parties representing the most active sector of Catalan nationalism have 
employed a strategy focusing on a continuous campaign to ensure that the process
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of competency devolution within the Spanish state remains alive. The debate 
among Catalan political parties is whether in the case of Catalonia, the process of 
devolution has gone far enough. Public debate has emerged within the Catalan 
nationalist movement and within the parties themselves on the degree to which 
claims of nationhood, statehood or even 'regionhood' should be asserted. Should 
Catalan objectives include a mere reformation of the statute of self-government? 
Or should a federalist model be adopted within the Spanish state, one which 
would ensure the uniformity of all regions? Whereas the federalist option has 
been viewed by other regionalist or nationalist movements within Europe as a 
solution, the federalist option has proven to be a Catch-22 in many aspects for the 
Catalan nationalist movement and remains controversial. CiU advocates a 
plurinational and multi-cultural framework within Spain, based on the Swish 
confederate model. The objective, to a certain extent, is to achieve a modem form 
of independence or European-style separatism which does not necessarily entail 
the formation of a state.
Within this debate, the question of greater participation in Europe has been 
growing in importance in recent years. Until the mid 1990s, most Catalan parties 
agreed that Europe was a 'good thing' for Catalonia but were unable to go beyond 
rhetorical discourse. Today's Catalan parties have concrete proposals for Catalan 
participation in the process of European integration. Although there is generalised 
consensus as to the importance of Europe to the consolidation of the State of 
Autonomies and the economic and political future of Spain and Catalonia, the 
strategies among Catalan parties vary extensively. The main difference lies in the 
extent to which Europe is employed to further nationalist objectives. Parties such 
as ERC and the PI view Europe as the place where Catalonia can secure its 
independence. CiU on the other hand, prefers to view Europe as a place where 
state sovereignty can be bypassed in favour of the sub- and supra-national levels. 
The rhetoric for the nationalist parties seems to be that "Spain is bad and Europe 
is good". Critics argue that the efforts exerted by the nationalist-led Generalitat 
reflect a deep complex of 'pais petit' or small country. They argue that the Catalan 
nationalists' activity in the EU represents a deep concern for their own survival. 
Whatever the motivations, what is clear is that the efforts clearly reflect a desire 
for foreign recognition which goes beyond the acknowledgement by other
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Europeans of a Catalan 'sub-culture' within Spain. As one party official succinctly 
put it, the "Catalan contribution to the EU is not to teach Catalan in Helsinki"150.
The positive view of Europe however, has shifted considerably in recent years. 
Many nationalists argue that the process of European integration has not advanced 
enough to benefit Catalonia. A positive approach to European integration is 
important to nationalist parties so long as continued integration signifies lingering 
protection of minority rights. Some studies show however that the ‘idea of 
Europe’ has not been embraced as enthusiastically in Catalonia as it has been 
elsewhere in Spain. According to the European Values Study described by 
Andres and Sanchez Fernandez, the ‘idea of Europe’ is not seen so much as an 
ideological goal but as a “politically neutral space where Catalonia can enjoy 
some freedom of action”151. A further complaint by many Catalan nationalists is 
the perception that a cafe para todos mentality ingrained within Spanish political 
circles has extended to the establishment of institutions at the European level.
As this chapter has illustrated, independence does not seem to be a primary 
objective among most Catalan political parties (with the exception of the small 
separatist ERC and the PI). However, the concept of Catalonia as a nation and the 
principle of self-determination guaranteed within the European context continue 
to be employed in the mainstream nationalist movement as ideological if vague 
elements in nationalist discourse. These elements, buried in a climate of 
ambiguity are employed at times as a form of pressure on the Spanish state to 
achieve nationalist objectives. However, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, 
the European ideal is pursued through a distinctly regionalist strategy despite its 
ambiguous nationalist rhetoric. Thus, the Catalan nationalists’ strategy is 
characterised by inherent ambiguity and contradictions, by both co-operating with 
and struggling against the central authorities and remaining very much embedded 
in its nationalist agenda. Participation in the process of European integration is a 
case in point.
150 Interview with Javier Sanchez, PSC.
151 Keating (1997), p. 700.
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Chapter 6
Participation at the EU level:
Legal and Constitutional Implications
Introduction
The process of European integration has had uneven effects on the structure of 
each member-state. In cases where sub-national authorities or actors play a strong 
role, the effects are even more obvious. Analysing the institutions and actors 
involved - at all levels of government - in determining the state’s position on EU 
matters is only one aspect of the effects of European integration on the state 
structure. It is equally important to examine the potential ramifications these 
changes may have on the legal and institutional structures of the individual 
member-states.
The dual processes of regionalisation and European integration have led, as some 
authors have argued, to an informal alliance particularly in the area of EU regional 
policy, between EU institutions and sub-national authorities. This alliance 
arguably weakens the nation-state by shifting competencies from the national 
level to the supranational and sub-national levels. According this argument, a 
type of ‘conspiracy’ based on mutual self-interest and rational choice is emerging 
between the latter two levels based on a zero-sum approach. Nevertheless, the 
case of the Spanish autonomous communities clearly shows that competencies 
and authority are both shared and re-allocated giving “rise to joint decision­
making rather than the domination of one level over the other”152. Thus, careful 
analysis is needed of the ever-changing relationship between sub-national 
authorities and the central government in the EU policy-making process. This 
allows for a more complete overview of the impact of European integration on 
both the sum (the balance of power among the entities) and the parts (the nature 
and position of each entity within the political system).
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The case of Catalonia will demonstrate that the process of European integration 
has not led to a strengthening or weakening of the state based on a zero-sum 
game. Instead, this process has led to a fundamental transformation of the 
domestic structures of the Spanish nation-state. This transformation highlights the 
importance of institutions and constitutional measures in the equation. The 
process of European integration has led to an increase in the interdependent 
interaction of national, sub-national and supranational actors. In the Spanish case, 
this growing interaction has had considerable legal and constitutional implications 
within the process of consolidation of the State of Autonomies. This chapter will 
focus on three issues. First, a comparative approach between the roles of the 
German Lander and the Spanish autonomous communities at the European level 
is outlined. Secondly, an analysis of the implications of the process of European 
integration on the Spanish state’s legal and constitutional arrangements will 
highlight the problems facing both the Spanish state and the autonomous 
communities in legal and constitutional terms. Third, the issue of national 
economic planning will be examined briefly as the starting point from which 
regional authorities began to demand institutionalised participation in EU matters. 
The comparative approach and analysis of the legal and constitutional 
implications will illustrate the development of an ongoing process of 
transformation of state structures in Spain
The German Lander and the Spanish Autonomous Communities: A 
Comparative Approach
At first glance, it may seem as if the process of European integration may have 
weakened the power of the regions or sub-national authorities vis-a-vis the state. 
Many of the competencies held by regional authorities with a high degree of self- 
government are gradually being transferred to the European level. Eventually, 
this loss of authority would be felt within the domestic political system where 
sub-national authorities would no longer need to participate in negotiations or 
legislation with the central government in those areas where competencies have 
been transferred to the EU level. Clearly, a process involving the ‘Europeanising’
152 Borzel (1997), p. 105.
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1of exclusive competencies has developed. This loss of competencies seems to 
confirm the view held by some that the process of European integration in fact 
strengthens the state vis-a-vis sub-national entities. Notwithstanding this, more 
analysis appears to demonstrate that in fact the opposite occurs. The case of 
Germany, as outlined below, will illustrate how its sub-national authorities, the 
Lander, have increasingly managed to keep the balance of power in constant flux.
A brief look at the case of the German Lander is important in tracing the rise in 
participation and influence of sub-national authorities in the EU decision-making 
process. The case is useful as a model for Catalonia since the German Lander 
have often been described, along with the Belgian regions and more recently the 
Austrian Lander, as the best examples of sub-national authorities which are 
influential at the preliminary stages of the process of EU decision-making 
(Hooghe, 1995) (Jeffery, 1996b). Unlike the Spanish case, where accession to the 
EC in 1986 coincided with the recent transition to democracy and consolidation of 
the State of Autonomies, the Lander in Germany demanded full participatory 
rights in the negotiation processes with European institutions from the very 
inception of the EEC. The Lander even enjoyed observer status in the German 
negotiations over the Treaty of Rome in 1957 even though they did not participate 
as full members of the negotiations committee. Although the Lander's influence 
over the European decision-making process was marginal at first, the German 
federal government did respond to demands for greater participation by allowing 
the Bundesrat to issue non-binding recommendations. Despite the fact that the 
Lander did not have a direct input into the basic treaty draft, over time they were 
able to secure increasing measures of influence in the EU legislation process 
(Borzel, 1997). Initially however, this influence was limited to implementing and 
administering European directives which in constitutional and Treaty terms did 
not allow for a great deal of manoeuvre.
153 By ‘Europeanized’, I would use the definition as presented by Peter John in describing the 
local government which has been ‘Europeanized’, the characteristics of which include 
participation in joint projects and networks of other European authorities, in receipt of European 
funding either through structural funds or otherwise, representation through an office in Bmssels, 
and the integration of EU activities in all administrative departments or divisions. John, Peter 
(1994).
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One of the questions deriving from the participation of sub-national authorities in 
EU matters is how disruptive this participation would be. In other words, will the 
introduction of more actors and institutions in the policy-making process 
complicate this process even further, increasing the chances for more conflict and 
less effective decision-making? The case of the Germany and its 1969 "Joint 
Task" of Regional Development between the federal government and the Lander 
is a good example. This combined effort in the EU regional policy-making 
process has led some authors to describe this type of participation as a joint 
decision trap with little capacity to adapt (Benz and Eberlein, 1998). However, 
the German case is useful in tracing the effects of European integration on the 
policy-making process of one of the most decentralized member-states of the EU. 
Its position as one of the EUs founding members allows for a more detailed 
analysis on the evolution of participatory arrangements for its Lander.
1986 marked a turning point for German federal government and Lander relations 
over European matters when the latter began to use “their veto power on the 
domestic ratification of major treaty reforms to press for more influence on the 
resources of initiative and information”154. During the ratification process of the 
SEA, the Lander reiterated many of their demands including that of “securing 
binding participatory rights in European matters and changing Art. 24 (1) of the 
Basic Law to make the transfer of national competencies to the EC subject to the 
consent of the Bundesrat (BR-Drs. 50/86, 21.2.1986)”155. Owing to 
overwhelming German approval of the SEA and the unpopularity of the Lander's 
demands, the Lander were ultimately unable to secure these demands (Borzel, 
1997). Despite its refusal to grant full participatory rights, the German federal 
government did formalize some of the existing informal information and 
consultation procedures.
Much has been written on the direct influence exerted by the German Lander both 
in Germany’s negotiations with the EU and directly on European institutions 
through increased contact by setting up offices in Brussels and establishing both 
formal and informal links with the European Commission and Parliament (Jeffery,
154 Borzel, (1997) p. 97.
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1995). Through these initiatives, the Lander have been able to collect and 
disseminate information to increase their knowledge of certain issues in order to 
formulate positions on specific policy matters. The Landerbeobachter 
(Observer), position created by 1988 legislation, also collects substantial amounts 
of information for the Lander. Similarly, the German federal government has been 
required by law since 1979 to submit all relevant European documentation 
including reports and other confidential information to the Bundesrat.
In the run-up to the 1991 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) leading to the 
Maastricht Treaty, the Lander pressured the German federal government with 
their demands for greater participation. Later, these demands would be reiterated 
by both the Catalan and Basque governments in Spain and included:
1. the inclusion of the principle of subsidiarity in the EU Treaty;
2. the creation of a regional body at the European level (equivalent to the 
recognition of the regions as a ‘third level’ of the European Union);
3. the right of the regions to defend themselves before the European Court 
Justice against violations of their jurisdiction by the EU;
4. the direct participation of regional representatives in the Council of Ministers; 
and
5. the participation of the Lander in the Intergovernmental Conference.
With these demands, the Lander set a precedent for other regions to follow. This 
list of demands was copied by other sub-national authorities in their proposal for 
greater regional participation in EU matters. With the creation of the Committee 
of the Regions (CoR), the Lander again played an important role by supporting 
proposals for institutional and treaty in the run-up to the 1996 IGC through the so- 
called Pujol report released by the CoR.
The Lander were able to participate in all negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty 
except for the final European Council meeting as well as the domestic 
negotiations on the formulation of Germany’s position. Ultimately, the German 
federal government relented in light of the continued threats by the Lander of 
vetoing the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in the Bundesrat (Borzel, 1997).
155 Ibid, pp. 97-98.
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The Lander scored another success when two of their five demands were met in 
the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty. By 1992, representatives from the various 
Lander participated in over 250 EU committees and the amount of Bundesrat 
recommendations addressed by the federal government increased substantially156. 
The Lander also enjoy the presence of a Landerbeobachter or regional observer in 
the German delegation. The German federal government has also significantly 
extended the amount of European level information made available to the Lander 
allowing them to develop more informed and articulated positions on EU matters.
There were several reasons for the Lander's success. Firstly, the Lander's strategy 
had shifted considerably over the past decade (Borzel, 1997). Up to 1985, the 
Lander insisted on defending their competencies from being transferred to the 
European level. However, from 1985 onwards, the Lander implemented a 
strategy demanding greater levels of participation in the EU decision-making 
process both within European institutions and in the formulation of the German 
position in the legislative process. Secondly, the political climate had changed to 
a more favourable one towards the Lander. Pan-European regional associations 
had taken hold and had increasingly become more influential. The idea of a 
‘Europe of the Regions’ in order to promote pan-European regional solidarity had 
spread. Nevertheless, the success of the Lander was not so much attributable to 
an ideological shift by the federal government favouring the Lander's position but 
the persistent threat by the latter of vetoing the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty in the Bundesrat.
In 1992 the informal level of the Lander's influence changed with modifications 
to the Basic Law which required the federal government to present all 
modifications to European treaties to the Bundesrat as well as the transfer of 
national competencies, thereby granting the Lander a substantial role in European 
matters. The Lander were also successful in gaining an institutional channel of 
interests and demands at the European level with the creation of the Committee of 
the Regions. At the domestic level, the modifications to the Basic Law meant that 
Lander representation in the formulation of the German position in European
156 Ibid, p.99.
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policy matters was guaranteed. This representation was even extended in cases 
where the Lander’s jurisdiction, interests or competencies were directly affected. 
The Europakammer or European Chamber, a committee entrusted with the EU 
matters, was created and granted significant decision-making powers in adopting 
resolutions discussed later in the Bundesrat. Changes to Article 23 of the Basic 
Law in 1991 secured Lander representation in the Council by a Land minister 
nominated by the Bundesrat. These changes allowed the Lander to formulate 
recommendations on all EU proposals, including imposing these 
recommendations when Lander interests or jurisdictions are involved.
The October 1993 Federal-Lander Agreement also officially recognises the 
existence and function of the Lander offices -  without diplomatic status - in 
Brussels. Like the 1994 Constitutional Tribunal decision in Spain and its 
repercussions for the Spanish autonomous communities, this official recognition 
allowed the Lander to formalize their links with EU institutions without the 
German federal government feeling threatened. The 1993 legislation also 
confirms the Bundesrats status as the institution where EU matters are discussed 
among the Lander and the federal government. It reinforces the Bundesraf s 
power of opinion as elementary to the policy-making process in EU matters. 
Essentially, the Lander have secured substantial changes in the domestic 
bargaining and ratification processes of EU matters. This process of change has 
fundamentally altered the balance between the power and influence of the German 
state and the Lander. This became evident in various situations including the 
ratification process of the 1996-1997 IGC outcome when the Lander threatened to 
employ their veto prerogative if the principle of subsidiarity, one of their most 
reiterated demands, was not revised (Borzel, 1997).
Nevertheless, since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, it appears as if the 
Lander are no longer as assertive and united in their demands for greater 
participatory rights. Particularly in the case of transferring greater levels of 
authority and competencies to the Committee of the Regions (CoR), the Lander 
have been divided, most notably with respect to the doubts expressed by the 
Eastern Lander (Christiansen, 1997) (Jeffery, 1996a). As will be discussed in the 
following chapter, the Spanish autonomous communities have echoed the
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Lander's disappointment with the weak consultative functions of the CoR. In 
addition, varying opinions on competency allocation among the various levels of 
government have weakened the position of the Lander with regards to their 
European aspirations. Nonetheless, the German federal government has 
continued to press its claims within the EU legislative process for a greater role 
for European regions in its attempts to address Lander demands.
Generally, several conclusions can be drawn from the German case. The Lander 
have been successful in achieving and exerting considerable levels of influence 
both within the German political process on European issues, jurisdiction and 
competencies, and directly at the European level. The case of Germany serves as 
a model for analysing the impact of both European integration and the growing 
levels of authority and influence by sub-national entities upon the state. By using 
the German case, the structural changes the state is undergoing can be examined 
without resorting to a zero-sum game approach. As Borzel argues, “rather than 
strengthening or weakening the central state level, Europeanization has reinforced 
the patterns and structures of power sharing and joint decision-making on which 
the German system of interlocking politics (Politikverflechtung) is based”157. 
This system of continuous bargaining between the three actors which has led to 
significant changes to structures, institutions and balances of power is useful in 
examining other case studies. The approach is useful despite its emphasis on a 
conflict-minimising style of bargaining very much more characteristic of the 
German rather than the Spanish case, as the following chapter will illustrate.
Nevertheless, the case of Germany as examined above is ideal for a comparative 
perspective with Spain. In both countries, sub-national authorities have 
articulated many of the same demands including securing greater participatory 
rights in EU matters both domestically and at the European level. A comparative 
approach using the German case provides greater insight into the relationship 
between sub-national, national and European authorities. The German case also 
addresses the question of sovereignty, an important element in the study of the 
evolving political arrangements of the Spanish state. The modifications to
157 Ibid, p. 104.
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Articles 23 and 24 of the Basic Law establish the role of the Lander within the 
European policy-making process. In sum, the new provisions bind “national and 
European sovereignty into an identical legal frame work [sic]” and presuppose the 
“disappearance of the notion of sovereignty in the traditional sense”158. Like the 
German case, the Spanish case demonstrates a two-fold process of evolution 
leading to a state of ‘shared sovereignty’. On the one hand, increasing measures 
of devolution of competencies and authority have led to changes in the 
institutional and political structures of the state as well as a continuous 
reassessment of the balance of power between the state and the regions. On the 
other, consolidation and participation in the process of European integration has 
exposed the Spanish state and its primary decision-makers to a process of 
socialisation and changed the nature of the political systems both at the domestic 
and European levels. Thus, the balance of power has merely been shifted and 
rearranged among the actors in the political system rather than each actor gaining 
or losing a set amount, a function of a zero-sum game (Hooghe and Keating, 
1994) (Hesse and Wright, 1996).
Despite the attractions of using Germany as a comparison, the German state has 
often described as a ‘unitary federal state’ (Scharpf, 1996) resulting in a series of 
drawbacks for comparative purposes. First, the Lander have managed to secure 
greater decision-making powers at both the European and federal levels by 
sacrificing their own autonomy. In other words, the Lander have managed to 
attain a position within the federal decision-making system wherein they 
collectively act as a set of checks and balances in exchange for individuality and 
the protection of regional autonomy and diversity. This shift in priorities and 
influence has been explained by the essentially uniform nature of many German 
Lander with a common history and political culture. The present forms of the 
German Lander159 do not represent in any way the historical territories or even the 
distinct cultural communities associated with the territorial formations of the
158 Leonardy, U. (1996) “The Political Dimension, German Practice, and the European 
Perspective” in Hesse, J. and Wright, V. (eds.) Federalizing Europe? The Costs. Benefits and 
Preconditions of Federal Political Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 94.
The present territorial boundaries of the German Lander are a product of the divisions imposed 
by the occupation forces in the immediate post-Second World War era. See Hesse and Wright, 
(1996).
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Spanish state. In addition, Germany has lacked the traditional nationalist or ethnic 
strife emanating from its regions which has characterised Spanish modem history. 
German politics has also been characterised by a higher degree of consensus and 
compromise between the federal and Lander levels than that experienced in the 
relations between the Spanish central government and the autonomous 
communities (Hesse and Wright, 1996). The German system of 
Politikverflechtung does not apply to the Spanish case in the area of EU matters, 
specifically with regard to the role of consensual agreements. The idiosyncrasies 
of the Spanish political system specifically relate to the pluralist nature and 
composition of the Spanish state and therefore need special consideration.
Nevertheless, the German Lander are not as similar as would seem at face value. 
Despite their identical constitutional frameworks, each Land has its own strategy 
at the European level. The cases of Lower Saxony and Bavaria (Jeffery, 1998) 
illustrate these disparities between a seemingly uniform strategy among all the 
German Lander and the nationalist rhetoric behind Bavaria's demands for greater 
participation in EU matters. This nationalist rhetoric could perhaps be described 
as a German form of the hecho diferencial. Indeed, in the Spanish case, 
nationalist rhetoric has provided the additional impetus for the autonomous 
communities to demand greater participatory rights in EU matters from the 
Spanish state. Furthermore, the Spanish autonomous communities have not 
shown signs of resisting the transfer of their competencies to the EU level as their 
German counterparts did before 1985.
Another difference between the two cases is the degree to which sub-national 
authorities are permitted to participate in the EU decision-making process. In the 
case of the Lander in Germany, through their ‘observer’ status in the negotiation 
process they are able to exert some direct influence particularly in areas where 
their interests or competencies would be directly affected (Borzel, 1997). Until 
recently, and as will be described in the following chapter, the participation of the 
Spanish autonomous communities in EU matters was limited to representation in 
the Sectoral Conference of the European Union established in 1988 by the 
Ministry of Public Administration. In contrast, the constitutional federal system 
of the German state already allows for significant participation by the Lander in
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domestic politics in the form of federal institutional arrangements such as the 
Bundesrat. Thus, the system allows the Lander to demand the right to participate 
in the EU policy-making process as compensation for losing competencies to 
Brussels (Borzel, 1997). This ‘compensation through participation’ is an inherent 
feature of the German political system and has prevented the balance of power 
shifting permanently towards either side.
Quite the opposite is true in Spain. As outlined in Chapter 4, the ongoing process 
of devolution has not yet established the competency boundaries between sub­
national and central authorities. Furthermore, the balance of power within the 
Spanish political system remains highly dependent on electoral outcomes, as the 
govemability pacts following the 1993 and 1996 general elections demonstrate. 
Nevertheless, the German case is useful for comparative purposes as a precedent 
for the Spanish autonomous communities to follow. The legal and constitutional 
implications in the German case do have relevance on the Spanish case, as the 
following section will outline.
Legal and constitutional implications on the Spanish autonomous 
communities
As described above, the German Lander enjoy a recognised and influential 
political institution, the Bundesrat, through which to channel their interests and 
organise their demands in their dealings with the federal government. Two 
important features of the structure of the Spanish state limit the capacity of the 
autonomous communities (CCAAs) to collectively channel their demands and 
articulate their interests on EU matters to the central government. First, the nature 
of the Senate, the weaker of the two parliamentary institutions, does not allow for 
effective or influential decision-making. Second, the asymmetrical nature of the 
Spanish State of Autonomies means that power is unevenly distributed throughout 
the autonomous communities.
According to Article 94 of the Spanish Constitution, the central government is 
required to convey to the Senate all information concerning international treaties 
or agreements it has entered. As the territorial representative chamber, reinforced
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by the 1994 Senate reform, this obligation would grant the Senate the same status 
as its German counterpart, the Bundesrat. Theoretically, it would mean that the 
autonomous communities would be able to discuss and formulate 
recommendations on EU matters within the Senate. In practice however, the 
inherent weaknesses of the Senate have prevented it from playing a more decisive 
role in securing greater participatory rights for the autonomous communities in 
the EU decision-making process. Article 95 provides both chambers the right to 
present motions to the Constitutional Tribunal against specific international 
agreements entered into by the government. Theoretically, this would provide the 
Senate with some power in EU matters by opposing these agreements. 
Nevertheless, this constitutional provision merely reinforces potential conflict 
between the central government and the autonomous communities by 
institutionalising judicial sentences rather than political channels of co-operation.
The inherent weaknesses of the Senate demonstrate the lack of a clear legal and 
constitutional framework within which collaborative efforts between the central 
and sub-national authorities can be exercised. As will be discussed in the 
following chapter, the Sectoral Conferences and bilateral negotiations have taken 
over the exercise of functions theoretically belonging to the Senate. At face value, 
the Senate would be the logical venue for discussion of EU matters. Catalan 
officials and political party representatives interviewed by the author concurred in 
describing the Senate as a centre of EU information dissemination rather than as a 
proper governing chamber. They argue that if the structure and function of the 
Senate remains unchanged, the state will always be the intermediary in EU 
matters, seriously limiting the participation of the CCAAs in EU matters. Despite 
the fact that CiU has occupied the vice-presidency of the Senate through Joan 
Rigol, the presence of Catalan nationalists in the higher echelons of Spain's 
second chamber has not led to the necessary reforms. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
the Senate’s true function does not correspond to its constitutional function as a 
territorially representative chamber. Instead, one could argue that the plethora of 
existing Sectoral Conferences on all matters has led to a Sectoral Conference 
Constitution for the State of Autonomies.
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Spain’s accession to the EC in 1986 could have arguably eroded the powers of the 
autonomous communities since the nature of the European decision-making 
power involves functions and powers exclusively reserved by the state (Scharpf, 
1996). Decisions taken at the EU level by the Spanish state are judged to be 
international obligations falling under the jurisdiction of international law under 
Article 149 Section 1.3 of the Spanish Constitution. As a result of the legal 
stipulations, it would seem that the autonomous communities are excluded from 
the right to implement EU treaties and legislation. Instead, the state bears full 
responsibility. Consequently, the redistribution of powers and competencies as 
stipulated by the various European treaties and ongoing legislation has resulted in 
powers being shifted to the supra-national level. This would imply a territorial 
redistribution of powers within the Spanish state. In itself, this would not prove to 
be a problem provided that legislative or constitutional reform involved 
compensating the autonomous communities with additional powers (Solozabal,
1996).
Nevertheless, the argument that European integration has led to the curbing or 
limitation of powers exercised by the respective autonomous communities does 
not hold true in the Spanish case. Firstly, efforts have been made to correct this 
redistribution of powers. A Constitutional Tribunal decision (Decision 252 of 
1988) held that collaborative efforts should be sustained between the central 
government and the autonomous communities in all matters referring to the 
implementation of European legislation within the limits and boundaries 
established by the Constitution and the individual Statutes of Autonomy. The 
balance of power between the two sides however, is tilted in favour of the central 
government, which retains a constitutional guarantee of control to ensure the 
uniformity of the implementation of EU treaties and legislation.
One of the proposed solutions to tilting the balance in favour of the CCAAs has 
been to institutionalise the right to petition contained in Article 77 of the Spanish 
Constitution (Perez Calvo, 1993). This would mean that CCAAs with objections 
to certain positions adopted by the central government in EU matters could 
exercise their right of petition to the Spanish Cortes. However, putting this 
measure into practice would create an avalanche of petitions to the Cortes taking
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up valuable time and resources and further accentuating the legal uncertainty 
generated by this stop and go measure. Furthermore, it does not address the 
problem of institutionalising the mechanisms by which the CCAAs can participate 
in the formulation of the Spanish position in EU matters. At the EU level, the 
problem is similar. As shall be seen in the following chapter, one of the demands 
made by Catalan nationalists is for the right for the CCAAs to present a case 
before the European Court of Justice (ECJ)160. The current agreement stipulates 
that in cases where the competencies of a specific CCAA are affected, the 
regional authorities may assign advisors to represent them in the working groups 
of the Spanish legal delegation. Again, the time and resources involved in this 
collaborative effort have prompted supporters of independent judicial actions by 
the regional authorities in the ECJ to press their case.
From a brief examination of the legal and constitutional framework surrounding 
the rights and competencies of the central government and the autonomous 
communities in EU matters, contradictions emerge involving the harmonisation of 
EU directives and norms. As discussed previously, from a legal standpoint EU 
treaties and agreements are regarded as international obligations and accordingly 
pertain to the Spanish state’s exclusive jurisdiction or area of competency. A 
conflict of interpretation arises however, when one considers the limits to state 
control as outlined in the 1978 Constitution and the respective Statutes of 
Autonomy and their delineation of the distribution of powers. If for example the 
EU issues a directive in the area of education which under the Catalan Statute of 
Autonomy falls under the direct jurisdiction of the Generalitat, the Generality's 
claims would enter into direct conflict with the state’s claim to exclusive control 
over the implementation of international agreements161. The Constitutional 
Tribunal has dictated that the central government is the only interlocutor in the
160 At present, only member-states governments can present or defend cases in front of the 
European Court of Justice. The issue of whether or not sub-national authorities, in this case the 
German Lander, was brought up by the German federal government in negotiations leading up to 
the Maastricht Treaty but a decision on the matter was not reached. Both the German Lander and 
the Spanish autonomous communities, particularly Catalonia and the Basque country, have 
fiercely lobbied their governments to include this issue in the 2000 IGC.
161 The present Catalan Statute of Autonomy lacks a provision stipulated by the Catalan Statute of 
1932 approved during the Second Republic which entitled the central government of the Republic 
to intervene in all matters relating to international treaties or agreements where the Generalitat did 
not exercise its powers (Solozabal, 1996).
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implementation of EU directives (Constitutional Tribunal Sentence 252/1988 of 
December 20, 1988). The same sentence however, mandates the co-operation 
between national and sub-national authorities respecting the internal rules of 
delimitation of competencies. Thus, the legal framework within which these 
boundaries are established on authority and competencies remains vague and 
ambiguous. The conflict of interest arising from this legal ambiguity increases the 
possibility of inherent political strife and reinforces the need for constitutional 
reform. As the process of European integration intensifies and more 
competencies are shifted to the supra-national level, the debate within Spain over 
the authority and jurisdiction involved in the implementation of EU legislation is 
likely to escalate unless a satisfactory solution is found.
The conflict generated by the ambiguous nature of the constitutional framework is 
exacerbated by the principle of subsidiarity as enshrined in its own terms in the 
Spanish Constitution (Article 149). It again questions the jurisdiction of the state 
vs. the autonomous communities in EU matters. Similarly, in Germany the 
distinctions between the state’s role in international obligations and the Lander's 
jurisdiction in competencies such as education and culture have not been defined 
in constitutional terms as has occurred in the US’s federal system. Like its 
Spanish counterpart, the German Constitutional Court developed a decision based 
on the principle of mutual harmonious recognition (bundesfreundliches Verhalten) 
by which each side must respect the jurisdiction and exercise of powers of the 
other. This decision was taken in response to the recognition that with the process 
of European integration the boundaries of policy areas and competencies would 
grow increasingly blurred. The absence of a similar decision in the Spanish legal 
system is merely delaying the resolution of a growing conflict between central and 
sub-national authorities in the implementation of EU policies and in the 
delimitation of jurisdictions.
The application of Community law to Spanish law also provides an instrument for 
Catalan nationalists and other regionalists to secure greater participatory rights. 
Article 146 of the Maastricht Treaty provides for the participation of sub-national 
authorities in the Council of Ministers in the form of observers, specifically with 
regard to competencies directly affecting these entities. For Catalan nationalists
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and other regionalists, the very nature of Article 146 implies institutional and 
constitutional reform including the fundamental transformation of the Senate. This 
interpretation extends to the Sectoral Conferences which in view of the 
nationalists are not sufficient to guarantee this participation. The lack of clear 
participatory mechanisms within the constitutional framework for regions with 
high levels of self-government such as Catalonia and the Basque Country will 
aggravate the ill feelings harboured between the central and sub-national 
authorities on competency allocation and jurisdiction.
The Statutes of Autonomy in themselves contain little and varied information as 
to the participation of the CCAAs in the central government’s position in 
international matters. The Statutes of those CCAAs which do refer to CCAA 
initiatives in international matters are concerned with specific issues such as the 
protection of regional languages and Spanish emigrants abroad. EU matters are 
not affected. The only exception to this is the case of Aragon whose Statute does 
contain a general provision allowing the regional government to petition the 
central government for international agreements in “areas of interest for 
Aragon”162. With regards to the central government’s obligation to inform 
CCAAs of its intentions on a specific position, only a few Statutes include this 
provision . With the exception of the Statute of the Canary Islands, the Statutes 
in question do not detail the CCAAs’ right of response to this information. 
Indeed, it is this omission of specific measures of response and co-operation 
which has led to a high degree of conflict between the CCAAs and the central 
government. What has occurred in the Spanish case is the Statutes’ lack of 
foresight which, when drafted, did not contemplate participatory measures for the 
CCAAs in Spain’s position in EU matters. Furthermore, with the publication and 
wide dissemination of EU directives and legislation, the central government’s 
obligation of informing the CCAAs on EU matters seems outdated and 
unnecessary. The process of devolution and transfer of competencies to regional 
authorities in itself carries a regular exchange of information within which the 
discussion of EU matters can be carried out. The reciprocal duty of exchange of 
information between the CCAAs and central government is enshrined in a
162 Article 40.1 of Aragon’s Statute of Autonomy.
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Constitutional Tribunal ruling (Constitutional Tribunal Sentence 76/1983, August 
5, 1983) again illustrating the important role carried out by the judicial system in 
establishing the rules and regulations in the process of devolution.
Several Constitutional Tribunal rulings164 since then have confirmed the CCAAs’ 
right to respond to specific policy measures affecting shared competencies or even 
competencies of exclusive state control. Again, it is the omission of provisions 
detailing the right of response to information in EU matters that prevents the 
development of an institutionalised mechanism of participation. In legal and 
constitutional terms, the asymmetry of the Statute of Autonomy provides an 
ambiguous and varied series of dispositions which does not define the 
participation of the CCAAs in the process of European integration. The potential 
for conflict between the central and sub-national authorities is clear.
Participation of the autonomous communities in national economic planning
The constitutional measures set out for the participation of the autonomous 
communities in national economic planning provided the legal and constitutional 
springboard from which the CCAAs could begin to demand greater participation 
in EU matters. Under Article 131 of the Constitution, the central government is 
responsible for the overall planning of economic activity. However, it draws up its 
economic plans in accordance with the forecasts supplied to it by the CCAAs. 
Under Article 149, the Constitution grants the central government the power of 
co-ordination of general economic planning, thereby enabling the CCAAs which 
have accepted the appropriate competence to develop such legislation further. The 
autonomous communities receive financial assistance from both the Interregional 
Compensation Fund (ICF), provided for by the Spanish Constitution and the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) provided for by the EU. 
Participation in the ICF established by law in 1984 and designed to reduce 
regional disparities as well as the CCAAs' constitutional provisions for
163 Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country, Article 20.5; of Catalonia, Article 27.5, etc.
164 Constitutional Tribunal Sentence 84/1983, 24 October 1983 involving a dispute between the 
Generalitat and the central government in the area of culture and Sentence 13/1988, 4 February 
1988 involving a dispute over the characterisation of fairs and exhibitions as ‘international’.
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participation in national economic planning provided a series of institutional 
mechanisms favouring increased co-operation between national and regional 
authorities. With Spain's accession to the EC, the need to harmonise the ICF with 
EU funds became painfully obvious (Borras, Font and Gomez, 1997). Contacts 
among national and regional authorities became even more frequent as did those 
with the European Commission.
The Generalitat realised early on that the process of European integration would 
have serious effects on the Spanish state's control over national economic 
planning. Along with the process of devolution initiated with the establishment of 
the State of Autonomies less than a decade before, the transfer of competencies to 
the European level would involve some loss of sovereignty. This was clearly in 
the following text published before Spanish accession to the European 
Community:
"Obviously, by joining the EEC, the Spanish State will 
have to adjust to this process of loss of sovereignty. But, 
at the same time, because of the Spanish Constitution 
approved in 1978, the state will also be subject to another 
process constituting what has been called the construction 
of the State of Autonomies"165.
The Generalitat also began to see the potential loss of competencies and
sovereignty that it would have to undergo with Spain's accession to the EC:
"Catalonia's Statute, approved in 1979, contains the areas 
taken on by the Generalitat substituting the power 
exercised by the central administration. Thus, in this 
context, Catalonia, equipped with certain measures of 
self-government, will also see itself immersed in this 
process of surrendering sovereignty implied by any act of 
economic integration" 66.
In public, the nationalist-led Generalitat embraced rhetoric declaring the end of
the nation-state and Europe as a point where 'nations' could bypass the state. Less
vocally however, the Generalitat continued to accept the fact that in areas such as
regional policy and funding, the Spanish State was still needed to channel regional
demands:
"Within the framework of territorial politics and given the 
fact that the Generalitat has been given the ability to forge 
its own regional policy, the effects could be determined 
by the applications made by the autonomous government
165 Generalitat de Catalunya (1982). “Catalunya i la Comunitat Economica Europea”, Institut 
d’Investigacions Economiques, Barcelona, p. 553, [author's translation].
166 Ibid, p. 553.
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of Catalonia for regional development projects, via the 
Spanish state as an intermediary, before the appropriate 
Community entities"167.
Soon it became clear who the 'winners' and 'losers' were in the process of 
distribution of power in the area of national economic planning. As outlined in 
Chapter 4, the asymmetric nature of the division of competencies among the 
various autonomous communities within the Spanish state has led to a 
heterogeneous distribution of administrative and institutional relations, resources 
and human capital. Thus, so-called ‘stronger’ autonomous communities such as 
Catalonia enjoy a disproportionately high degree of expertise and allocation of 
resources in their day-to-day institutionalised relations with central government 
authorities. The co-ordination surrounding the planning and implementation of 
the ICF and ERDF led to the reinforcement of existing institutional co-operative 
arrangements as well as the emergence of new networks. The context within 
which greater participation in EU matters, on a decision-making level rather than 
merely on a policy implementation level, had been established.
Conclusion
With Spain's accession to the EC in 1986 and the relatively young age of the State 
of Autonomies - less than a decade - the introduction of an additional level of 
governance caused concern among Spain's central administration. These concerns 
did not refer to questions on competency allocation and authority but to the 
potential problems of overburdening and inefficiency on an archaic bureaucracy. 
By 1986, the process of devolution was only beginning to take hold and a sense of 
'business as usual' with the decentralised administrative arrangements had not 
begun to emerge. The introduction of an additional level of governance - the EU 
level - seemed to emphasise the lack of consensus on the functions exercised by 
each level of government in the new State of Autonomies. Unlike the German 
case with its system of inter-governmental relations, the relative newness of the 
Spanish system and the existing centralised political culture made it hard to avoid 
conflict and competition among the various actors involved.
167 Ibid, p. 554.
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The German example demonstrates a case in which sub-national entities do not 
attempt to overtake the state. Instead they form part of the nation-state, generating 
a policy-making process in EU matters with overlapping and complementary 
components. The Spanish case is not as clearly defined. The inherent ambiguity 
of the legal and constitutional framework has raised a series of potential sources 
of conflict which have until recently remained outside the realm of public debate. 
However, one must look beyond the legal and constitutional provisions stipulated 
by the Spanish Constitution and respective Autonomy Statutes to gain a clearer 
picture of the CCAA participation in EU matters. The establishment of the system 
of the Sectoral Conferences and the consolidation of bilateral negotiations 
following the 1996 general elections have led to a gradual transformation of the 
nature of Catalonia’s participation in EU matters. The issue at hand reflects a 
dilemma: the logic behind the State of Autonomies vs. the EU logic. A future 
political European Union of nation-states will have to contend with a similar 
dilemma. Each nation-state will have to resolve this problem in its own way.
Thus, the process of European integration continues to pose a challenge to the 
distribution of powers within a given state affecting the overlapping of powers 
and competencies among the different levels of government. The boundaries 
must be clearly defined as well as the resolution of conflicts between the various 
levels of government without their having to habitually resort to the judiciary 
system. This would be achieved by designing a distinct legal and constitutional 
framework rather than a series of regulations and directives based on court 
decisions. If the EU is to continue its process of integration and more specifically, 
its process of political integration, it must face these challenges in light of the 
particularities of each system.
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Chapter 7 
The Participation of the Autonomous
Communities in Process of European Integration 
Introduction
Keating (1997) argues that one of the pre-conditions to ensure the success of a 
given nationalist movement, is its ability to project itself effectively in the 
international arena. This ability does not necessarily entail exercising exclusive 
authority over such areas as foreign policy and diplomacy traditionally 
competencies pertaining exclusively to the state. Therefore, new forms of 
international co-operation have been pursued to ensure this non-territorial form of 
public recognition.
Even before Spain’s accession to the European Community in 1986, the 
Generalitat, realised the importance the process of European integration would 
have on Catalonia. This was particularly evident in the area of regional policy 
where Spanish regions would benefit substantially from EC funding and where 
regional governments would have to play a role in the implementation of various 
EC funded programmes. The Generalitat viewed this latter element of policy 
implementation as one which would find the most resistance by the central 
government. As early as 1982, it acknowledged that the “main difficulty in 
articulating an effective regional policy at Community level is found in the 
resistance of the member-states to lose political control over a subject which could 
have economic, social, political and electoral consequences of a great scale”168. In 
other words, the Generalitat realised that the process of European integration and 
its potential transfers of competencies would be resisted by the Spanish central 
government as had the process of devolution initiated with the 1978 Constitution.
168 Generalitat de Catalunya (1982), p. 491.
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However, the Generalitat was also very aware that European integration could 
pose a similar threat to the hard won levels of self-government Catalonia attained 
with the 1980 Autonomy Statute and subsequent measures of devolution. 
Nevertheless, the traditional pro-European vocation of Catalan nationalism 
prevailed. As outlined in Chapter 5, most Catalan political parties - with the 
exception of separatists - view the process of European integration as 
complementary to the consolidation of the State of Autonomies in Spain. Rarely, 
if ever, has it been viewed in the last 15 years as a threat to Catalan sovereignty 
and self-government. Instead, it is seen as providing a catalyst for change in the 
Spanish policy-making process involving the 17 autonomous communities 
(CCAAs). Participation in the process of European integration has also provided 
an opportunity for Catalonia to project a modem image abroad and an area in 
which sub-national entities like Catalonia are able to secure a greater role in the 
EU decision-making process.
To this end, Catalonia has its own pressure groups lobbying European officials in 
Bmssels and has actively participated in the framework established to 
institutionalise various forms of regional co-operation at the European level. 
Whether or not these initiatives were intended to displace traditional forms of 
diplomacy or foreign policy, it is clear that their success has led to changes to 
traditional political structures, entities and ideals.
Towards a ‘direct route’
The Spanish CCAAs have demanded participatory rights in EU matters since 
Spain's accession to the Community in 1986. From 1988 until 1992, negotiations 
between the government and the CCAAs remained paralysed as a result of the 
refusal of the latter - particularly from Catalonia and the Basque Country - to 
accept the central government's offer. The strategy of transregional co-operation 
initiated by the Generalitat at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s 
was part of a concerted effort to establish a more important political and economic 
role within the EU. When that proved to be insufficient, the Generalitat turned 
back towards the central government and using its advantageous electoral
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position, demanded greater participatory rights in the heart of the EU decision­
making process.
This turnaround occurred following the March 1996 general elections when the 
winning PP coalition was forced to seek coalition partners in the mainstream 
Basque and Catalan nationalist parties (the PNV and CiU). Each party had its 
own set of demands but one of the key measures demanded by both was the 
improvement of the Basque Country's and Catalonia’s representation in the EU. 
In its political platforms CiU has always demanded via directa or a ‘direct route’ 
to Europe because “as nationalists, we believe that our nation has the same right 
as other European nations to be represented in Europe”169. Although achieving a 
‘direct route’ to Europe was highly unlikely in light of the resistance of Spanish 
mainstream parties, CiU did manage to extract a promise from the PP to grant 
Catalonia its ‘own voice’ in Europe. The concession was part of an extensive 
govemability pact between the PP and CiU. Thus, in comparison to other 
concessions made by the PP to the Catalan nationalists, the promise to secure 
greater representation for Catalonia in EU matters was a minor one. Furthermore, 
the agreed provision stipulated that the PP government would be expected to 
guarantee the participation of all CCAAs in EU matters affecting them. It is 
likely that the PP thereby hoped that Catalan demands would be diluted if grouped 
with the other autonomous communities.
The legislation regulating some of the participatory measures granted to the 
CCAAs in EU matters (Law 2/1997) was approved by the Cortes less than a year 
after the 1996 general election. These measures allowed for the reinforcement of 
the existing Conferencia para Asuntos Relacionados con las Comunidades 
Europeas (hereafter, Sectoral Conference) which had been institutionalised in 
October 1992 following their informal creation in 1988. The decision to create 
this body followed an agreement relating to the participation of the autonomous 
communities in cases involving Spain presented to the European Court of Justice 
with regards to the implementation of the EU’s competition policy directives. 
The Sectoral Conference is not limited to EU matters but extends to all
16Q “El Comprorrus de Convergencia” (CDC publication), 20 March 1998.
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competencies where the CCAA have exclusive or shared competencies. 
Nevertheless, the Sectoral Conference Relating To EU matters can arguably be 
said to have lost its sectoral character. With its institutionalisation in 1992 and the 
channeling of CCAA participation in EU matters, it has devised a modus operandi 
for each policy-making area. While the Sectoral Conference Relating To EU 
matters discusses general EU affairs, the other areas of competency where the 
three (EU, national and sub-national) levels of government are involved, are 
allocated to specific Sectoral Conferences (see Table 1). Again, the 1992 reform 
meant that the Sectoral Conference Relating to EU Matters no longer remained as 
a mere instrument of co-operation between the central government and the 
CCAAs. Instead, the Sectoral Conference became a proper institution where the 
CCAAs are able to forge a common position and negotiate with the central 
government. The November 1994 agreement consolidated this move by 
formalising several internal decision-making procedures allowing the Sectoral 
Conference to move away from merely generating a common strategy.
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Table 1
EU Policies EU Council of Ministers 
where decisions are 
taken
Sectoral Conference
Institutional and General 
Affairs
General Affairs Relating To EU Matters
Single Market Single Market Relating To EU Matters
Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture
Fisheries Fisheries Fisheries
Economic policies affecting 
CCAA competencies
ECOFIN Council of Fiscal and 
Financial Policies
Transport Transport National Conference for 
Transport
Social policy Social Policy Social Policy/Employment 
Policy
Education, Vocational 
Training andYouth
Education Education
Environment Environment Environment
Industrial Competition Industry Industry and Energy
Research and Development Research General Council of Science 
and Technology
Trans-European Networks Territorial Infrastructure and 
Management
Public Health Health Inter-territorial Council of 
the National Health Service
Culture Culture Culture
Consumer Consumer Consumer
Energy Energy Industry and Energy
Civil protection Civil protection National Commission for 
Civil Protection
Tourism Tourism Tourism
Telecommunication Telecommunication Advisory Council for 
Telecommunications
The Sectoral Conference Relating To EU Affairs, presided by the Minister of 
Public Administration, along with the participation of the Secretary of State of 
Foreign Affairs and for the EU as well as the Secretary of State for Territorial 
Administrations, was established as a consultative organ between the central 
government and the CCAAs. Its main consultative tasks lie in the area of 
information dissemination and the formulation of common CCAA positions on 
EU matters. Meeting on a minimum twice-yearly basis, it also sets co-operative 
measures to enhance CCAA participation in the implementation, management and 
monitoring of EU policies. It seeks to clarify technical procedures and to resolve 
any problems arising from the implementation of EU policies and directives. 
However, the Sectoral Conference primarily serves as a forum where the CCAAs 
can adopt common positions on EU matters and where co-operation among the
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various representatives is crucial. It is in this area where differences arise. 
Officials from the Generalitat accuse their Basque counterparts of undermining 
the Sectoral Conference by not granting it the attention it deserves. Others 
criticise an apparent lack of debate within the Conference itself. Nevertheless, the 
Generalitat has assumed a constructive attitude towards being grouped with other 
CCAAs in the Sectoral Conference rather than attempt to emphasise Catalonia’s 
singularity or hecho diferencial as a ‘historic’ community.
The Catalan government - following CiU’s agreement to support the PSOE 
government in 1993 - was able to extract greater concessions over regional 
representation in Spain’s delegation within the EU. In May 1994, a Mixed 
Commission for the European Union was created combining deputies and senators 
from both chambers to discuss EU Matters. Furthermore, a bilateral commission 
was established to inform the autonomous communities of Spain’s position on EU 
matters and conversely, to gather information on the positions of the governments 
of the autonomous communities. This bilateral commission would remain in 
constant contact with each of the CCAA parliamentary committees on EU affairs. 
From the beginning of Spain's EC membership, most CCAAs had formed 
parliamentary committees of a permanent nature whose principal task was to 
monitor European activities and inform their respective legislature of any 
developments.
Most importantly however, the Sectoral Conference allows for the establishment 
of bilateral co-operative mechanisms in the case of participation in EU matters 
directly affecting one particular CCAA. It is this clause of the 1997 legislation 
which has provided particularly Catalonia and the Basque Country with the 
opportunity to establish an institutionalized bilateral relationship with the central 
government as an alternative to the Sectoral Conference which groups these two 
communities with the remainder of Spain’s CCAA.
The bilateral commission established between the Generalitat and the central 
government in June 1998 provides for the institutionalisation of several key 
figures of the Generalitat in the latter’s quest for securing greater participation in 
EU matters. These figures include the Advisor for European Matters to the
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Generalitat's President, the Executive Director of the Patronat and the 
Generalitat's Director General for External Relations. The Generalitat has thus 
managed to secure a bilateral consultative mechanism by which it can negotiate 
directly with both the Ministry of Public Administration and the central 
government’s Foreign and EU Relations cabinet. Although at this point it is too 
early to reach any conclusions as to its effectiveness or impact, the establishment 
of the bilateral commission serves a high symbolic function and allows the 
Generalitat to pursue its own agenda on specific EU matters away from the other 
CCAA in the Sectoral Conference. The bilateral commission’s scope of activities 
includes the adoption of preventative measures to avoid conflicts between the two 
administrations within the framework of an institutionalised mechanism of co­
operation. Catalan officials insist however, that the bilateral commission is not a 
substitute for the Sectoral Conference but in light of Catalonia’s unique position 
within the constitutional framework of competencies, a necessary complement. 
They insist that the bilateral commission is not intended to substitute the Sectoral 
Conference. Instead, the Generalitat admits that the Catalan ‘reality’ differs from 
that of other CCAAs and that this entitles the Generalitat to seek alternative 
measures of participation. Thus, although there is no ‘direct route’ as such, the 
Generalitat has managed to secure a ‘voice’ within the central government to 
articulate its demands on EU matters.
Participation in the formulation of Spain's position on EU matters
The participation of the CCAAs in formulating Spain’s position on specific EU 
matters is divided into 2 spheres. The first sphere involves all policy areas falling 
under the exclusive competency of the CCAAs. From the very beginning, the 
CCAAs are involved in negotiations with the central government to arrive at a 
common position on EU matters such as regional policy and Common 
Agricultural Policy. The second sphere involves policy areas under exclusive 
central government control but which affect the CCAAs and in which the central 
government must take into account the opinions of the CCAAs. Within the 
second sphere, most common CCAA-central government positions are negotiated 
in the Sectoral Conference. For obvious reasons, many more policy areas 
affecting Catalonia and the Basque Country fall under the first sphere making
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bilateral relations a crucial element of the policy-making process. It is the policy 
areas encompassed in the second sphere however, which have been the most 
conflictive. With the Generalitaf s continued struggle to attain increasing levels 
of competencies deriving from the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, the policies in 
the second sphere have increasingly become more of a grey area. Furthermore, as 
more and more competencies are transferred to the European decision-making 
framework, the battle to retain control over existing competencies will intensify.
This struggle is all the more apparent at the EU level. The September 1994 
Senate motion establishes the right for the CCAAs to be integrated into the 
Spanish delegation negotiating issues directly affecting competencies under 
exclusive CCAA control. The on-going process of devolution of competencies 
initiated with the 1978 Constitution complicates the categorisation of policies 
under spheres of mixed or exclusive control. In addition, Article 146 of the 
Maastricht Treaty stipulates that in areas of exclusive control by sub-national 
authorities, these may be represented by a ministerial figure in the Council of 
Ministers. This provision has so far only been employed by Belgian, German and 
Austrian representatives as stipulated by their respective federal arrangements. 
Again, the areas under which competencies are of an exclusive or shared nature 
remain ambivalent. This is aggravated by the varying levels of autonomy enjoyed 
by each of Spain’s 17 CCAAs. For those CCAAs enjoying high levels of 
autonomy, the Sectoral Conference is not a sufficient substitution. However, a 
common agreement as to the powers and nature of the ministerial delegate 
representing the CCAAs has yet to be reached. The potential conflict generated 
by this situation can only worsen in light of increasing transfers of powers and 
competencies to the supranational and sub-national levels.
Within Catalonia itself, the arrangements made by the Generalitat to 
institutionalise its relations on EU matters with central government have met with 
widespread criticism from the opposition. The Catalan Parliament receives advice 
and recommendations from a parliamentary committee exclusively dedicated to 
EU matters. This committee is entitled Commissio de Seguiment dels Proces 
d ’Integracio de I ’Estat espanyol a les Comunitats Europees. The committee’s 
emphasis has clearly been on recommending motions on specific EU policies
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affecting Catalonia in areas such as structural funds and transregional
1 70initiatives . It has however adopted a resolution (Resolution 611/V, 4 June 
1998), supported by both CiU and the PSC to promote the presence of Catalan 
and other regional parliaments in EU institutions either through a participatory or 
consultative role. Nevertheless, opposition parties such as the PSC, ERC and IC 
accuse the CiU-led Generalitat of obstructing any form of debate in the Catalan 
parliament on EU matters. They criticise what they perceive is the Presidency’s 
monopoly on dealing with EU matters with its participation, through the Office of 
the Presidency, in both the Sectoral Conference and bilateral commission.
Catalan participation within the Committee of the Regions
As one of the stronger regions both within Spain and the EU, Catalonia has 
achieved significant levels of influence in the EU decision-making process. 
Stronger regions possess the resources needed to effectively convey their interests 
and demands at the European level (Hooghe, 1995) (Sutcliffe, 1997). With a 
high degree of self-government, Catalonia has more to lose in terms of transfer of 
competencies from the national to the supranational levels. It places great 
emphasis in channelling its resources towards securing a greater institutional role 
within the European legislative process. This is achieved through informal links 
such as the establishment of contacts through academic and institutional 
conferences on regional and nationalist issues as well as regional networks. 
Formal links are secured by opening regional offices in Brussels and participating 
in institutions such as the Committee of the Regions.
In comparison with more unitary and centralised member-states such as the
171United Kingdom and France , Spain’s CCAAs enjoy significantly more 
representation within the Committee of the Regions (CoR) with seventeen 
representatives from the autonomous communities and four representatives from 
Spain’s large cities. This means that Catalonia's representation within the Spanish
170
See Catalan Parliament Resolutions lf/I, 52/1,165/n, 181/11, 72/V, 142N  and 864/V.
171 Within these member-states, the central government plays an enormous role in selecting 
regional and local representatives with not all sub-national entities represented.
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delegation - with no institutional distinctions- is one of many. This situation has 
been a source of dispute between the central government and the Generalitat. 
Many Catalan nationalists view Catalonia’s status as a ‘historic community’ as 
being undermined by its grouping with other autonomous communities both at the 
national and European levels172. In addition, the perception that the CoR has 
become a ‘Committee of Member State Representatives’ (Christiansen, 1995) has 
contributed to the Catalan disenchantment with the CoR as a true representative 
body of regional interests within the EU decision-making process. This 
perception is limited to the Catalan nationalists however. Catalan parties such as 
the PSC with strong links with their Spanish counterparts do not view the CoR in 
the same light as other Catalan nationalist parties. Instead, they view the central 
government as being the more appropriate vehicle to represent Catalan interests in 
the EU decision-making process173.
The inclusion of local/municipal representatives in the CoR has angered Catalan 
nationalists and particularly Jordi Pujol for several reasons. First, the combination 
of local and regional interests is viewed as undermining the uniformity of 
demands of each group. For this reason, Pujol has often demanded the separation 
of both groups and in recent years has concentrated his efforts in the Assembly of 
European Regions rather than the CoR. Second, political motives fuel this 
resentment owing to the tension and rivalry between the two personalities of Jordi 
Pujol and Pasqual Maragall, as President of the Generalitat and former Mayor of 
Barcelona respectively174. Finally, Pujol has often angered his fellow Spanish 
CoR representatives, particularly those from less active autonomous communities 
in his demands for the inclusion of the CoR as an equal partner in the EU’s 
decision-making process through Article 4. Among other EU institutions and 
despite Pujol’s image as an influential and enthusiastic political leader, the 
Catalan representation within the CoR remains as ‘one of the many’ despite its 
aggressive strategy to distinguish its role from others.
Interviews Nos. 1, 2 ,4 , 5, 6, 7,8, 9 and 11.
173 Interview No. 10.
174 Although Joan Clos took over the post of Mayor of Barcelona from Pasqual Maragall in 1997, 
the latter remains an important member of the PSC and is engaged in a tense standoff with Jordi 
Pujol in the run-up to the October 1999 Catalan elections as the PSC candidate for the Presidency 
of the Generalitat.
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Surprisingly, Catalonia’s influence in the CoR can at best be considered erratic. It 
has evolved from a massive initial enthusiasm to the present state of barely 
disguised boredom. Pasqual Maragall, mayor of Barcelona until 1997 served as 
Vice-Chairman of the CoR’s Special Commission for Institutional Affairs and for 
which Jordi Pujol, President of Catalonia was asked to draw up a report on the 
CoR’s views on institutional reform. This was done in preparation or the IGC 
which would prepare many of the proposals incorporated into the 1997 Treaty of 
Amsterdam. The report was overwhelmingly approved by the CoR in its 
Resolution of 21 April 1995 despite intense debate on issues such as the right to 
bring actions to the European Court of Justice.
Both Maragall and Pujol have been active in the European regionalist movement. 
Pasqual Maragall was elected President of the CoR on March 20, 1996, a post 
held until January 1998. He was also elected President of the Council of European 
Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) from December 1991 until 1997, preceding 
Jordi Pujol’s election as President of the AER in 1992. Both the CEMR and the 
AER have been active promoters of regional and local authority participation in 
European affairs by carrying out extensive lobbying activities at the European 
level. In 1990, the AER passed a resolution which called for (1) regional 
representation in the Council of Matters in matters directly affecting sub-national 
interests and (2) the creation of an institution which would channel sub-national 
interests in the EU decision-making process175. The CEMR and AER participated 
in the European Summit of the Regions and Cities held in Amsterdam in May 
1997 prior to the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam the following month. This 
action represented a deliberate attempt to articulate demands as a single voice 
away from the CoR . It is interesting to note that the Catalan presidencies of the 
CEMR, AER and CoR during the 1990s may have contributed to the dual strategy 
envisaged by Christiansen (1997) needed for sub-national authorities to secure 
direct influence within the EU decision-making process without insisting on full-
175 Assembly of European Regions (1990) “Resolution of the Assembly of European Regions on 
the Institutional Participation of the Regional Level in the Decision-making Process of the 
European Community”, Strasbourg.
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fledged institutional reform and recognition. Instead, this influence would be 
directed sotto voce by redirecting lobbying efforts and consultative functions.
The institutional idiosyncrasies of the CoR have also suited the personality-driven 
approach of Catalonia's EU strategy. Within the CoR itself, the President enjoys 
considerable influence over the agenda. This was particularly evident during the 
presidency of Pasqual Maragall when the amount of CoR Opinions doubled. It is 
debatable whether this proliferation of Opinions and highly concentrated authority 
is the result of the individual style of the President or as the result of the 
organisational and procedural structure of the CoR. From the amount of Opinions 
and work generated during both the Catalan presidency of the CoR and the 
Spanish presidency of the EU in 1995, it is clear however that the Catalan 
government played an important role in promoting institutional reform of the 
CoR.
During the Spanish presidency of the European Council in 1995, much work was 
carried out on institutional reform by the Catalan government. Jordi Pujol, as 
rapporteur of the CoR presented a draft resolution of the CoR’s role in the 
institutional framework of the EU and the Council. In addition, Pujol presented 
various reports underlining the need for institutional reform by dividing the CoR 
into two chambers with regional and local authorities represented separately. The 
recommendation was not taken up by the CoR. Despite the Catalan nationalists' 
disappointment with the weak consultative functions of the CoR, they have 
remained, in the form of their leader, powerful and active promoters of the role of 
sub-national authorities in the process of European integration.
While Catalonia benefited from significant influence with Jordi Pujol as 
rapporteur from 1995 onwards, in 1998 it was left without any representative in 
the CoR’s Bureau or its Commissions. Instead, Eduardo Zaplana (PP), President 
of the Autonomous Community of Valencia, represented the Spanish CCAAs at 
the commission level. Jordi Pujol vacated his position as special rapporteur of the 
Commission on Institutional Affairs in the CoR’s March 1998 plenary session. In 
the Opinions taken during the CoR’s plenary session in March 1998, not one 
rapporteur was a Catalan representative or for that matter, a Spanish
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representative. In 1997, the Spanish participation rate of its full members fell 
drastically from 31.4% in 1996 to 19% in 1997 compared Ireland’s 97.8% 
attendance rate in 1996176. From the interviews conducted between 1997-1999 
with Catalan political party representatives, MEPs and Generalitat officials, 
interest in this institution has decidedly waned for several reasons.
First, research on the nationalities of the rapporteurs of individual opinions 
demonstrates that paradoxically, traditionally centralised member states such as 
the UK seem to be over-represented (Farrows and McCarthy, 1997). This seems 
to support the view held by many Catalan nationalists that the cafe para todos 
syndrome they perceive to be inherent in the Spanish political system has 
permeated the Committee of the Regions. They argue that at some point the CoR 
will have to come to terms with the differential nature of its representatives. This 
would mean that sub-national authorities with high degrees of self-government 
would be granted special treatment to recognise their inherent differentiation. 
Occasional references to those regions as ‘nations’ or ‘historic nationalities’ are 
employed to justify the special treatment but more often, the justification lies with 
the high degree of self-government enjoyed by the specific region. In other 
words, the view is that special treatment should be granted to regions enjoying 
high levels of autonomy.
Some Catalan nationalists have even accused the CoR of advocating the 
regionalisation of the EU without taking into account the specific characteristics 
distinguishing each region. Thus, they accuse the CoR of promoting “regionalism 
without nationalism”177. To Catalan nationalists, creating an institution with the 
objective of regionalising the EU cannot succeed without taking into account the 
special features - language, culture and history - which distinguish one region 
from the next. How can one compare the authority enjoyed by Jordi Pujol, 
President of the Generalitat of Catalonia with a member of Oldham Metropolitan 
Borough Council in the UK, both full CoR representatives? Thus, Catalan 
nationalists fear that their objectives might be diluted in an institution where
176 Committee of the Regions’ Annual Report 1997.
177 Quote from Interview No. 12.
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representatives stem from regions or sub-national authorities with substantial 
differences in power and self-government.
The decline in Catalan and for that matter Spanish participation in terms of 
rapporteurs and representation in the various Committees is difficult to explain. 
Does this reflect the political culture of respective sub-national authorities in that 
rather than participating through committees and as rapporteurs, participation and 
influence is concentrated at the presidential level? Or does this reflect a 
progressive decline in interest in participating in the CoR? The relative 
youthfulness of the CoR makes these questions difficult to answer. The context 
within which the CoR was created has changed dramatically. Towards the late 
1990s, the EU was generally plagued by widespread disenchantment with the 
introduction of the single currency, the persistent problem of unemployment, the 
democratic deficit and the lack of legitimacy of EU institutions. These factors 
have contributed to a change in attitude towards EU institutions in general, a 
change very much echoed by Catalan nationalists. It is clear from interviews with 
Catalan officials and political party representatives that there is a generalised 
feeling of disappointment in the CoR.
In the Basque Country, similar feelings of frustration have emerged among the 
PNV-led government and nationalist party officials (Munoa, 1996). Likewise, the 
German Lander's interest in the CoR has declined in the wake of the Maastricht 
Treaty. This is perhaps attributable to the generalised disenchantment felt with 
the performance and structure of the CoR and changes within the German political 
system allowing for a greater role for the Lander at the federal level (Christiansen,
1997). The decline in interest in the CoR by the Catalan government, on the other 
hand, reflects its increasing preoccupation with political events occurring within 
the Spanish state. These include the change in government in 1996, the loss of the 
CiU’s absolute majority in the Catalan parliament in 1995, the obligations 
imposed by the 1996 govemability pact and the Basque peace process initiated in 
September 1998. A more plausible explanation is the growing realisation by 
Catalan officials that their influence in the EU policy-making level is felt more 
within their own state than directly at the European level.
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Nevertheless, the participation in the CoR of two influential Catalan political 
leaders in their capacities of President of Catalonia and Mayor of Barcelona are 
important for several reasons. First, their presence is important symbolically for 
both the Catalan nationalist movement and representatives of other European 
regional or nationalist movements. Secondly, their continued access to actors and 
institutions within the EU decision-making process has allowed them to develop 
close inter-personal relations with many EU officials. This gives them a definite 
advantage over other regional leaders. These inter-personal relations have 
allowed them to become effective lobbyists to further their own objectives in the 
European arena. These objectives include urban renewal projects and 
employment initiatives for the Socialist Mayor of Barcelona, Pasqual Maragall. 
For the CiU President of Catalonia, Jordi Pujol, these objectives have included the 
protection of Europe’s cultural and linguistic minorities, meeting the convergence 
criteria for EMU, funding for Objective 2 areas and a greater role for sub-national 
authorities in the EU decision-making process. In essence, participation in the 
CoR by holding its presidency and drafting influential reports have allowed 
Catalan leaders to gain a certain measure of authority and legitimacy with other 
actors at the EU level. The Generalitaf s representatives in the CoR have also 
tried to present a united front along with Spain’s other CCAA representatives. 
For example, in the run-up to the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam the Spanish 
autonomous communities displayed a significant degree of solidarity and 
agreement (Reilly, 1997).
Regional and nationalist networks
The links among regional and nationalist parties within the EU, both at the formal 
and informal levels, have led to a convergence of views and goals including that 
of working together towards the regionalisation of Europe. This has ensured that 
CiU has co-operated with a variety of European nationalist parties including the 
Scottish Nationalist Party, Flanders’ Volksunie and the Welsh Plaid Cymru to 
enhance the regions’ common pursuit of interests. The PNV, Eusko Alkartasuna 
(EA), ERC and Unio Mallorquina (UM) joined forces with the Nationalist 
Coalition Europe of the People to create a parliamentary group of Stateless 
Nations within the European Parliament for the June 1999 elections. From no
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seats in the 1994 elections to 2 seats in the 1999 elections, the PNV left the 
European Popular Group in which it has remained along with CiU since Spain’s 
accession to the EC. Despite the fact that the PNV signed the Barcelona 
Declaration, described below, along with CiU, the two parties did not enter into a 
coalition for the 1999 European Parliament elections. In part, this was due to the 
radicalisation of the PNV’s policies on the EU resulting from its govemability 
pact with EH, HB’s (ETA's political arm) successor {El Pais, 6 May 1999).
The Barcelona Declaration and Gasteiz Agreement signed in July and September 
1998 respectively by the Bloque Nacional Gallego (BNG), the PNV and CiU 
agreed the following points on participation at the EU level:
1. Full participation in the Council of Ministers and COREPER.
2. Recognition of Basque, Galician and Catalan as official languages of the 
EU.
3. The right to bring motions to the European Court of Justice in cases where 
the competencies of the CCAAs are directly related including in cases 
where EU institutions or other member-states act against the interest of 
Basques, Catalans and Galicians within the EU's legal framework178.
4. Establishment of national circumscriptions for European elections
5. Establishment of official links between the European Parliament and the 
three CCAA parliaments in questions
6. The presence of the 'nationalities' in the Spanish delegation in IGCs 
negotiating EU constitutional reform
7. Direct participation in EU working committees dealing with issues directly 
affecting CCAA competencies
8. CCAA governments will directly receive structural and cohesion funds 
from the appropriate EU institutions for the implementation of EU 
regional policy
9. Greater co-ordination among MEPs from 'state-less nations'
10. The reform of EU legislation in that when it refers to a specific 
competency, it names the 'nationality' involved according to the internal
178 As described in the previous chapter (see footnote 160), at present, only member-states 
governments can present or defend cases in front of the European Court of Justice, a form of 
indirect representation for sub-national authorities.
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distribution of powers within each state.
11. The establishment of participatory measures for the CCAAs in 
international agreements where CCAA competencies will be affected.
The issue of Basque and Catalan collaboration in the area of participation in the 
process of European integration has not been described in great detail in this 
study. The complexities of the relationship are beyond the scope of this study. 
What is important to note however, is that the strategies of each autonomous 
community vary dramatically. The Basque Country, in contrast to Catalonia, has 
adopted a strategy based more on conflict and veiled threats of non-cooperation in 
the political arena, accusing their Catalan counterparts of “burying” the objectives 
of the Barcelona Declaration (El Pais, 25 September 1999). Unlike Catalonia, the 
Basque Country has not taken the same opportunities in pursuing transregional 
networks or co-operative measures with other Spanish autonomous communities. 
However, the differences end there. Both autonomous communities have exerted 
considerable effort to reinforce the perception both within Spain and the EU that 
they are considerably different from other Spanish autonomous communities.
Considerable amounts of research have been conducted in recent years (Borras, 
1993) (Smyrl, 1995) (Letamendia 1997) regarding intraregional and transregional 
forms of co-operation. European integration has promoted these forms of co­
operation specifically in areas traditionally reserved to the state. Growing 
problems such as immigration, crime and terrorism have encouraged many sub­
national authorities to work together across borders and in areas traditionally 
managed by the state. Attitudes of traditional highly centralised states have 
changed towards intraregional and transregional forms of co-operation allowing 
sub-national authorities to engage in (albeit limited) external relations 
(Letamendia 1997). Catalonia has been a key supporter of transregional networks 
as alternative channels through which it can secure international recognition and 
promote its economic and political links abroad. Since 1991, Catalonia has 
entered into several intraregional and transregional bilateral agreements outside of 
the sphere of influence of the central government. These include agreements with 
the State of Ilinois in the United States, the Buenos Aires Provincial government 
and Wales, as well as joining the Arc Mediterranee made up of other regions
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within the EU including Languedoc-Roussillon, Midi-Pyrenees, Provence-Cote 
d’Azur, Liguria, Piedmont, Lombardia, and Valencia. Thus, the Catalan 
government has encouraged the development of various sub-national activities 
among other regions within the EU. In addition, it has enjoyed bilateral and 
multilateral relations with other regions in Belgium and Italy, as well as joint 
activities with Sweden, Japan and the United States. It has also exchanges with 
international organisations such as the UNESCO and the Council of Europe.
Since 1988, Catalonia belongs to a transregional network of developed regions 
entitled "Four Motors of Europe" along with Baden-Wurttemberg, Rhone-Alpes 
and Lombardy. The Four Motors is an attempt to integrate several activities in 
common to the four regions. These activities include the exchange of information 
and technology, the promotion of R&D, urban co-operation and the environment. 
Together the four regions share information and business development abroad. 
Other efforts by the Generalitat to promote transregional integration in the areas 
of culture, sport, tourism vocational education and research. Besides encouraging 
political and administrative co-operation, the agreement's objectives include 
growing economic exchange and the proclamation of this particular area of the 
Mediterranean as one of the cores of Europe. Indeed, Catalan nationalists have 
often referred to Barcelona as the capital of that part of the Mediterranean. These 
activities have been a consistent phenomenon throughout the 1990s. The 
collaborative efforts and exchanges have both a symbolic and functional value to 
Catalan nationalists. They promote Catalonia's image in an international context 
as an equal to other strong regions of Europe both in economic and political term 
distinguishing them from other Spanish CCAAs and European regions.
Patronat Catala Pro Europa
Representative offices in Brussels are another channel through which sub-national 
entities have channelled their resources towards greater involvement in the EU 
decision-making process. Catalonia has set up nine Trade Bureaus within the EU 
and established a powerful lobbying network in Brussels. The Patronat Catala 
Pro Europa is a semi-public institution created in July 1982 by the Generalitat 
and a group of institutions both in the public and private sectors including
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universities, local administrations, chambers of commerce and building societies. 
Its primary objectives are to educate and inform the Catalan public of the changes 
and activities occurring at the European level. Over the years however, it has 
gradually extended its activities to include monitoring EU initiatives affecting 
Catalan interests from an institutional, economic and socio-cultural perspective. 
The Patronat seeks to aggregate a range of social, economic, cultural and political 
interests in Catalonia and communicate these to the appropriate institutions in 
Brussels. As such, it serves to communicate many of Catalonia’s conditions and 
needs to the appropriate EU decision-makers and acts as an informal forum for 
representatives of business, labour and other interest groups to discuss EU- and 
Catalonia-related events.
The Patronat also seeks to disseminate information on the process of European 
integration. The Patronat has offices in Brussels as well as in the capitals of all 
four Catalan provinces which has allowed it to develop an extensive co-operative 
network with both local and regional authorities. The Patronat could be described 
as a quango (quasi autonomous non-governmental organisation) with its 
nominated (not elected) board ands its semi-autonomous internal operations yet 
reliant on the Generalitat for funding and specific objectives. Despite its semi­
public status, the Patronat has often been described as a ‘quasi-embassy’ 
representing Catalan interests. Its peculiar status reinforces the argument that 
regions which are the “most politically entrenched, most ethnically distinct, and
1 70richest” have the greatest level of representation . Not only is this the case vis- 
a-vis other regions within the EU but also within Spain itself, with wealthier 
CCAAs such as Catalonia having access to a greater amount of resources.
The Patronat is governed by a board presided by the President of the Generalitat
1 8 0and is composed of representatives of all the entities representing the Patronat . 
In addition, the Patronat is advised by a Consultative Council composed of
179 Hooghe and Marks, (1995) p. 16.
180 These include the Generalitat, Federacio de Caixes d ’Estalvi de Catalunya, Cambra Oficial de 
Comerg, Industria i Navegacio de Barcelona, Universitat de Barcelona, Universitat Autonoma de 
Barcelona, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya, Universitat 
Pompeu Fabra, Universitat Ramon Llull, Escola Superior d ’Administracio i Direccio dEmpreses 
(ESADE), Insitut d ’Estudis Superiors dEmpresa (IESE), Associacio Catalana de Municipis,
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experts in European affairs and nominated by the board. The Consultative 
Council assesses the Patronat and guides it in carrying out its general objectives 
in an attempt to maintain close links with the interests of the Catalan public. The 
Consultative Council is in itself composed of four sections: (1) a parliamentary 
section in which all political parties represented in the Catalan parliament are 
represented; (2) an academic section with academics from major Catalan 
universities; (3) a socio-economic section made up representatives from business 
organisations, trade unions and professional associations; and (4) a section of 
local entities to ensure local authority representation.
Essentially, the composition of the Patronat is an attempt to reflect all sections of 
Catalan society. Rather than remaining as a Catalan chamber of commerce or 
tourist board, the Patronat is an institution combining a variety of functions and 
objectives. The most important characteristic of the Patronat is that it is 
intrinsically Catalan-oriented in nature. It focuses solely on advancing Catalan 
interests. Its public awareness campaigns highlight the effects of specific EU 
legislation on Catalonia as for example of the campaign “Catalunya i l’Euro 1997- 
1998" (Catalonia and the Euro 1997-1998).
Despite the enthusiasm surrounding the creation of the Patronat in 1986, opinions 
on its performance and composition vary considerably among Catalonia’s 
political parties. Catalan political party representatives from the PSC, IC, ERC 
and the PI interviewed between 1997 and 1999181 expressed their discontent with 
the Patronat's limited powers. Many expressed their desire to see the Patronat 
converted into a foreign policy arm of the Generalitat. Instead, many argue, this 
institution has merely served the interests of Jordi Pujol’s party (CDC) with the 
position of the Patronat's Secretary General occupied by a CDC Member of the 
European Parliament. Nevertheless, the presence of an MEP with thorough 
knowledge of EU policies and institutions can serve to reinforce the Patronat's 
leverage and scope of activity in the EU decision-making process. Similarly, the 
alternate member to the Catalan CoR representative is presently also a CDC MEP
Federacio de Municipis de Catalunya and the Ajuntament de Barcelona.
181 Interviews Nos. 1, 5, 10 and 13.
210
strengthening the link between the CoR and the European Parliament and co­
ordinating Catalan strategy in both institutions.
The other perceived weakness of the Patronat is the result of a set-back originated 
by the Constitutional Tribunal’s May 1994 sentence against the Basque 
government’s decision to create a government institution empowered with 
establishing direct relations with EU institutions. The 1994 Sentence did, 
however, provide a legal recognition of the CCAA delegations in Brussels. The 
Patronat's office in Brussels, established in 1986, was one of the first regional 
offices set up in Brussels. Its establishment more than 10 years ago, along with its 
Basque counterpart, is viewed by many Catalan political representatives as a test 
case to observe how sub-national authorities can participate in the complex web of 
the EU legislative process. The Patronat's Brussels experience has allowed the 
Generalitat to familiarise itself with the reality of European integration and 
integrate these experiences into its legislative and executive functions. Relations 
with other European sub-national or regional authorities, particularly the German 
Lander, among the respective Brussels offices and in the CoR, have led many 
Catalan politicians and government officials to seek similar rights to participation 
for Spanish CCAAs. Catalan political representatives view the March 1993 
Federal government/LaWer law guaranteeing the right of the German Lander to 
maintain direct relations with EU institutions as an example for the Spanish 
CCAAs to follow. They support the German legislation as an example to follow 
despite the fact that it does limit the potential authority enjoyed by the Lander 
offices in Brussels by underlining the non-diplomatic character of these 
institutions.
At the same time, most Catalan nationalists would like to see the Patronat's 
primary duty as implementing the Generalitat’s EU policy. Nevertheless, in 
interviews182, Generalitat and Patronat representatives vehemently denied the 
latter’s intention of being or ever having been Catalonia’s diplomatic 
representation in the EU. When asked, however, whether the Patronat would 
ever become the Catalan’s ‘embassy’ in Brussels however, many did not reject the
i o}
Interviews Nos. 2, 8, 9, 11 and 14.
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possibility. Thus, there seems to be some sort of confusion or ambivalence about 
the Patronat's true function and future objectives. On the one hand, both 
Patronat and Generalitat officials painstakingly point out the information 
dissemination, educational, consultative and lobbying functions of the former both 
in Brussels and around Catalonia. On the other hand, there are continual 
references both in documentation and in discourse on the institutional and 
political dimension of the Patronat and its role in promoting Catalonia’s 
participation in the process of European integration. The symbolic importance of 
the Patronat should not be underestimated however. Its offices in Brussels and 
Barcelona for example, display the flags of Catalonia and the European Union but 
interestingly, not the Spanish flag183.
Furthermore, the Patronat's now almost tenured experience in Brussels has led to 
a point where many Catalan politicians across the spectrum see the need to 
empower the Patronat with new challenges and objectives in the ever-changing 
legislative and institutional landscape of the EU. Although the Patronat's statutes 
explicitly avoid any reference to Catalan participation in the process of European 
integration or any institutionalised form of diplomatic representation, over the 
years the scope of activity of the Patronat has clearly expanded. Its improvement 
in relations with the Spanish permanent delegation in Brussels and the highly 
praised public information campaigns it has conducted in Catalonia on EU 
policies and institutions have given it more latitude in creating a quasi-policy 
network in Brussels. The central government, despite its refusal to allow the 
CCAAs to establish direct relations of a permanent representative form with EU 
institutions, has accepted the presence of regional offices in Brussels. Along with 
Germany, Spain was one of the primary supporters of the creation of the CoR. In
1 fid.interviews , Generalitat and political party officials acknowledged the central 
government’s change in attitude and its realisation, if often forced politically, of 
the need to diffuse adequate levels of information to the CCAAs on changing EU 
policies and directives.
183 Similarly, both the European and Catalan flags are prominently displayed in the lobbies of the 
Catalan nationalist party headquarters but with no sign of the Spanish flag.
184 Interviews Nos. 2, 3,4, 7, 8, 9,11,13, and 14
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Reform following the March 1996 General Election
With the creation of the post of delegado autonomico (autonomous community 
delegate) in September 1996 as a result of the CiU/PNV and PP govemability 
pact, the Spanish permanent delegation in Brussels now has an autonomous 
community delegate, one of 50 other delegates. The delegado or agregado 
autonomico's function is primarily to disseminate information to the respective 
CCAA offices in Brussels. Although Catalan officials generally seemed pleased 
with the progress achieved and the creation of this post, there is also concern that 
access to information on EU matters requires formal institutional and political 
representation. Thus, the general view held among many Catalan nationalists and 
government officials is that “information without participation limits the capacity 
for action of the autonomous communities, but the participation without 
information would relegate the autonomous communities to a superfluous role” 
(Dalmau, 1997). The delegado autonomico is also seen by Catalan officials as 
providing a symbolic rather than truly representative role. They acknowledge 
however that the creation of the post represents the beginning of a process of 
institutionalisation of CCAA interests at the EU level.
The official occupying the post is a Spanish diplomat accountable to the central 
government, rather than the individual CCAAs. Clearly the official nature of the 
relationship between the delegate and the CCAAs is one-sided in that the former 
provides information rather than direct representation. However, the relationship 
between the delegate and the CCAAs has evolved in such as way that the delegate 
also transmits many of the CCAAs’ petitions to the appropriate areas of the 
Spanish permanent delegation. Nevertheless, Catalan nationalists see the creation 
of this post as the implicit state recognition of regionalist rather than nationalist 
demands. They argue that the central government has recognised the potential 
benefits of policy implementation by sub-national authorities without recognising 
the singularity or hecho diferencial of the CCAAs involved. Furthermore, the 
delegado's consultative and informative role does not allow the CCAAs direct 
access to the Council of Ministers.
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Although the 1994 sentence was a set-back for those CCAAs like Catalonia and 
the Basque Country, which saw the ‘direct way’ to EU institutions as the only 
way to secure their place in the process of European integration, the 1996 
govemability pact between CiU/PNV and the PP reignited the demands for 
greater participation. Moreover, the consolidation of the State of Autonomies and 
a changing political culture among Spain’s political elite has led to a fundamental 
transformation in the central government’s attitudes towards CCAA participation 
and representation both in Brussels and in the formulation of Spain’s position in 
EU matters. Spain’s own experiences after more than a decade as an EU member- 
state have also served to weaken long-standing fears of sub-national mobilisations 
and a widely held view that all external activities fall under the exclusive realm of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Collaboration with federal or decentralised states 
such as Germany and Italy has clearly shaped new attitudes among Spain’s 
political elite working within EU institutions. On a more practical level, new 
forms of co-operation with sub-national entities have become more the norm 
across EU member-states and the Spanish government has supported this trend by 
consolidating its institutional and administrative relations with the CCAAs in 
many areas of EU policy.
The Generalitaf s strategy towards enhancing CCAA participation in the process 
of European integration has also evolved over the years. On the one hand, this 
strategy relies on continual references to Catalonia’s ‘right’ as a nation or region 
to participate in the Europeanisation of Spanish politics. Catalan nationalists 
point out the internal participatory mechanisms granted to regions or sub-national 
authorities in other EU member-states following the wave of external 
representative activities developing in the early and mid 1990s. In the case of 
Spain, the Generalitat argues, while CCAAs have been able to establish 
representative offices in Brussels and increase their participation in the 
implementation and monitoring of EU policies, the internal participatory 
mechanisms have not been sufficient to overcome the discrepancy.
On the other hand, the Generalitat has adopted a pragmatic strategy intertwining 
the concepts of subsidiarity and the partnership principle to persuade the central 
government of the benefits surrounding increased sub-national participation in the
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formulation, implementation and monitoring stages of various EU policies. The 
concept of subsidiarity has met with great scepticism by the Spanish central 
government which argues that in itself its practical application is limited. The 
devolution of competencies and the varying degrees of self-government stipulated 
by the 1978 Constitution and Statutes of Autonomy serve as point of reference by 
the Generalitat to justify its actions in policy areas where Catalonia and other 
CCAAs enjoy a high degree of responsibility. The Generalitat has also taken 
great care in highlighting the complementary nature of Catalan activities in 
Brussels. It argues that by defending Catalan interests or by Galicians defending 
Galician interests, the CCAAs are in fact defending Spanish interests. This 
pragmatic strategy serves its own interests, however, by using the central 
government as an intermediary to attain its objectives at the EU level. With the 
awareness that it does not possess the necessary resources or political influences 
to persuade other member-states of its own objectives, the Generalitat employs its 
influence in the central government to develop its own EU policy strategies.
The Generalitat is also very aware that efficient access to the information and 
opportunities at the EU level is highly dependent on the level of organisation and 
resource allocation of each regional representative office. It has thereby invested 
a great deal in reinforcing the Patronat's management structure. The number of 
staff it employs to deal directly with EU issues is extensive. In comparison to the 
Scottish regional council of Strathclyde with a population of 2,296,300 which 
employs 3 employees in its European Unit (Sutcliffe, 1997), the Patronat employs 
approximately 16 persons including lawyers and economists to analyse and 
interpret EU legislative proposals and initiatives in its Brussels office, with many 
more staff in its 4 home offices. It attempts to place as many Catalan officials in 
Council and Commission working groups in Brussels as possible. Due to their 
experience and access to resources, both Catalonia and the Basque Country have 
more access to working groups than the rest of Spain’s CCAA generating a 
substantial discrepancy among the varying origins and loyalties. The enormous 
differences in access to resources do demonstrate the varying levels of political 
presence and influence among sub-national authorities within the EU.
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In retrospect, the creation of the CCAA delegate position in the Spanish 
permanent delegation in Brussels was a compromise solution for the negotiating 
factions in the 1996 govemability pact. The pact also stipulated that the CCAAs 
would be allowed to participate in the working groups of the European 
Commission, not to be extended to the Council of Ministers. Full representation 
of the CCAAs in the Spanish delegation assisting the Council of Ministers in the 
EU presented a series of both practical problems and constitutional ramifications 
which seemed too complicated at the time too deal with. However, the creation of 
the post represented a first step towards the institutionalised recognition of the 
effects that the process of EU integration might have on the CCAAs. This step 
was taken within the constitutional framework of the Spanish political system, an 
ongoing process requiring greater initiatives to address the interests, concerns and 
differences of all seventeen Spanish autonomous communities.
The Basque nationalists including EA and PNV have been more vocal in 
demanding the direct representation of the CCAAs in the Spanish permanent 
delegation in Brussels. Taking the German and Belgian examples, in February 
1998 the Basques demanded full participation of the CCAAs in all those 
ministerial councils discussing issues affecting CCAA competencies, including 
the powerful Councils of ECOFIN and General Affairs. This measure, if 
approved, would mean that Spanish sub-national authorities would follow one of 
the measures established by federal systems: sub-national or regional presence in 
the Council of Ministers, the ultimate decision-making power within the EU. In 
the Belgian cases, sub-national representatives are accountable to their respective 
parliaments. The legislative overload following the 1993 constitutional reforms 
lead to a substantial delay in parliamentary instructions for these delegates, often 
up to two years (El Pals, 4 March 1998). As discussed in the preceding chapter, 
the German case offers a more clear-cut constitutional delineation of 
competencies. The German Lander representative not only represents the 
individual Lander but also represents the German state as a whole. Transferring 
this model to the Spanish case presents a series of difficulties. Appointing the 
CCAA delegate proved to be such a contentious issue in 1996 among the various 
CCAAs, that the Foreign Affairs Ministry took matters into its own hands by 
proposing a candidate, subsequently accepted by all parties. The second problem
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with applying this model to the Spanish case is that of legitimacy. Again, the 
structural weaknesses of the Senate discussed in the preceding chapter are 
obvious. In the German case, the Bundesrat is the institution within which each 
sub-national authority is able to put forth its recommendation and position on a 
certain issue. This is not the case in Spain, where the CCAAs’ bargaining 
position is undermined by the lack of a strong institution capable of channelling 
the varying interests and concerns.
In March 1998, the Mixed Congress-Senate Commission for EU matters agreed to 
the proposal with the support of the PSOE which had modified its original 
position on CCAA participation in EU matters. The proposal stipulated the 
creation of a CCAA representative in the Spanish delegation participating in those 
meetings of the Council of Ministers dealing with matters where the CCAAs have 
exclusive competencies. The position of the CCAA representative would rotate 
regularly. However, the success of these new measures is highly dependent on 
continued collaboration among the various CCAAs. It is here where problems 
arise. If the system is to succeed, with bilateral commissions established between 
the central government and the 'historic' autonomous communities, then this 
arrangement must be accepted by all the CCAAs.
National Rhetoric within a Regionalist Strategy
Although nationalist rhetoric on the process of European integration has already 
been analysed in Chapter 5, the influence of Catalan nationalism is clearly 
illustrated in many of the Generalitat's activities in securing greater participation 
at the EU level. Many of these activities may have a strong pragmatic element but 
many purely reflect a desire to protect Catalan identity and self-government. The 
concept of “Spain is bad, Europe is good” seems to shadow many of the 
Generalitat's initiatives. Thus, it seems ironic that with the process of European 
integration intensifying and the ensuing transfer of competencies and powers to 
Brussels, the Generalitat maintains a firm conviction that anything related to 
Europe entails something positive even if this means surrendering hard fought 
powers.
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Why all the effort then? Harvie (1994) describes the ever-increasing scope of 
activities by sub-national authorities as a new type of ‘subjective and aggressive’ 
regionalism. Catalan officials describe their activities as a reflection of 
Catalonia’s “complexity as a small nation” and obtaining foreign recognition of 
the “sense of being a small nation” as the only viable option . Catalan officials 
also defend Catalonia's activities abroad by citing reasons of "internal survival" or 
"preventing the manipulation of Catalonia's image abroad" . They argue that 
they are setting a precedent for other nationalist parties who will eventually have 
to follow suit. Catalan nationalist rhetoric supports a defence of Europe’s 
collective identities as a motivating factor behind Catalan efforts to shape EU 
policies and secure their own participation. They argue that the final objective is 
not to achieve a federalist European state which would lead to the ‘melting pot’ 
syndrome often described as characterising American society. They promote the 
concept of ‘unity in diversity’ arguing that the recognition of the hecho diferencial 
within the EU’s decision-making framework would not represent a threat of 
fragmentation or the spread of separatism.
Nationalist undertones are clear in the direction taken by the Generalitat in many 
of its policy initiatives at the EU level. Many of these initiatives focus primarily 
on the protection and promotion of minority languages and culture. These include 
the failed effort in the European Parliament in the early 1990s to secure the use of 
Catalan as an official EU language. Another example is the Socrates programme, 
set up in early 1995, which combines the earlier Erasmus and Lingua education 
programmes promoting the exchange and diversification of education and foreign 
language programmes. Securing Catalan representation in the committee proved 
to be particularly satisfactory to Catalan nationalists since the exclusion several 
years earlier of the Catalan language from the Lingua programme by the Council 
of Ministers.
The issue of the Catalan language and its protection and institutionalised 
recognition has preoccupied Catalan nationalists particularly in the European 
Parliament (EP). In 1988, both the Catalan Parliament (Petition 113/88) and the
185 Quotes are from Interview Nos. 5 and 10.
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Parliament of the Balearic Islands (Petition 161/88) petitioned that Catalan be 
declared by the EP as an official language. Although the move failed, the EP did 
recommend in 1990 that the EU's treaties and basic texts be published in Catalan. 
It also approved the inclusion of Catalan in Commission programmes for learning 
EU languages and recommended the use of Catalan by the Commission's offices 
in its written and oral dealings with the public in the regions in question. Before 
that, CiU MEPs joined forces with the IC MEP, Antoni Gutierrez Diaz to draft a 
series of motions on the obstacles to the use of Catalan in the universities and on 
television (Doc. B 2-1323/86), the use of Catalan in certain activities of EU 
institutions (Doc. B 2-247/87) and on the publication of basic EU texts in 
Galician, Basque and Catalan (Doc. B 2-1327/87). In addition, Catalan MEPs 
have worked diligently stressing the use of Catalan in everyday life, even in 
everyday EU life. These efforts include a motion to change the use of place- 
names to Catalan in official documents (Doc. 97/C 373/109)
The protection and promotion of Catalan culture has also been the object of 
nationalist strategy abroad. The Generalitat has also sought representation in 
UNESCO and in all foreign cultural forums including the official Spanish cultural 
institute, the Cervantes Institute. Participation in these organisations is 
theoretically reserved to the Spanish state. The argument for participation 
according to Catalan nationalists is that “the tradition of Catalan nationalism 
contains a cultural basis the expression of which is language”^ /  Pais, 23 January 
1998). It offers as a precedent the cases of Canada, Belgium and Germany. 
Belgium has three Culture Ministers, one from each community (Flemish, 
Walloon and German). In the German case, the Lander representative is chosen 
by the Lander to represent them in UNESCO gatherings. The Catalan proposal 
would be an intermediate solution, with a representative chosen by the Generalitat 
but continuing to form part of the Spanish delegation.
Some Catalan political representatives prefer to shy away from the historic 
differentiations and the references to ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’ and focus instead 
on the importance of the regionalisation of Europe. They contend that for
186 Quotes are from Interview Nos. 8 and 9.
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pragmatic reasons, the regionalisation of the EU will generate more efficient 
policy implementation and monitoring, arguing that the most dynamic sectors of 
EU politics and economies are those which are the most decentralised. As for the 
singularity of Catalonia or its unique status, they argue that the hecho diferencial 
must not be imposed on either Catalan society or on the EU’s decision-making 
process.
Another issue is the change in discourse. The concept of the ‘Europe of the 
Regions’ has been much debated in recent years, particularly in the aftermath of 
the Single European Act and its successor, the Maastricht Treaty. The concept 
itself generates a great deal of confusion and misinterpretation. For those 
resenting the rising influence of the regions and possibly the advent of a European 
federal state, the concept has inspired warnings of the demise of the nation-state. 
It has also led to dire predictions of the subjugation of European states by the 
regions and an increasingly authoritative supranational state. The concept has 
often been re-evaluated and renamed as ‘Europe with the Regions’ so as to 
eliminate any negative connotations (Leonardy, 1996). In the Catalan case, the use 
of the concept of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ seems to have waned in recent years. 
Instead, within Catalan nationalist discourse, references to a ‘Europe of state-less 
nations’ or a ‘Europe of the people’ seem to have become more common place. 
The concept of a ‘Europe of the people’ refers to sub-national authorities being 
the level of government -  with the exception of local authorities -  closest to the 
people and therefore, more capable to articulate citizens’ interests. Thus, the 
ambivalence between regionalism and nationalism both in practice and discourse 
remains an unresolved issue.
Conclusion
Formal representation for the autonomous communities in the process of 
European integration has only recently been approved in Spain (1997) after 
repeated demands by many of the autonomous communities, particularly 
Catalonia and the Basque Country. Before this time, particularly during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, most CCAAs seemed less concerned about the apparent 
loss of competencies that EU membership would bring. Rather than battling out
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these potential conflicts with the central government either through the Senate, 
bilateral negotiations, the Sectoral Conferences or even the Constitutional 
Tribunal, many CCAAs preferred to compensate this loss by establishing an 
official or unofficial presence in Brussels. The nationalist led Generalitat place a 
high degree of confidence in the so-called ‘third way’ through alternative 
institutions such as the Committee of the Regions. What is clear, however, is that 
this strategy has largely been abandoned and there has been a shift towards the 
reformulation of domestic policy-making mechanisms in securing greater 
participatory rights in EU matters.
The mechanisms established during the 1990s to promote greater Catalan 
participation in the process of European integration have had mixed results. The 
Committee of the Regions, after an initial burst of activity by the Generalitat has 
been left to one side for a variety of reasons. These reasons include the 
Committee’s limited powers, the inherent differences between highly centralised 
and decentralised member-states and the regional-municipal divide. Instead, the 
Generalitat's EU strategy has focused on seeking greater participatory rights in 
the Spanish permanent delegation, the Council of Ministers and various working 
groups. Within Spain itself, the Generalitat has also pursued a dual strategy of 
co-operation through the Sectoral Conference and bilateral relations with the 
central government through the bilateral commission. Although the 1996 
govemability pact has certainly helped the ruling CiU coalition to push through 
many of its demands, sufficient progress has been made to prevent any future 
retreat on policy developments should a new government come to power. Despite 
varying opinions on the degree to which the Generalitat should directly be 
involved in EU matters, there is a consensus among Catalan parties on the 
importance of Catalonia’s participation in EU policies187. The shared pro- 
European vision has prevailed in the Generalitat's initiatives over the last decade 
in EU-related matters and has allowed it to pursue its strategy of international 
recognition.
187 Catalan Parliament Resolution 611/V.
221
There are substantial disparities among sub-national authorities within the EU 
with regards to access to channels of European decision-making in terms of 
funding, representation and organisation (Hooghe and Marks, 1995). Catalonia 
has benefited from its privileged position within Spain’s State of Autonomies and 
from a regional government dominated by a pro-European nationalist party since 
the Generalitaf s re-emergence in 1980. The result of this has been that 
Catalonia has evolved into one of the more prominent sub-national actors within 
the European decision-making process. Lynch (1996) argues that the goals and 
objectives of nationalist and regionalist parties have been significantly 
Europeanized as a result of the process of European integration. In the case of 
Catalonia, it is perhaps not the goals that have become Europeanized. Rather, 
Catalonia provides an ideal example where a nationalist-led government has 
adopted a regionalist strategy to secure greater participation in EU matters both by 
independent and co-operative means.
It has been argued that the opportunities and institutions provided by the EU are at 
present the sole means through which the democratic rights of minority groups 
can be addressed vis-a-vis the power and influence exerted by the majority 
(Leonardy, 1996). This is obviously not the case for Catalonia which has been 
able to provide itself with several channels through which it can pursue its 
objectives. These channels include institutional arrangements within which 
Catalonia can provide the leadership for other sub-national authorities seeking 
similar forms of representation and promote the regionalisation of politics and 
public policy. These channels include the Committee of the Regions and the 
Sectoral Conference. Its own bilateral relations instituted with the central 
government through the bilateral commission and govemability pact as well as an 
established policy network in Brussels allow it to pursue its own objectives, more 
nationalist in tone.
Nevertheless, Catalonia faces certain challenges to its dual strategy. Although 
most Catalan parties share CiU’s pro-European vision, parties such as the PP, PSC 
and IC will be more likely to rely on the central government to pursue their 
European objectives. The Sectoral Conference is most likely to remain a 
consultative forum. If Senate reform is pursued to convert this parliamentary
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chamber into a true territorially representative institution, Catalonia’s efforts to 
rely on bilateral relations with the central government and its singularity may be 
undermined. At the EU level, the nationalist objective of transforming the 
Committee of the Regions into a Senate of the Regions or Regional Chamber has 
already seen several frustrated attempts. Catalan efforts to divide Spain’s one- 
constituency arrangements for European Parliament elections have met with 
significant resistance. Nevertheless, if the eventual aim of the EU is political 
union in accordance with federal arrangements, it will have to address regional 
and sub-national demands by distributing legislative powers to the varying levels 
of the political system. Similarly, as the process of European integration 
intensifies, Catalonia will be forced to decide how willing it is to relinquish its 
hard fought competencies to Brussels and whether its present participatory 
arrangements in the EU decision-making process will suffice.
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion
The aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty and the shift in attention to sub-national 
entities with talk of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ or the possible erosion of the 
traditional nation-state led to a surge in research on the subject. This thesis is an 
attempt to contribute to this research by presenting the case study of a region with 
a strong nationalist movement and a high degree of self-government. Space 
limitations have prevented a comparative analysis with other regions in Europe. 
Thus, comparisons with weaker regions, even within Spain itself, are inherently 
limited by the particularities of the Catalan case. Nevertheless, some parallels can 
be drawn from the Catalan case. This is especially true in examining the broader 
question of the transformation of the nation-state.
Europeanisation and regionalisation
As illustrated throughout this thesis, it has often seemed as if the core or the 
symbols of the nation-state have undergone a process of consistent erosion. The 
twin processes of regionalisation and Europeanisation have de-coupled the nation­
state. What the nation-state is and where it is going is central to an understanding 
of how political systems in Western Europe -  at all levels -  will evolve. The 
state, however, continues to play an important role in the European system of 
governance. As the Treaty of Westphalia showed in 1648, the rise of the modem 
state has depended on international agreements (Hirst and Thompson, 1995). 
Arguably, the same can be said for the future of the modem nation-state. How 
political integration at the EU level and how the internal distribution of power are 
forged, will determine how the nation-state will evolve.
Thus, many of the concepts used to define the nation-state must be re-evaluated. 
The application of concepts such as legitimacy or sovereignty needs to be 
qualified in light of this process of change. As the Catalan case illustrates, 
national sovereignty has been re-constituted as a result of the regionalisation and
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Europeanisation of the Spanish political system. Within the context of the 
internal distribution of power, a mutual recognition of this re-constituted 
sovereignty reinforces a stable constitutional and political arrangement. Through 
constant negotiations such as the ones conducted on the State of Autonomies and 
the process of European integration, an agreement can be reached on the degree of 
sovereignty to be shared.
This thesis has attempted to demonstrate how the effects of European integration 
and devolution in the Spanish case also encompass changes at the sub-national 
level. The progress made towards European integration has changed the nature of 
Catalan nationalism. Wilson and Smith (1993) have argued that this progress 
towards integration has led to the birth of new ideas and concepts about regional 
culture, ethnic identities, and nationhood. Besides ‘Europeanising’ the Catalan 
nationalist movement, the process of European integration has also been a key 
motivating factor in moves towwards institutional change. The relationship 
between the actors in this process has been highlighted in this thesis as well as the 
recomposition of governance in the Spanish political system. Thus, the Catalan 
case has demonstrated that as new processes evolve, these have thrown traditional 
methods of policy formulation and implementation into disarray. These processes 
include decentralisation (central government to regional government), 
centralisation (central government to the European Commission), principles of 
subsidiarity (European Commission to regional government), and supra-national 
institutional building.
Europeanisation of Catalan nationalism
A substantial part of this thesis has focused on the European strategies embraced 
by the Catalan nationalist movement and particularly, that of CiU. This thesis has 
attempted to shed light on how the pro-European dimension of mainstream 
Catalan nationalism has evolved over time. In the 1990s, disappointment in the 
performance of the Committee of the Regions may have temporarily diverted 
attention elsewhere as did the negotiations between CiU and the PP following the 
1996 elections. Nevertheless, the advent of Spain’s participation in the single 
currency, opposition to enlargement and continued exposure to the process of
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European integration have led CiU to refocus its energies towards building 
Catalonia’s profile within the EU and securing its position within the Spanish 
political system. It has continued to make progress and has attempted to discover 
innovative methods of securing a greater role for sub-national authorities within 
the EU’s institutional framework. CiU’s leverage within the Spanish political 
system has also allowed it to perform an agenda-setting role in developing Spain’s 
position on European matters. The extent to which this has occurred is difficult to 
measure in quantitative terms but clearly, Catalonia’s contribution has been 
beyond that of many of the other autonomous communities in Spain.
Unlike the Scottish Nationalist Party (Lynch, 1996), CiU has been an active rather 
than reactive participant in the process of European integration. The substantial 
degree of popular support for European matters has facilitated CiU’s activities and 
allowed it to wield considerable leverage in dictating its terms to the ruling party. 
This in turn has allowed it to shape both the domestic and European political 
agendas. Nevertheless, there are potential obstacles that could hinder the success 
achieved by CiU in securing greater participatory rights for itself and other 
autonomous communities in the EU decision-making process. These might 
include:
1) the emergence of an anti-European movement within Catalan society 
concerned with Catalonia’s loss of influence in the process of European 
integration and the ongoing crises within the EU itself (e.g. the resignation 
of all 20 EU Commissioners in early 1999);
2) the failure of EMU;
3) a substantial electoral change eliminating CiU’s possibility of wielding 
power at the domestic political level;
4) the breakup of CiU’s coalition;
5) the replacement of CiU’s political leadership with actors unwilling to 
commit fully to the present EU strategy;
6) increased Europeanisation which has not been met by a parallel process of 
devolution or regionalisation in Spain;
7) a return to fundamentalist nationalist objectives, rejecting the moderate 
nature of the Catalan nationalist movement and embracing a more 
aggressive and less co-operative strategy.
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Despite these potential pitfalls, much progress has been made since Spain’s entry 
into the European Community in 1986. Attitudes towards the participation of 
sub-national authorities in the process of European integration have changed and 
nowhere is this more clear than in Spain. Through the years, direct contact with 
the rest of the EU has not only strengthened the Catalan nationalist movement 
itself but also changed Spanish political culture. This changing political culture 
has favoured changing the existing system of limited participatory measures for 
sub-national authorities in the EU’s policy-making process.
Like its counterpart in the Basque Country, the PNV, CiU has supported European 
integration insofar as it would erode the traditional strength of the nation-state 
with greater emphasis on minority nationalist rights (Letamendia, 1997). Concepts 
such as subsidiarity in EU parlance have been subject to wide interpretation 
among sub-national authorities. On the one hand, the concept benefits regions 
immensely, by theoretically allowing regional governments to claim more power. 
The development of the principle of subsidiarity meant that the welfare of the 
regions was no longer an issue to be dealt with exclusively by the member-states 
themselves. Thus, subsidiarity remains one of the guiding principles of the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty. Basque and Catalan nationalist parties such as the PNV and 
CiU believe that they can reshape the structure and attitudes of the EU so as to 
benefit them individually as regions. These parties have used the principle of 
subsidiarity as a defence for the greater distribution of powers at both the 
European and national levels. As this thesis has tried to explain, the Catalan 
government has sought to increase existing levels of self-government and to 
deepen the process of the devolution of competencies not only within the 
framework of the Spanish state, but also within an association of various member- 
states that is the EU.
In addition, the Catalan government and specifically CiU, with much of its 
economic ideology based on principles of free trade and the adoption of a single 
market, have adopted the position that as greater European economic integration 
evolves, economic interdependence between Catalonia and the rest of Spain will 
diminish (Diez Medrano, 1995). For Catalonia, the EU has offered the benefits of
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a large single market and generous regional subsidies. In addition, by reinforcing 
democratic practices and the rules of the free market doctrine, EU membership 
has helped secure economic reform not only at the regional level, but also within 
other regions of Spain. EU membership has forced Spain to adopt an enormous 
amount of competition rules and market regulations, compelling it to embark in 
much-needed structural reform, the results of which have clearly benefited 
Catalonia. Furthermore, joining the EU has compelled Spain to pass the political 
tests of democracy and to respect the minority cultures within its borders.
Regional Policy
The issue of EU regional policy is one that has not been considered at any length 
in this thesis due to space limitations. Its relevance to the issues discussed should 
not be underestimated, however. The greatest problem that the regions have faced 
with regards to EU regional policy seems not necessarily the amount of funding 
available. Instead, most sub-national authorities benefiting from EU regional 
subsidies are not provided with sufficient financial autonomy in order to ensure 
the most efficient and equitable distribution of public resources. In addition, 
regional interests are often underrepresented in the European Community’s 
decision-making process. Although in principle the European Parliament would 
be the ideal institution to channel regional interests since it is directly elected, its 
weakness vis a vis the more powerful Council of Ministers prevents it from 
adequately representing the EU’s sub-national authorities. In the case of Spain, 
the additional shortcoming is that Spain is considered a single political unit, 
thereby undermining the potential electoral strength of regional political parties. 
Another persistent problem until recently has been the fact that regional policy 
was only considered important insofar that regional disparities could slow down 
the integration process. Finally, policies emanating from Brussels were not 
considered to be as important as those stemming from central governments. Until 
recently, regions did not feel the impact of EU policies and therefore did not take 
these policies too seriously. Nevertheless, increased allocations from the EU 
general budget do represent a greater emphasis on regional policy, rather than area 
specific policies directed towards individual member-states. The EU’s regional 
budget increased from 75 million ECUs in 1975 (1.5% of the total budget) to
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4,704 million ECUs in 1990 (10.1% of the total budget). Despite the growing 
influence of sub-national authorities in EU regional policy, the primary decision­
makers have continued to be the member-states, most notably through the Council 
of Ministers, through national policies and legislative institutions (Conzelman, 
1995). Institutions such as the AER or the CoR were created to appease the 
increasing pressure exerted by the regions demanding a greater role in regional 
policy formulation.
The Europeanisation of sub-national politics
What the case of regional policy demonstrates is that, as the process of European 
integration has intensified, sub-national authorities have become more aware of 
the potential benefits reaped from the transfer of competencies to the EU level. 
Most of the literature on the empowering of sub-national authorities in the process 
of European integration has focused on the example of regional policy. This 
thesis has deliberately avoided broaching the subject in order to analyse the 
process by which sub-national authorities in Spain have secured more 
participatory rights in the process of European integration. As outlined in this 
thesis, this process involves a re-think of how the concept of sovereignty is 
applied in describing political systems increasingly being subject to pressures 
from above and below.
As the Catalan case has illustrated, the issue of sovereignty has been a cause of 
considerable debate within Catalan political circles. Although the early 1990s 
were marked by increasing manifestations against the continued loss of 
sovereignty by member-states, issues of integration are treated separately within 
the Catalan nationalist movement from those of sovereignty. For the Catalan 
nationalist movement, much more important issues to contend with include those 
of cultural and national identity, rather than the debate on the potential loss of 
national sovereignty, highlighting the cultural determinism inherent in the Catalan 
nationalist discourse. From a cultural pluralist approach, this would lead to the 
conclusion that the Catalan nationalist movement has been intent on defeating 
state-influenced centralist tendencies, both within the confines of the Spanish state 
and at the supranational level, by encouraging the development of multi-cultural
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or even multi-national states. Thus, identity is used as a political resource to 
combat the inherent demand imposed by the nation-state, the confirmation of a 
single identity. This does not constitute the destruction of the nation-state but 
entails a fundamental reinterpretation of the concept. According to this rationale, 
continued administrative decentralisation and the strengthening of regional 
political institutions may divert attention away from national governments and 
bring Europe “closer to its people” as the Committee of the Regions has tried to 
emphasise. Integration has had such an impact on the decision-making and policy 
implementation processes that there has been a move away from the static 
centralised administrative structures and a move towards the development of 
regional administrative institutions. Thus, nationalist movements such as CiU are 
moving away from the traditional concepts of political sovereignty and prefer to 
focus on economic sovereignty, controlling the public purse strings, and gaining 
more control in areas such as health and education.
Regions with strong nationalist movements such as Catalonia and the Basque 
country are unlikely to see integration as a threat to their development. In recent 
years, Catalonia in particular has attempted to alter the protectionist tendencies of 
its neighbours in Spain. For the Catalan nationalist movement, European 
integration will lead to an increase in economic interdependence. Catalan 
nationalists see the increasing free market tendencies as benefiting the region’s 
economy, particularly if the EU is willing to subsidise development and 
modernisation projects. In the past, CiU has tended to be more pro-European than 
its other Northern European counterparts by realising that without access to 
European regional funds, Catalonia will suffer from restricted economic 
development, budget constraints, and lacklustre foreign investment.
Perhaps more so than its Basque counterpart, the Catalan nationalist movement 
has accepted the high degree of economic interdependence existing between 
Catalonia and the rest of Spain. By acknowledging this, parties such as CiU now 
seek to achieve political interdependence. To a great extent, this has already been 
achieved through full participation in the Spanish political process. Greater 
interdependence is seen as a political advantage because it would allow Catalan 
nationalists to gain greater political control over economic development. In a
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sense, the rationale behind this strategy is similar to that behind the European 
integration movement itself: first, set out to achieve control over the economic 
sphere, then proceed with political integration. As a result, the Catalan nationalist 
movement has embraced European integration by supporting political integration 
into the European Union and seeking political autonomy within their own states at 
the same time.
This pro-European strategy has allowed the Catalan nationalist movement to use 
the EU as a forum to define its national and international identities. This has 
contributed to the further transformation of the concept of the nation-state among 
researchers as well as a functional reinterpretation of the concept of sovereignty. 
The shift towards European integration “not only threatens the state’s sovereignty, 
it strengthens the EC’s role as arbiter of international and inter-regional 
integration, further calling into question the degree to which joining the EC has 
transformed or reduced national and/or governmental sovereignty”188. In essence, 
the EU has proved to be a support system for regions seeking greater autonomy. 
The Commission's support for increased contact with sub-national authorities in 
areas such as regional policy merely reinforces the legitimacy of regionalism. By 
doing so and in its efforts to find its own identity, the process of European 
integration has challenged state sovereignty.
The question remains however, whether the EU will manage to construct its own 
trademark sovereignty, something that has never been successfully attempted. 
While interpretations of sovereignty are being re-constituted, sub-national 
authorities have still not managed to secure a powerful role in the EU decision­
making framework. In its search for a definition of its own identity as a supra­
national organisation, the EU has not allowed regions to defend their own identity 
as well as establishing a new role for themselves in the EU decision-making 
framework (Balcells, 1996). Instead of seeking support from the regions, the EU 
has favoured the interests of small member-states vis-a-vis larger member-states, 
further hindering European integration. Nationalist rhetoric advocates the 
destruction of the traditional concept of nation-state and that states must be
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created based on historical territories and languages, leading to a greater sense of
European unity. The rationale behind this is that “priority must be given to the
cultural values of territorial communities with a language of their own over the
expansionist, authoritarian values of State nationalism which cannot serve as a
1 80foundation for politically united Europe” . Balcells proposes an alternative 
framework by suggesting the establishment in the EU of the Swiss model of 
confederation in which various communities are assimilated, despite territorial, 
cultural and linguistic differences.
Cultural pluralism
The centrality of cultural and linguistic factors within the Catalan nationalist 
strategy has been highlighted throughout the thesis. By linking the past and future 
of Catalan society and culture, the Catalan nationalist movement has successfully 
established itself as a major player in the Spanish political system. Indeed, it is 
this link between past and future achievements, a sense of historic consciousness 
and continuity inherent in the moderate nature of the movement, which has 
characterised the success of the Catalan nationalist movement. The key to the 
ongoing success has been the multifaceted approach towards Catalan identity, 
through dual or multiple identity, which has been able to incorporate traditionally 
isolated sections of Catalan society. Catalan identity has remained open to a loose 
interpretation of common values and ideals continuously subject to change over 
time. It has done so by rejecting any serious aspirations to self-determination or 
state-formation. Within the boundaries of its territory, the Catalan nationalist 
movement has remained inclusive and has demonstrated flexibility by 
encouraging others to adapt. It has also demonstrated the capacity to adapt to the 
demands and constraints posed by the globalisation of the economy (Keating, 
1997).
1 QQ
Wilson, T. and Smith, M. (1993). Cultural Change and the New Europe. Boulder: Westview
Press, Inc., pp. 13-14.
189 Balcells, A. (1996). Catalan Nationalism, (ed.) Geoffrey J. Walker, London: MacMillan Press 
Ltd., p. 198.
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Thus, the concept of national identity remains an inclusive one, both in policy and 
ideological terms. Catalan nationalist discourse emphasises the notion that 
“anyone who lives in Catalonia and wishes to belong is Catalan.” This has been 
particularly important in view of the traditionally high immigration levels in 
Catalonia. Moderate nationalist ideology which has encouraged the integration of 
newcomers has led to some authors to describe Catalan nationalism as pragmatic 
nationalism or integrationist regionalism (Conversi, 1997). As highlighted in 
Chapters 3 and 5, Catalan culture and language are the two central components of 
Catalan identity190 although the issue of language and specifically linguistic policy 
has proved to be increasingly divisive in recent years. Opposition parties such as 
the PSC and PP have been able to capitalise on the feelings of discontent and 
discrimination among many sectors of Catalan society. Specifically, the PSC and 
its presidential candidate Pasqual Maragall have promoted an alternative vision of 
Catalan nationalism or Catalanism which does not have language as its central 
axis (El Pais, 9 September 1998). Thus, the controversy surrounding Catalan 
linguistic policy could mark a turning point for the electoral success and relative 
consensus enjoyed by the Catalan nationalist movement in the first two decades of 
the transition.
Despite these potential setbacks, the Catalan nationalist movement has continued 
to develop its nation-building project. Although Keating (1997) argues that a 
successful nationalist movement is one which has recognised the limits of 
sovereignty, the Catalan nationalist movement has on the one hand progressively 
secured its authority within its own territorial and society base. On the other 
hand, it has also secured greater authority within the Spanish state by pushing the 
limits of and encouraging new interpretations of sovereignty. This has been a 
characteristic of regionalisation and European integration within Western Europe 
itself. In part, this has been attributable to astute political negotiations by its 
leadership in recent years by engaging in pacts with mainstream parties in power 
including a pact with the PSOE in 1993 and with the PP in 1996. By extracting 
concessions from the state and building its reputation and in the European Union, 
the Catalan nationalist movement has successfully maintained the rhythm of the
190 As stressed by Jordi Pujol, the “identity of Catalonia is in great part linguistic and cultural.”
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process of nation-building. In addition, it has managed to secure the legitimacy of 
its policy goals both at home and abroad. Accordingly, one of the common 
strategies among Catalan parties, both nationalist and regional branches of 
Spanish parties, is “competition for control of the State and that State is Spain”191. 
Again, the moderate nature of the Catalan nationalist movement is represented by 
these parties within a stable system, striving to attain policy outputs both at the 
state and European levels. Although the strategies may differ, the objectives of 
protection of Catalan identity, language and culture and the encouragement of 
greater economic relations both within the Spanish state and at the European level 
are shared among all the parties.
Nevertheless, parties such as the PSC, ERC, IC and the PI have increasingly 
distanced themselves from the EU strategy adopted by CiU. Various reasons 
account for this move. First, CiU has managed to secure its presence in many of 
the institutions involved in EU matters, such as the Patronat and the Committee of 
the Regions, much to the dislike of other Catalan parties. The transformation of 
the PSC and the influential presence of Pasqual Maragall has resolved many of 
the traditional problems faced by Catalan socialists such as reconciling 
Catalanism and leftist political ideology. This change has allowed it to gain 
greater confidence in participating in the nationalist debate. More importantly, 
there is an underlying ideological ambiguity within nationalist rhetoric leading to 
a general sense of confusion as to the true reasons behind CiU’s strategy. In other 
words, does this strategy contribute to the regionalisation of Europe or Catalonia’s 
own nation-building process? The ‘nationalist ambivalence’ which characterised 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century Catalan nationalism seems to have 
persisted with discrepancies within the movement itself on the question of 
Catalonia as a ‘nation’ or a ‘region’(see Table 8.1).
(See Pi, R., ed., 1996, p. 176.)
191 Marfany, J. (1995) La Culture del Catalanisme. Editorial Empuries: Barcelona, p. 102.
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Table 8.1
A Region or a Nation?
Question: What term do you prefer to use when referring to Catalonia? Is it a
region or a nation?
Concept Percentage
A region 59
A nation 36
N/A 5
Source: CIS Opinion Survey I, 1996
Despite the continued persistence of this ‘nationalist ambivalence’, what is clear is 
the consolidation of several key concepts employed by the Catalan nationalist 
movement in the Catalan consciousness. Issues such as identity, a sense of 
differentiation and the importance of the role of Catalonia within Spain, although 
not necessarily universally agreed upon, have enshrined themselves in Catalan 
society. This core element of the Catalan nationalist ideology, and one employed 
in nationalist mobilisation, is the continual emphasis on the perception of 
Catalonia as a nation different from other regions or ‘historic nationalities’ which 
make up the plurinational state of Spain. This element is shared by other 
nationalist parties in Spain192 for which nationalist ideology is based on the 
defence of a distinctive identity. Consequently, “self-awareness of their own 
differential origin is a permanent incentive for the Basque Country, Catalonia and 
Galicia to maintain their institutional distinctiveness with relation to the rest of the 
Spanish regions”193.
Although employed in Catalan nationalist discourse, these ideals do not 
necessarily translate to the strategic level of policy-making as the example of the 
EU strategy illustrates. Thus, if the demand of greater autonomy within the state 
and the EU [a regionalist objective] is combined with the potential goal of
192 Examples of nationalist parties employing notions of historic differentiation and a distinctive 
identity include the obvious Basque and Galician parties including the Bloque Nacional Gallego 
(BNG), Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), PNV, and Herri Batasuna (HB); as well as the less obvious 
examples of the Coalicion Canaria (CC) and Union del Pueblo Navarro respectively representing 
the Canary Islands and Navarra.
193 Moreno, L. (1995) p. 25.
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independence [a nationalist objective], the logical consequence is that there is a 
constant demand for an increasing number of competencies. Following this line 
of reasoning, the logical conclusion of this process is when there are no remaining 
competencies to adopt and all the functions of the state have been transferred to 
the European level. If resources and efforts are directed towards the continuity of 
this process, one could only assume that independence is the final objective. 
However, this objective clearly does not seem to be the case in the Catalan case. 
Over the years, Catalan nationalism has consistently reiterated its desire to 
integrate both the Catalan and Spanish economies into the global economy and to 
appease a majority of Catalan society by rejecting any secessionist aspirations. 
On the basis of this analysis, the present prospects for an independent Catalonia 
remain distant.
Catalan nationalism and European integration
Yet, as the State of Autonomies consolidates and the process of European 
integration intensifies it is not clear if the mainstream Catalan nationalist 
movement will remain as cohesive as under the leadership of Jordi Pujol. The 
importance attached to the legacy left by his leadership when he is out of office 
may be disputed. Perhaps his role will remain of secondary importance, if such 
considerations play a role at all in an analysis of the development of the Catalan 
nationalist movement. This raises the question of to what extent political 
personalities have played a role in the Catalan case to pursue the Catalan 
nationalists’ strategy of securing greater participatory rights in the process of 
European integration. As Chapter 5 highlighted, the growing divergence of 
opinions expressed by Catalan government and party officials on an appropriate 
EU strategy for Catalonia clearly reflects significant discrepancies on the 
importance attached to Catalan participation in the process of European 
integration. Ironically, the fact that European integration presupposes the 
increasing transfer of competencies from both the sub-national and national to the 
supra-national level seemingly does not give rise to concern within Catalan 
political circles.
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Nevertheless, Catalonia has been able to compensate for the loss of sovereignty 
derived from the supranationalisation of competencies, at least in some measure. 
This has been achieved through the establishment of informal and formal 
participatory measures in the process of European integration. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that as the process of European integration intensifies and more 
competencies are transferred to the EU level, Catalonia and other Spanish 
autonomous communities will in some way want to be compensated. This 
compensation will have to come in the form of greater participation in EU 
matters. The justification for this compensation can be made in terms of 
nationalist rhetoric. However, a more logical explanation can be derived from the 
issue of administrative and bureaucratic efficiency. If the process of European 
integration is to maintain a certain standard of efficiency, this will depend to a 
great extent to the measures used to incorporate the interests and experiences of 
those responsible for policy implementation, as is the case of sub-national 
authorities.
The Catalan nationalist movement’s EU strategy has become more moderate in 
practice. While nationalist rhetoric emphasises the recognition of Catalonia as a 
“nation” within Europe, in practice this strategy is distinctly more regionalist in 
nature. The demands for increased participation in EU matters have focused on 
improving institutionalised mechanisms of co-operation through both the Sectoral 
Conferences and bilateral relations. Accordingly the measures demanded include:
1) full co-operation and increased two-way flow of information in Community 
processes;
2) co-responsibility in the decision-making processes;
3) the presence of the autonomous communities in the Spanish delegations, EU 
institutions and the COREPER;
4) institutional recognition of the existing plurinational character and hecho 
diferencial within the European framework;
5) recognition of the right of the autonomous communities to maintain a foreign 
policy of a cultural and commercial nature;
6) the establishment of mechanisms for the active participation of the 
autonomous communities in the composition, demand and distribution of 
structural and cohesion funds.
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The achievements in addressing the issue of participatory rights for Catalonia and 
the other Spanish autonomous communities in EU matters have not yet resolved 
the conflict between: 1) those who argue that only the central government can 
represent the Spanish state in its entirety in EU matters and 2) those that who 
believe that only sub-national authorities can represent the differing cultures and 
nationalities co-existing within the Spanish state. Nevertheless, the achievements 
have certainly helped overcome some of the obstacles. Like the process of 
European integration, the process of consolidating sub-national participation will 
require a constant search for consensus. Otherwise, the Spanish position in 
Brussels may find itself weakened by the constant conflict within the Spanish 
state. If the Spanish state’s representation abroad is not to be undermined, it is 
crucial that the autonomous communities participate in elaborating the position of 
the Spanish government in the EU and in applying EU legislation. By 
institutionalising the participatory rights of the autonomous communities, both in 
practical and constitutional terms, the key role of sub-national authorities in the 
Spanish state will be recognised.
Europe a la carte and Autonomy a la carte
This thesis has attempted to highlight the importance that the processes of 
regionalisation and European integration have had on the nature of nation-state. 
The case of Catalonia illustrates that sub-national authorities are unlikely to form 
an alternative to the nation-state. Catalonia relies on the same sources of law, the 
international economic order and collective security relied upon by the Spanish 
state. However, what is occurring is a shift away from the nation-state as a central 
unit of analysis when describing political systems in Western Europe. There is a 
growing recognition of the weaknesses of the nation-state while it is 
acknowledged that the state will not disappear. In functional terms, its role as a 
mediator or filter continues to be important. Nevertheless, it will need to adapt to 
the pluralism of modem society be it from below or from above.
The Catalan case clearly demonstrates how these twin processes have evolved 
simultaneously. This thesis has attempted to underline the legal-constitutional,
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political and sociological implications of this transformation. Examples of policy 
areas in which the Catalan government has effectively asserted its objectives at a 
European level by succeeding in bypassing the national level, have begun to
194emerge .
Specifically however, the Catalan case has generated some interesting 
conclusions. Most importantly, the Catalan nationalist movement has employed a 
regionalist strategy for nationalist objectives in the area of European integration. 
After a period of initial enthusiasm in the late 1980s and first half of the 1990s, 
Catalan nationalists have opted for a dual strategy, co-operating with the central 
government while maintaining active participation in EU institutions. This policy 
has been aided by the pragmatic nature of the nationalist movement, with roots in 
a tradition of modernising the political and economic structures of the Spanish 
state. This tradition is also reflected in the movement’s participation within the 
Spanish State of Autonomies. As the conceptual framework of this thesis has 
attempted to highlight, the impact of the process of European integration on sub­
national politics must be taken into account within the broader context of 
democratic consolidation, economic modernisation and the institutionalisation of 
new types of political structures and frameworks. It is therefore important to 
contextualise European integration as one of several variables and particularly, its 
evolving nature.
The consolidation of the Spanish State of Autonomies is occurring simultaneously 
with process of European integration. The Europeanisation of the Catalan 
nationalist movement has developed exposed by these two processes. Recent 
years, however, have seen growing divisions within the Catalan political party 
system on the question of Europe, specifically with regards to Catalonia's role in 
it. Since the respective 1993 and 1996 govemability pacts with the PSOE and PP 
governments, Catalan nationalists have turned away from the Committee of the
194 One example would the Catalan government’s successful attempt in November 1997 at 
persuading the Commission to initiate legislation regarding the labelling of products in the other 
‘co-official’ languages of Spain: Catalan, Basque and Galician. Along the same lines and 
coinciding with the Commission’s consideration of the Generalitat’s initiative, the controversial 
law of the Catalan language was being debated in the European Parliament, a move initiated by the 
Spanish government (See El Pals, November 7, 1997).
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Regions as a viable institution within which their demands at the European level 
can be articulated. Indeed, they have managed to establish a direct line of 
communication to Madrid and from there to Brussels while maintaining a myriad 
of links with other Spanish and EU sub-national authorities. Where this strategy 
will lead is difficult to determine but nonetheless raises the importance of the 
issues of regionalisation and European integration as part of a new political 
agenda within Catalonia, Spain, and the European Union. From a normative point 
of view, there is clear need to develop new conceptual frameworks to explain the 
concurrent development of supranationalism and new forms of nationalism, 
adjusting to new institutional and constitutional frameworks. This type of 
nationalism no longer requires the construction of a nation-state to obtain 
autonomy and instead seeks to promote a new form of non-territorial form of 
public recognition in new boundary-free multicultural space at the supranational 
level. This thesis is a first attempt to construct this alternative conceptual 
framework.
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Appendix I
Catalan Nationalism: Chronology of Events
Marriage of Ramon Berenguer IV and Petronila of Aragon 
created the Kingdom of Catalonia and Aragon, a type of 
confederation
Creation of the first Catalan Corts 
Union of the Crowns of Castille and Aragon 
Crowns are joined to form Kingdom of Spain 
Battle of Els Segadors
Peace treaty signed between Kings Louis XTV and Felipe IV 
leading to the loss of Catalan territories of present-day France 
Abolition of the Generalitat 
Decree of Nova Planta 
Restauration of the Joe Florals
Club dels Federalistes is established and a federalist movement 
begins to spread around Catalonia 
Federal Pact of Tortosa
Failed attempt to declared a Catalan State in Barcelona
Publication of Las Nacionalidades by Francesc Pi i Margall
First Congres Catalanista is held
Centre Catala is established by Valenti Almirall
Memorial de Greuges is presented to King Alfonso XU
Publication of Lo Catalanisme bv Valenti Almirall
Lliga de Catalunya is established
Publication of La tradicio catalana bv Jose Torras i Bages
Unio Catalanista is established
Bases de Manresa are approved
Centre Nacional Catala is established
Lliga Regionalista is established
Solidaritat Catalana is established
Publication of La Nacionalitat Catalana bv Enric Prat de la Riba
Centre Nacionalista Republica is estabslihed
Institut d ’Estudis Catalans is established
Events of the Tragic Week unfold
Unio Federal Nacionalista Republicana is established
Constitution of the Mancomunitat of Catalonia is approved
Partit Republica Catala is established
A campaign demanded a statute of autonomy for Catalonia
develops
Accio Catalana and Estat Catalana are established
Unio Socialista de Catalunya is established
General Primo de Rivera carries out coup, dictatorship begins
The Mancomunitat is dismantled by the Primo de Rivera regime
Assemblea Constituent del Separatisme Catala is held in Havana
Publication of Per la concordia by Francesc Cambo
Publication of L’altra concordia bv Jaume Bofill i Mates
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya is established
Francesc Macia proclaims the Catalan Republic
Generalitat is re-established in Catalonia with Macia as
President
Unio Democratica de Catalunya is established
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1932
1934
1936
1938
1939
1940 
1945
1953
1954 
1971
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Referendum takes place on the Estatut de Nuria
Catalan Statute of Autonomy is approved
Catalan Parliament is established
Partit Nacionalista Catala is established
Lluis Companys is elected President of the Generalitat
Lluis Companys declares a Catalan State within a Federal
Republic of Spain
Catalan Autonomy Statute is suspended
Generalitat returns
Outbreak of the Spanish Civil War
Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC) is established
Catalan Autonomy Statute is repealed
Government of the Generalitat goes into exile
Front Nacional de Catalunya is established
Generalitat President Lluis Companys is executed
Moviment Socialista de Catalunya and Consell Nacional de la
Democracia Catalana are established
Consell Nacional Catala is established in exile
Josep Tarradellas is declared President of the Generalitat in exile
Assemblea de Catalunya is established
Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya is established
Congres de Cultural Catalana is held
Death of General Francisco Franco
Consell de Forces Politiques de Catalunya is established
Partit Socialista de Catalunya is established
Oppositions forces around Spain under a joint platform as
Coordinacion Democratica
Adolfo Suarez is designated President
Celebrations of the Diada (September 11) take place in several 
areas of Catalonia
First democratic general elections held in Spain since the Second 
Republic
The Diada is celebrated officially for the first time since the 
Second Republic with more than 1 !4 million people 
demonstrating in Barcelona
Return of Josep Tarradellas and the reinstatement of the 
Generalitat
Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya is established 
Referendum on the Spanish Constitution approved 
Catalan and Basque Statutes of Autonomy are approved 
Nacionalistes d ’Esquerra and Indepentistes dels Paisos Catalans 
are established
Constitutional Tribunal is established
Catalan Parliament is elected with Jordi Pujol as President of the 
Generalitat in the first Catalan elections since the Second 
Republic
Terrorist group Terra Lliure is formed 
Crida a la Solidaritat is created 
Attempted coup by Colonel Tejero
Legislation approved by the Spanish Cortes regulating the use 
and representations of the flags and symbols of the state and the 
autonomous communities
PSOE wins general elections and Felipe Gonzalez is elected 
Spanish Prime Minister
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1983
1984
1986
1987
1988
1992
1993
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Llei de Normalitzacio Lingiiistica is approved by the Catalan 
Parliament
Jordi Pujol is reelected President of the Generalitat
Spain joins the European Community
European Parliament elections held
The Catalan Millenium is celebrated
Jordi Pujol is reelected President of the Generalitat
Barcelona Summer Olympic Games take place
Jordi Pujol is reelected President of the Generalitat
Govemability pact is signed between Convergencia i Unio (CiU)
and the ruling PSOE
Jordi Pujol is reelected President of the Generalitat 
General elections held
Govemability pact is signed between CiU and the Partido 
Popular (PP)
Jose Maria Aznar of the PP is sworn in as Spain’s Prime Minister 
Llei del Catala is approved by the Catalan Parliament 
Ceasefire declared in the Basque Country by ETA on September 
16
European Parliament elections held in June 1999 
Elections in Catalonia held in October 1999
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Interview
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
Appendix II 
Interviews
Name and Position
Ferran Poudevida
Director, International Committee
Partit per l’lndependencia
Casimir Dalmau
Director, Patronat Catala Pro Europa
Antoni Bayona
Director, Institut d’Estudis Autonomies
Salvador Sedo
Secretary, International Relations 
Unio Democratica de Catalunya
Jesus Maestro
Political Secretary, Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya
Nicolau Gonzalez 
Head, International Division 
Centre Intemacional Escarre per les 
Minories Etniques i les Nacions 
(CIEMEN)
Joan Vallve, Member of the European 
Parliament
Convergencia Democratica de 
Catalunya
Date
7 January 1998
14 December, 1998
16 December, 1998
16 December, 1998
18 December, 1998
19 December, 1998
21 December, 1998
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Montserrat Riba,
Head, European Affairs Section 
Directorate General for Foreign 
Relations
Generalitat de Catalunya 
Dr Pau Puig i Scotoni 
Adviser
Directorate General for Foreign 
Relations
Generalitat de Catalunya 
Javier Sanchez
National Delegate for the Sectoral 
Conference for Europe and Abroad 
[Delegado Nacional de la Comision 
Sectoral de Europa e Intemacional] 
Partit Socialista de Catalunya 
Carlos Gasoliba i Bohm 
Member of the European Parliament, 
Convergencia Democratica de 
Catalunya,
Secretary General, Patronat Catala Pro 
Europa
Aureli Argemi
General Secretary
Centre Intemacional Escarre per les
Minories Etniques i les Nacions
(CIEMEN)
Antoni Gutierrez Diaz
Member of the European Parliament
Iniciativa per Catalunya
Imma Buldu
Director, Patronat Catala Pro Europa 
Bmssels Delegation
Artizone
Delegate for the Autonomous 
Communities in the Spanish Permanent 
Delegation in the EU 
[Consejero Autonomico de la 
Delegation Permanente ante la UE]
21 December, 1998
21 December, 1998
23 December, 1998
23 December, 1998
23 December, 1998
24 December, 1998
12 January, 1999
12 January, 1999
Appendix III 
Tables
Table 1
Question: According to the following scale, where would you place yourself?
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Only Spanish 12 11 12 12 13 12 13
More Spanish 
than Catalan
6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Equal 43 47 44 39 44 40 47
More Catalan 
than Spanish
22 21 23 22 23 23 20
Only Catalan 15 14 13 19 13 16 13
NS/NC 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
Table 2
Question: With regard to the Spanish state, which to you think Catalonia should be?
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
A region of Spain 17 19 15 21 13 10
An autonomous 
community of 
Spain
47 40 39 43 45 55
A state within a 
federal Spain
14 17 19 16 15 14
An independent 
state
19 18 23 17 22 16
Other 0 1 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 3 4 3 2 4 4
No response 1 1 1 1 0 1
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Table 3
Question: With regard to the Spanish state, which to you think Catalonia should be?
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Autonomous 24 20 21 28 20 26 24
General 36 41 44 38 45 37 43
Municipal 12 13 10 8 7 12 11
European 8 5 6 7 7 5 5
All equal 14 15 13 14 15 15 14
None 5 4 3 3 4 3 4
Don’t know/no 
response
1 3 3 2 2 2 0
Table 4
Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following concepts: Nationalism
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Agree 41 38 41 43 44 41
Disagree 30 36 31 32 27 34
Don’t care 22 17 18 19 19 16
Don’t know/No 
response
6 8 10 6 9 9
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Table 5
Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following concepts: Independence for 
Catalonia
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Agree 35 31 37 35 36 29
Disagree 50 53 50 49 52 56
Don’t care 11 11 9 14 10 11
Don’t know/No 
response
4 5 5 3 3 4
Table 6
Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following concepts: Autonomy for 
Catalonia
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Agree 78 71 78 72 80 80
Disagree 13 19 13 17 11 11
Don’t care 8 6 6 8 6 7
Don’t know/No 
response
2 4 3 2 3 2
Table 7
Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following concepts: Federalism
1991
Agree 31
Disagree 31
Don’t care 15
Don’t know/No 
response
23
248
Table 8
Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “The Spanish 
democracy has not reached the level of European democracies?”
1995 1996
Agree 61 51
Disagree 26 31
Don’t know/no 
response
12 18
Table 9
Question: Do you feel more European or more Spanish?
1995
More European 23
More Spanish 62
Equal 12
Don’t know 3
No response 1
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Table 10
Question: Do you feel more European or more Spanish? 1996
Only Spanish 17
More Spanish than European 26
Equally Spanish and European 43
More European than Spanish 8
Only European 5
Don’t know 1
No response 2
Data carried out 1990-1996 by the Institut de Ciencies Politiques i Socials at the 
Autonomous University of Barcelona
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